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THE
JAPANESE IN KOREA
EXTRACTS FROM
THE KOREA REVIEW

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EDITOR

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PREFACE.

The management of the KOREA REVIEW puts out the following extracts from that magazine, to form a connected statement of actual conditions in Korea.

To anyone who may see this pamphlet we urge the necessity of a full and open discussion of the question. Not only Korea is interested. It is well to know what Japan is capable of doing outside her own natural sphere. There is no object-lesson which can teach this more clearly and definitely than her handling of Korea.

Japan is to be commended for her energy and spirit. ~~She has done great things but when she steps outside~~ her legitimate interests she demonstrates an utter lack of those qualities which make her a safe teacher or leader of the Far East. None of the other Far Eastern peoples have passed through a feudal state as Japan has done and this, for one reason, makes it impossible for her to become a criterion for these other peoples. She did it in her way. They must do it in their way. This is a fact which Japan does not understand or at any rate ignores. She is too young to be a safe guide to any other nation. Her predominance in the Far East is a distinct menace to the peace of the world just as the ambition of the first Napoleon was. Unless the Powers are willing to witness a complete upheaval and transformation of political and commercial conditions in Asia they must awake to the importance of this problem.

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THE JAPANESE IN KOREA.

FROM THE KOREA REVIEW.

Japan as a Colonizer.

One of the leading Japanese foreign papers recently contained what purported to be, and doubtless was, a digest of remarks made by Baron Kaneko in America on what he called the "Great political question of the twentieth century"—namely Colonization. After remarking that "there is little opportunity or inducement for colonization in the cold latitudes" he adds that in the Pacific Islands, Asia, India, Africa and South America there is an immense field of endeavor; and he makes bold to add that "it is on these lands that the eyes of the world's statesmen are fixed."

Now we venture the opinion that this is true only of the statesmen of a very few countries. Take America, whose statesmen are at least of average ability. We very much doubt whether there are half a dozen of them interested in the matter of colonizing any of the lands enumerated. Surely the work of the United States in the Philippines would not indicate any desire to colonize those islands. The activities of American statesmanship have been rather to lead the people of those islands to develop the resources of their land themselves. To this end witness the enormous number of teachers sent there. They are not colonizers in the sense intended by Baron Kaneko.

If he had said that statesmen are keenly alive to the importance of securing markets for the products of their respective countries in these other lands he would have been far nearer the mark,

but such an ambition includes every country. England, America, Germany want trade in every country, the great as well as the small, the strong as well as the weak.

It seems to us little less than absurd to say that India forms an immense field for colonization. It already has a population of nearly 300,000,000, and colonization of that country by others would simply mean the displacement of just so much of the native population, the alienation of just so much wealth and the cutting off of just so much opportunity for native industry.

Baron Kaneko's remarks amount to the cold-blooded proposition that the aim of modern statesmen is to seize upon territory not their own and use it for the expansion of selfish interests at the expense of the natives of those lands. We repudiate this slander *in toto*. There may be some small souls who have such a narrow view of life and of history as this but we sincerely believe they are the great exception.

Baron Kaneko is evidently speaking from what he conceives to be the standpoint of the Japanese people. It might be worth while to ask why it is that Japan wants to find an outlet for surplus population. We come face to face with a paradox at the very start for if there is anything evidently true about Japan it is that she aspires to become a great manufacturing and distributing center like England. If so she cannot spare a single man or woman. The rapid growth of her industries demands that people stay at home rather than run away.

If it is true that Japan actually needs to get rid of part of her population it must be due to one of two reasons; either industrialism has not kept pace with growth of population or else the people, through the adoption of western ideas have acquired needs faster than they have acquired the ability to secure the satisfaction of those needs. To state it in condensed form and with perhaps a tinge of hyperbole, the clerk on forty yen a month wants to drink cham, pagae but can't afford it unless he can do the work of four clerks and absorb their salaries. The other three must colonize!

Bringing the question down to its Korean phase, the only one in which this magazine is legitimately interested, we draw the natural conclusion that Baron Kaneko advocates the sending into Korea a large number of Japanese. The only opening immediately apparent for these men is that of agriculture, for the soil is the only asset immediately available. Commerce requires time for its development. The soil, like the poor, is ever with us. Colonization will mean an immediate and enormous acquisition of land in the peninsula. As we have before stated, the Japanese will not be content to take up land that the Koreans have hitherto considered too poor to cultivate. They will demand and obtain good land. Let us suppose that 50,000 people come. The land and houses and implements necessary for their support and shelter will cost at least one yen per man or a total of yen 10,000,000, but Baron Kaneko says that the population is increasing at the rate of 400,000 per year. Of this a mere 50,000 would be an absurdly small fraction. Who is to provide the money for this settlement? Surely the Japanese government cannot. The truth is that the land will be taken at a nominal price just as everything has been taken here. But what about the

increase of Korea's population? It amounts in all probability to at least 100,000 a year. These must be looked after as well. No reasonable man will be able to deny that Baron Kaneko's plan will be a crushing blow to the progress and welfare of the Korean people. Emigration to Canada, where there are millions of acres still lying fallow, is one thing, but to Korea where every nook in the hills is cultivated to its fullest extent, it bears a very different complexion.

Baron Kaneko says that "The great majority of people think we are not a colonizing nation but we are. For many years we have had no opportunity to prove it. Three hundred years ago Japan was the greatest colonizing nation in the world. We colonized China, Manchuria and Korea." Here we begin to see what sort of arguments the Baron brings forward. Three hundred years ago Hideyoshi, a blood-thirsty usurper, determined to conquer China by way of Korea. He hurled his army of trained cut-throats upon the peninsula but was defeated and driven back into the southern part of the country. There they were obliged to till the fields for their own support because the Korean naval power made it impossible to escape to Japan. For seven years they endured this enforced exile and then by a desperate attempt, homesick and half famished they broke through the cordon of Korean boats and got away home. A few hundred who had married Korean women remained and were almost immediately absorbed in the Korean population. A few years later the Japanese humbly asked if they might make a commercial station at Fusan. After long hesitation this was granted but the number of Japanese was strictly limited and they were closely confined to certain narrow limits. And this is what Baron Kaneko calls great colonizing! The truth is that at that very time Spain had

probably a thousand colonists to Japan's one. Japan and China were at sword-points and that Japan colonized in China or Manchuria in any genuine sense is inconceivable. It is very unfortunate for the Baron's contention that he uses such an argument as this. The spasmodic attempt at expansion made by Hideyoshi, served but to illustrate the lack of the very quality the Baron would attempt to demonstrate. But even if it were true that Japan had once been a colonizing power, the fact that in 1868 she had not a single colony would prove that she was at that time no colonizer. One might as well say that Spain is a great colonial power simply because at one time she was such.

When asked whether Japan intends to enforce in Korea the same policy she has enforced in Formosa the Baron made an evasive reply but said that in some respects the policy would be the same. A few days ago we received a letter from a gentleman, who crossed the Pacific on the same boat with the Japanese peace commissioner, saying that on that boat he met a gentleman who had long been a resident in Formosa and who said that the administration of affairs there was almost a perfect counterpart of the methods in Korea as set forth in the pages of *The Korea Review*. But the Baron adds "Their inherited customs we will allow them to maintain so long as they do not conflict with the necessary limitations of loyalty to the Emperor and the Japanese government." In spite of the mixed metaphor we take this to mean loyalty to the Japanese Emperor. "We shall encourage the Koreans to maintain whatever is dear to them in a legendary way, but also encourage a spirit of loyalty to Japan." Every word of this might be spoken by a Russian about Poland. It all breathes the spirit of absolute and final extinction of Korea as a nation. Now this goes far

beyond the bounds of a mere protectorate. It means the definite absorption of Korea by Japan for all time. But more follows and worse. "They are a people whom it will be easy to manage. They are not war-like, they are not troublesome, but they are of rather a low order of intelligence—what you would call stupid in this country (America). We shall not encourage intermarriage between Japanese colonists and the Koreans. On the contrary we shall oppose it very vigorously. We shall consider the Koreans as a lower race." A lower race, forsooth! Inferior intelligence! When the Korean has outwitted the Japanese at every turn for the past thirty years in the game of diplomacy, being compelled by military weakness to use cunning instead of brute force! A race equal to the Japanese in natural intelligence and greatly superior in physique and temperament. This Japanese gentleman throws out his chest and says "a lower race," when many of his countrymen in Korea go about more than half naked through the streets of Seoul to the disgust and scandal of the Koreans; when they do not hesitate to kick and beat and rob the Koreans right and left, as has been proved over and over again; when, baffled in their attempt to browbeat the Korean government into giving up a valuable concession absolutely without compensation, they have the best and most loyal Korean official driven from office to make room for a creature of their own, who will sell his own land for money; when they build in Seoul in a prominent site a huge brothel, housing hundreds of the votaries of vice, and flaunt it in the face of Koreans, who, corrupt enough, God knows, have the grace to hide their infamy from the public eye.

He will consider them a lower race; will oppose intermarriage; will, in fine,

stamp the Korean beneath his heel for all time and exterminate him. There is not one word of genuine sympathy nor a hint at real helpfulness, and we venture the opinion that with the exception of a very few leading men the words of Baron Kaneko voice the sentiment of the whole Japanese people. They describe with wonderful exactness the attitude of the Japanese in Korea today, and they demonstrate the lack of the primary and fundamental qualifications for a successful handling of the Korean people.

Witness the closing words of this characteristic interview. "The dominating note in Japan's colonial policy will be a blending of kindness with firmness, a course midway between that adopted by England and Russia." Will any student of history or of contemporaneous government show us how a blending of firmness and kindness will result in a course midway between that of England and Russia? Is England lacking in kindness or is it that Russia is lacking in firmness, or is it *vice versa*. No, it is plain that this is mere word-juggling. The truth is that in Korea Japan has proved herself neither kind nor firm. She has evinced the narrowest kind of selfishness and at the same time a curious lack of firmness. The latter is due to the attempt to carry out impossible schemes, financial, economic and industrial. If Korea is to be handled properly by the Japanese it must be by a very different stamp of man from Baron Kaneko.

The Korean Customs Service.

One of the most important and most prominent departments of the Korean government is and for many years has been, the Maritime Customs. It has been the battle ground of more than one

international quarrel, the sweetest nut to crack in all the basket. The interest which it inspires is doubtless based upon the fact that it represents ready money, spot cash; and that is the most attractive form which the god of wealth ever assumes.

The removal of J. McLeavy Brown, C.M.G., from the control of the Korean Customs by the Japanese is an event of high importance to this people and its consequences will be far reaching.

The Japanese have acquired the power to work their will in Korea. Since the day they drew up their treaty with Korea in 1904 guaranteeing her independence they have been attempting to absorb every profitable asset of the Korean government. It has been one continuous and consistent course of absolute selfishness unrelieved by a single attempt to do anything directly for the welfare of the Korean people. Here again we have a striking case in point. The Japanese government has no official in its whole realm that can begin to handle the position as Dr. Brown has done and can do. If in their vanity they think they have they will eventually discover their mistake. But this has little weight. Here is a definite and profitable asset of the Korean government and must be wrenched from them as other things have been. Justice, education, enlightenment, these are things that Japan has no thought of giving Korea except in the most incidental sort of way. There is not a single note of helpfulness in their entire policy as illustrated in the acts of the past two years. They want the Customs department and they will have it, irrespective of Dr. Brown's long and priceless services.

But it is not only the money they want. Their vanity is doubtless hurt because an important resource of the Korean government is still outside their grasp.

THE JAPANESE IN KOREA.

It is worth while asking in what essential particular this attempt to get the Customs out of Dr. Brown's hands differs from that of the Russians in 1897. After examining the case pretty carefully we have been compelled to decide that there is only one main difference and that is that whereas in the former case the British government demurred, in this case it acquiesces. The justice of the two cases is the same. The injury to Korea in case of acquiescence is practically the same, for there is little doubt that Kir Alexsiefz was as capable of handling the service as any Japanese is likely to be. The meat of the matter lies in the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in which, as we have said before, everyone's interests are guarded except those of Korea. For the sake of personal gain Great Britain has sold Korea to Japan. England has a treaty with Korea in which, according to international law, she regards Korea as a coördinate power. It is all well enough to smile and shrug the shoulders but so long as right is right and law is law so long will it be true that in handing over Korea to the Japanese without so much as consulting the Korean government, Great Britain has stained her empire. How long has it been since Anglo-Saxons have lost the desire to see fair play and have begun to damn the under dog? There is many a Britisher in Korea today who knows that given half a chance, the Korean would make a good citizen, a steady worker, an honest, intelligent man. But there are no days for the exhibition of mere feeling. Sentiment has become synonymous with sentimentality and the days when rugged justice and impartial sympathy moved the makers of British policy are apparently past. Dr. Brown himself is proof enough of what could be done in Korea if the people could be given a little good advice and firm but sympathetic control. The two years he was in

power he did, single handed, enough to show that with a few more to back him and to help work out his plans Korea could become a thoroughly respectable government. Russia knocked that in the head once, and now Japan, instead of enlarging his powers fourfold, as she ought, is securing his removal and with his removal one of the last straws at which the drowning nation can grasp. Byron sung for captive Greece and England heard and answered. But Greece was once a mighty power, you say. Ah, there's the trouble. Yet, do you drop your arms into the palm of him alone who once was strong and rich? Do you stretch forth your arm and rescue from the grasp of violence that man alone who once was able to defend himself? Is chivalry at last dead and weakness no longer its own sufficient plea? It seems so.

A Protest.

For the past few weeks, those who are interested in seeing satisfactory relations established between the Koreans and the Japanese have been looking for signs that the Tokyo authorities were trying to back up their words with definite action, but the state of affairs here has become rapidly worse instead of better, until at last the Koreans have reached a state little removed from desperation; and those who catch the under-current of feeling among the people are aware that we are dangerously near the point of revolt at the methods adopted by the Japanese.

It is not merely what the Japanese are trying to do in and about the great commercial centers like Seoul, Pyong-yang, Taiku and Songdo, but the utterly inexplicable methods they adopt in doing it that call for loud and insistent protest. And those who are the most genuine friends of Japan should be the first to

make the protest. The facts which we propose to relate here will uphold this indictment. We have been making a careful examination of conditions here and in Pyeng-yang and the statements we append can be relied upon as true. Plenty of witnesses can be brought to substantiate them. It remains, as it has always been, inexplicable on any rational theory how the rights of Koreans should be so completely ignored as they are being at this moment both in Seoul and Pyeng-yang. This is a rather serious charge to make but the facts bear it out. There can be no excuse which will pass current for the perpetration of the following outrages, for they can be called nothing less.

Let us examine first the state of affairs in the vicinity of Seoul. This city lies about three miles to the north of the Han River, which curves around toward the north holding the city as it were in an elbow. The high wooded hill called Nam San forms a part of the southern boundary of the city and throws its spurs south and east as far as the river bank. Almost the entire area between Seoul and the river, covering thousands of acres of land, has been staked out by the Japanese on the plea of military necessity and the entire population which runs up into the tens of thousands have been notified that they must vacate their houses and fields when notice is given. In this area there are large and flourishing villages of from one hundred to five hundred houses. The people have their long-established occupations and local business connections. Their livelihood depends in large measure upon these business connections and upon the local interests. But not a thought is given to this fact. They are told that they must vacate at some time in the near future. When they demand pay for their land and houses they are told that the Japanese authorities have paid over, or are to

pay over, to Korea some three hundred thousand yen for all this property at Seoul, Pyeng-yang and Wiju and that eventually the people will be paid something for their houses and lands.

Now in the first place we must ask what meaning there is in the term "military necessity." We note that in all this district near Seoul the Japanese marks often follow the conformation of the cultivated land up the little valleys, the stakes being set around the fields and taking no account of the uncultivated spurs. This is a very curious thing. If this is for military necessity one must wonder in what way the seizure of only this cultivated land can benefit the Japanese army. If they needed the hills for strategic purposes, for the building of fortifications or earthworks, it would be a different matter, but this is quite out of the question here. The Japanese themselves affirm that the Koreans are being driven out because "The Japanese are going to live here." In other words the gigantic confiscation has nothing whatever to do with military necessity and is simply the forcible seizure of Koreans' property for the purpose of letting Japanese settle there. This is proved conclusively by what is seen at Pyeng-yang. Between the modern city wall and the railway station, to the west, there is a distance of two miles, through what is called the *wesung* or "Outside Town," supposed to be the site of the old city of Kija. This was held by Korean farmers and each man held the deed for his land. The Japanese seized the entire tract, over 3,000 acres, excepting a few acres held by Chinese, and said it was for military necessity. Not half the Koreans were paid a cent for their houses or lands. Now we find that this tract is being built up, by ordinary Japanese merchants and artisans, into a city by itself. Is this military necessity? Hardly. It is nothing but an exhibition

of superior force for the purpose of acquiring property for nothing. These are plain words but we challenge the Japanese or their defenders to prove them to be untrue. Hundreds of people are simply driven from their houses and lands without a cent of compensation. They have no money to rent or buy another place, nor any money to pay for moving. They are simply bereft of everything, including, in many instances the means of livelihood. As the writer was passing along the road through the section near Seoul Japanese were busy tearing up crops from fields along the way making ready to build a road (not railroad). Women with children stood by, crying and wringing their hands at sight of the destruction of the crop which alone insures them against starvation next winter. The Japanese said he was doing it according to orders. The writer was besieged by more than fifty men along the way who begged that some way be found to delay, at least, the carrying out the monstrous sentence. But what way is there? Shall we tell these people to arm themselves and fight for their homes? However great their wrongs no one would feel justified in suggesting such a remedy. If the people should rise *en masse* and petition the government for redress they would be told (and have been told) that the government is forced to it by the Japanese. If the Koreans should make a monster demonstration, of a peaceful kind, petitioning the Japanese to have mercy, they would be dispersed at the bayonet's point. The only way to save the situation is to appeal directly to the highest authorities in Japan and demand as an elemental human right that the people be left in possession of their property or that they be paid a fair market price for it.

The evils of this sweeping confiscation are aggravated by the way in which the Japanese attempt to evade responsibility.

Having secured from the Korean government by duress a promise to secure the land, the Japanese, knowing that the government has no money with which to pay for it, go to the people and turn them out of their homes and lands and tell them to look to the Korean government for pay. Having shorn the Korean government of all independence action and assumed control of the finances of the country, the Japanese authorities turn about and tell the people to collect their pay from their own government, as if it were an entirely separate and autonomous affair, and able to find the money. We consider this to be not only wrong but it is cowardly as well. If the Japanese want to seize the land why do they not do so without trying to cover the tracks by claiming that the Korean government is responsible? The Japanese are men on the battle field, let them come out and be men in their dealings with Korea.

In order to pacify the people who are being driven out of their homes the Japanese tell them that Japan is going to turn over to the Korean government some money to be distributed among the sufferers. What could be more exquisitely ironical than this? The sum named is not one tenth the amount necessary to give the people even the minimum market price for their property and to have this paid through the hands of Korean officials would be such a travesty of justice that we can but marvel that the Japanese should have the face to suggest it.

If there were some immediate and stern military necessity like the near approach of the enemy we can imagine the temporary removal of Koreans from situations of danger or from land needed for fortifications, but when, under the plea of military necessity, enormous stretches of merely residential and agricultural property are suddenly seized,

paid for in promises only, the people warned to move out, while as yet there is no enemy within two thousand miles and that enemy thoroughly beaten,—when, I say, such acts are performed they put the perpetrators morally on the defensive. On the night of the ninth instant as the writer passed through the affected district women and children came pressing about him by the score begging him to find some means to avert their being driven from their homes, without a cent of money wherewith to procure a lodging place. Far into the night young women with babies in their arms were hurrying past in flight to a more distant village. The absolute callousness of the Japanese agents is something appalling. Having been ordered to carry out the "improvements" they come into the villages and put down all protest by beating the people, and no one dares to resist because this would immediately result in the coming of the gendarmes and the shedding of no one knows how much innocent blood.

Now this language will doubtless sound like exaggeration to those who have not been on the spot and seen things as they are, but what we ask is that the facts be investigated. Is it possible that a people which has won such high encomiums as the Japanese shall allow their fair fame to be brought into the dust by acts which are comparable in quality though not in quantity with the military confiscations of the Caesars? We do not believe it, and we feel confident that if the high authorities from whom the present policy presumably emanates could see these people being driven from their homes and fields penniless and practically without hope of redress they would be the first to rescind the order. And why should Korea be subjected to such drastic treatment, and the land of her people be thus wrested from them on a mere pretext? Even in a conquered ter-

ritory modern military ethics would not permit of such confiscations without compensation. How much more grievous then is the wrong when we remember that Korea is the ally of Japan. If the Korean government blocks needed reforms then let the government suffer but what have the common people to do with this and what excuse does it give for driving out people that are entirely innocent of any intention or desire to block reforms, but would rather welcome them?

These people have no one to whom they can appeal against their hard fate. They were informed by the Mayoralty office that their land had all been given to Japan and they must prepare to vacate it. When it came to the sharp pinch a crowd of them went to the Mayor's office and protested against the forcible eviction. They were referred to the Home Office as being the source of the order. They went there and asked to see the Home Minister, and were told that it was an Imperial order. They then became desperate and charged the Minister with having lied to them and having stolen their land. Thereupon the Minister asked the Japanese gendarmes to disperse the crowd adding that killing was none too bad for them. The Japanese charged the crowd and one man had his arm cut to the bone and another had his face cut from forehead to chin. Someone in the back of the crowd threw a stone into the Home Office and it seems that the cowardly Minister feared a riot and ordered the attack.

The surprising thing is that the Japanese so poorly gauge the temper of the Korean people. The latter may not be quick to resent their wrongs but if thousands of them are to be deprived of their homes without payment they will surely make trouble. It comes to a matter of life and death at last, and then the Korean becomes a wild beast in fearlessness.

The writer has lived among and has watched this people for something like twenty years and nothing is more certain than that a continuance of the present course of action will lead to trouble for which the Japanese will be directly responsible. Let the Koreans become once thoroughly aroused and they change from the mildest and most inoffensive people into veritable beasts which have no fear of death. If the Koreans are driven to the wall they can inflict such damage upon the vested interests of the Japanese as to render their occupation of Korea profitless.

All this can be averted easily by the adoption of a decent and equitable policy in the peninsula. A very little kindness goes a long way with a Korean, and Japan has it still in her power to conserve her own interests and those of Korea by stopping the wholesale confiscation of land and going to work in a slower and more humane way.

The Japanese in Pyong Yang.

There are hundreds of cases in which the Koreans in Pyong-yang have been most unjustly treated. There has been one enormous grab on every hand in the city and in its environs. Military necessity is the excuse given in almost every case. Two thousand acres of farming land were included in one monstrous confiscation; but the excuse of military necessity fell to the ground when the land thus seized was divided up among Japanese merchants and others. What military necessity can there be in a miscellaneous collection of civilians who have nothing to do with the military, in most cases? One cannot look into all the cases brought to one's attention but it is beyond question that the action of the Japanese in Pyong-yang has been hard to bear. The worst excesses of Korea's most corrupt officials never look

on the form of such wholesale confiscations as those which have taken place at Pyong-yang.

A Japanese subject owned a little plot of ground in Pyong-yang but the opening to it was very narrow. A large tiled house worth 6,000 yen stood in the way. The Japanese offered the owner 120 yen and when it was refused the Korean was seized, dragged away to one of the Japanese compounds and brutally beaten and otherwise ill-treated. He at last got away and immediately took opium and killed himself. In China this would have been a serious matter but the Japanese laughed at it and attempted to make the man's widow give up the house. She declared that she would die rather than sell on any terms. This is no faked story but an actual occurrence. The Koreans are helpless because they are too wise to revolt openly. The time will come however when the Koreans will be driven to it unless better counsels prevail among the Japanese. A few miles from the city a Korean owns a fine hot spring. A Japanese civilian appears, drives his stakes all about the property and says he has taken it because of military necessity, though he has no papers to show.

Not only so but the Japanese have swarmed all over the property of Americans and Englishmen and planted their stakes knowing perfectly well whose the land is. The Japanese Consul when approached about the matter said he knew it was the property of foreigners but he added "You had better just let the stakes remain where they are for the present." When I asked these American gentlemen why they did not pull up the Japanese stakes and throw them in the ditch I learned that if this was done some of the servants or adherents of these foreigners would immediately be seized and beaten within an inch of their lives. And so these foreigners

have to submit to the humiliation of having Japanese sign posts all over their property without daring to pull them up. It is indeed a curious condition of things. Whatever the authorities in Tokyo may say, (and we do not doubt their sincerity) the conditions in Korea are utterly at variance with the generous plans made in the capital of Japan. It makes no difference how badly a Korean may be injured it is next to impossible to secure redress.

Over a year ago we said that the Japanese would find it harder to handle Korea properly than to beat the Russians but we had no idea that the promises of reform would play such an inferior part in the program. If any reader thinks this is an exaggeration let him come here and we will promise to show him a few of the particulars of the situation. A widow woman came to me yesterday and asked me to do something for her, as her whole living had been swept away by the Japanese when they built the railway across her land. She had received nothing by way of compensation and it was plain the government could not reimburse her. Now I affirm that the failure of the Japanese to see that this woman, or any other person whose land was taken, received from the government the payment for her land was a gross injustice. It was morally no better than conniving at theft. A power that will with one hand seize the finances of a neighbor and with the other wave on the people to collect their payment from that government, knowing that it can never be done, leaves much to be desired.

The people of Pyeng-yang deserve our profound sympathy, but no more so than the people in the suburbs of Seoul. Not only have the Japanese not emulated the example of the British in Egypt but they have reversed many of the fundamental rules laid down by Lord Cromer

for the handling of that people. No one is more ready to give them applause for what they do that is mutually beneficial both to Korea and Japan. We have consistently maintained an attitude of the utmost optimism as regards the Japanese, and we are enthusiasts in our admiration of her achievements; but surely the time must soon come when Japan will carry out a helpful policy here or else she will lay herself open to the charge of selfish aggression.

Japanese Finance in Korea.

Ever since the assumption of control in Korea by Japanese at the beginning of the present conflict the matter of a national currency for Korea has been rightly assumed to be of great importance.

The situation as then faced was something as follows. In most of the country districts nothing would pass except the old-time copper cash. In the open ports and the large trade centers there was a debased nickel coin in circulation. It had been unloaded upon the people by a government that saw in the minting of money a source of revenue and consequently a coin was produced whose intrinsic value was perhaps two fifths of its face value. It was a denomination just high enough to make counterfeiting worth while but not high enough to place the necessary initial expense of counterfeiting beyond the reach of any man who could scrape together a hundred yen or so. The result, in a country where police supervision was practically unknown, was that in a very short time the country was flooded with spurious coin much of which was intrinsically as good as the genuine. The Japanese did more than their share of this counterfeiting, for they were able to do it on a larger scale. Of course the nickels immediately went to a discount and hover-

ed between 200 and 250 per 100 yen. This was where they belonged intrinsically. It was simply an indirect tax on the people. The government had put them out at par and each man who lost by fall of exchange was taxed just that much.

Perhaps the most unfortunate thing about the counterfeiting business was that it became impossible to guess how much nickel coinage there was in circulation in the country. In western lands where banks and clearing houses have their fingers upon the financial pulse of the community it is possible to make a fair estimate of the amount of money in circulation, but there was no way to tell in Korea. All that could be known was that the rapid rise in price of all commodities indicated that the amount was large.

Now the enormous fluctuation in exchange worked ruin to mercantile interests, especially Japanese; and the merchants were insistent in their demands that the currency be put on a firmer basis. As the Koreans import much more than they export, and the greater part of the import business is in the hands of the Japanese, it is plain that the difficulties and uncertainties of exchange worked the Japanese more injury than it did the Koreans. The latter were getting along very satisfactorily and the outcry did not come from them to any appreciable degree. It was perfectly natural that the Japanese authorities should consider monetary reform of the greatest importance, for it struck their nationals the hardest.

Let us see, then, what methods were devised for overcoming the difficulty. It was determined to mint a new coin equivalent in value to the Japanese five sen piece and one that could be maintained at par by making it always exchangeable for Japanese money at face value. It must be borne in mind that

though the Korean coin had gone to a ruinous discount the reason was not that the intrinsic value of a Korean nickel was so far below that of a Japanese nickel. In fact they were much alike in intrinsic value. And right here we strike the first important question in regard to the whole matter. In Japan gold is the monetary standard. The nickel coins are only for convenience and no one would claim that they are intrinsically worth what their face proclaims. In a subsidiary coinage this is possible and permissible *provided the government putting out such fiat money can prevent counterfeiting*. We presume that Japan can do this. But when we look at Korea we see a different state of things. The nickel is the sole medium of exchange, (at least in the large centers). There is no gold standard nor silver standard and the nickel is not a merely subsidiary coinage, of which comparatively little is necessary, but the universal medium of exchange of which there must be an enormous amount in order to carry on business. There never was enough to do this, and so in very many transactions involving upwards of ten thousand yen in value, Japanese money was used. Now the enormous output, the ignorance of the people as to what was a good coin and what counterfeit, the sad lack of police supervision and the willingness of Japanese to supply Koreans with counterfeiting machinery resulted as anyone might expect. The desire and the resolve to remedy this state of things is a laudable one, but we would ask this question. What is the practical value of putting out another nickel coin that is as easily counterfeited as the old one and whose intrinsic value is but little greater than that of the old one, at a time when there are no more safeguards against counterfeiting than there were before, but on the other hand an added incentive in the fact that these new coins are exchangeable for

Japanese money without discount? That is a pretty long sentence but we have no time to shorten it. All that the counterfeiters will have to do will be to see that they use nickel that is up to sample and that their dies are good. They will have no difficulty in putting out a coin that will deceive the very elect. Will the Japanese government be able to redeem these at par for an indefinite period and to an indefinite amount? It is said they have already been counterfeited. That shows what the counterfeiters think about it. We lay no claim to any special knowledge of technical finance, but we confess to a complete failure to see how the new coinage is to settle the difficulty.

What Korea needs is currency which includes different values of coins so that large transactions will be carried on in higher values of coins, leaving the nickel to be merely subsidiary; but even so it would be necessary to provide safeguards against counterfeiting. When we come right down to the rock-bottom facts we have to admit that until a people has developed a civilization high enough to guard itself against counterfeiters it has no business to dabble in any coinage of high enough intrinsic value to repay the labor of counterfeiting. Such a currency was the old copper cash. It was never counterfeited. The only way for tricksters to get around the law was by tempering with the government mint and its authorities. No one could afford to counterfeit in secret. Too large a plant was necessary and the returns were too slow and small to make it pay. In the present stage of Korean enlightenment and police supervision we consider the whole nickel business to be a financial blunder.

We must next look at the method adopted for the substitution of the new nickels for the old. In order to do this a certain amount of the new money was prepared and public announcement was made that from a certain day the old

coinage would be exchanged for the new, the best of it at two to one and the rest at some lower rate. We note in the first place that the monetary reformers had no idea of how much of the old coinage was in circulation and therefore could not tell how much of the new to provide; and secondly that no adequate provision was made for the rush that should have been seen to be inevitable. And what was the result? Chinese and Japanese capitalists immediately began buying in the old coinage, gleaning out the good pieces and unloading the remainder largely in the outlying ports where the people were less on their guard against counterfeits than in Seoul. In this way an enormous amount was hoarded awaiting the glorious day when coins bought at 2.40 to the yen would be redeemed at 2.00. One would have supposed that this eager buying would drive the price of nickels up, but it did not. Rumors were circulated that while Japanese and Chinese would be treated equitably by the exchange bureau the Koreans would have most of their money thrown out and even some of it confiscated. This frightened the Korean merchants and they hastened to get all the nickels out of their hands by laying in large stocks of goods or by selling nickels to the Chinese and Japanese. In this way the great bulk of the nickels went into hiding in the coffers of the crafty. If, now, the monetary reformers had been able to carry out their advertised program and had shoved over their counters enough of the new coinage to exchange for all the old that was presented, all might have gone well, but they found, to their apparent dismay, that the amount presented for redemption was far too great to exchange, and the program was postponed for a month; then it was postponed again and again. Meanwhile Seoul began to suffer from the extreme scarcity of money. Obligations aggregating millions of dollars

could not be met, because of the tightness of the money market: naturally, since all the money was hoarded awaiting redemption. Then the inevitable happened and the old nickels began to rise in value until they approached the mark at which the government had offered to exchange them. The hoarders were quite safe in any event but the public suffered. In a short time the old nickels were passing hands at two to the yen and a few capitalists were mulcting the public to the tune of twenty per cent in two months.

But this desperate state of things did not come about without attempts being made to relieve the situation. The Minister of Finance promised the merchants that the government would lend them on good security, through the Korean bank, enough money to tide over the crisis. He seems to have failed to consult the adviser before taking this most laudable step, and so the latter, wounded in his *amour propre*, refused to allow the plan to be carried out. The Korean market might go to smash sooner than a point of etiquette should be overlooked. Then the Emperor learning of the dire straits of the merchants proposed to lend them some 300,000 dollars of money belonging to the Household Department and not coming technically under the supervision of the Finance Adviser. When the Emperor sent for the money, which was partly in the Japanese bank and partly in the hands of another Japanese firm, Mr. Megata was informed of it and His Majesty learned to his surprise that he could not get at this money without the consent of Mr. Megata. The latter is adviser to the Finance Department only, but he assumed arbitrary control of the Emperor's private funds and prevented their use even when the purpose was to relieve the desperate straits of the merchants. It was quite natural that interest on money rose to a fabulous percentage

and the Japanese money lenders took advantage of the occasion to loan money at five and six per cent a month. It is said they got the capital from the very bank which was holding back the money that the Emperor was to have helped the people with. Such is the report that we heard in Seoul but we cannot vouch for its accuracy.

When at last the pressure became too great and the just claims of the merchants became too insistent, the bank agreed to advance a certain amount of money, but by this time the Korean merchants were so angry at the financial tricks that had been played upon them that they asked pointedly how much solid gold there was behind the notes of the bank, and expressed distrust of the ability of the bank to make good when these notes were thrown back for redemption. This again caused excitement and it looked for a time as if there would be a run on the bank.

Finance is something like war, in that success is the only recommendation of any plan. It is the same in finance as in war that, given a complete knowledge of the demands of the situation and a force adequate to the carrying out of a plan, the end is practically certain. Failure merely demonstrates that the situation was not understood or the plan not carried out properly. Today Korean monetary matters are more mixed and unsatisfactory than they have ever been. The Koreans say that the man appointed by Japan to carry out monetary reform in Korea is a good accountant but that he is unable to grasp the large facts and unravel a complicated problem. We know nothing about this personally but we do know that the present state of things never should have been permitted. It cannot properly be called a transition stage from one currency to another. It is a panic caused by bad management, ignorance of actual conditions and arbi-

trary tampering with the inexorable law of supply and demand. If there was doubt as to the amount of nickels that would be offered for redemption why did the authorities not limit the amount that would be received from any single individual? This would have helped to prevent the withdrawal of money from circulation. When it was found that money was getting tight, means should have been adopted at once to relieve the pressure, instead of which the attempts made by the Koreans themselves to solve the question independently of the Japanese were blocked.

The monetary difficulty in Korea can not be solved off-hand. The evil is too deep seated and pervasive to be treated except by a long and patient process. When the people get used to a certain medium of exchange it is very difficult to reconcile them to any other. What plan would be the most effective it is not our province to suggest, but it is very much to be hoped that the Japanese authorities will find some way out of the difficulty without disturbing commercial conditions more than is absolutely necessary.

Editorial Comment.

We may as well give up the notion that the whole trouble in Korea is caused by a few rowdy Japanese coolies. This was for a long time the general opinion and was so admitted by the Japanese; but recent events show conclusively that the Japanese military authorities are carrying out a vast scheme of reprisals which have for their object the seizure of Korean private property wholesale and with the merest pretense of compensation. One of our Seoul contemporaries has affirmed that the people are to be left in possession of their fields at least for the time being. The writer with his own eyes saw field after field

being torn up and the crops destroyed while the owners stood by and watched the destruction of their property. The Japanese in charge of the work said that he had been ordered to do it and must obey. To his credit he it said that he seemed rather ashamed of the job.

It has been intimated that this land may be intended as a settlement of Japanese soldiers after their discharge. Everyone knows how important it is that arrangements be made in advance for the disposal of the disintegrated elements of a large army and no one can find fault with the foresight of the Japanese, but in choosing this particular spot the greatest harm is being done the Koreans, while it will be no better for the Japanese than hundreds of other places would have been. No one can suppose these ex-soldiers can step into the work which the Koreans of the river towns are doing. The latter are the great purveyors to the capital. They handle the fuel and lumber from the interior and were it not for them Seoul would be in a sorry plight. Now to oust these people and substitute soldiers in their places will be doing a great injury both to those Koreans themselves and to all the natives of Seoul. But of course this never occurred to the Japanese authorities, or, if it did, so much the worse; it was ignored. Why seize land where there are thousands of Korean houses when these will never be utilized by the Japanese? They will be demolished and Japanese structures will be put up. Or again, why not let the Korean villages alone and utilize the broad tracts of land about and between them for the Japanese? By paying a fair price the land could be purchased and all would have gone on peacefully. But no, the Koreans must be treated to a vast confiscation which tramples their rights in the ground and makes them from now on inveterate haters of the Japan-

ese. This utter insensibility to the hatred of the Korean proves as nothing else could how much Japan has still to learn of the science of handling an alien people. The difficulties that Russia has had with Poland, that Americans have had with the North American Indian, that England, even, has had with Ireland, teach the Japanese no lesson. How about the decades to come when the hatred engendered today will break out periodically and cause endless trouble and expense? How about when the Koreans, in this rough school, shall have learned to bite back? Japan is laying up for herself a bitter reckoning in the future. Look for instance at the Koreans employed by the American Korean Electric Company as motormen and conductors. They have broken away from the old time indolence of the Korean and have, by honest and hard labor, gained a good degree of self-respect. Even these few years have transformed them in bearing and in manner and if a Japanese strikes they strike back. A short time ago we witnessed an interesting little scene. Two angry Japanese who had been put off the car because of refusal to pay were running along the side of the moving car trying to get on, to attack the conductor or motorman. The conductor with a heavy walking stick belabored them over the head and shoulders with all his might until finally they had to drop off. We could not but admire the pluck shown by the Korean. He stood up for his rights and those of his employers. Now in time there will be thousands of Koreans who will be ready to stand up and make trouble if they are cuffed and kicked about. Is Japan ready to pay the bill for all the trouble and turmoil that this feud will cause? Would it not be infinitely better to treat the Koreans with some semblance of humanity and avoid the otherwise inevitable?

Kennan and Korea.

The first article by Mr. Kennan in the *Outlook* appeared in the issue of October 7th, 1905. The editors announced that "This is the first of a series of articles founded upon Mr. Kennan's observation and study of conditions in Korea the past Summer. They will deal with the personality of the Korean Emperor, the venality of Korean officials, the degradation of the people, the Japanese administration of affairs in that country and the future of Korea."

It is quite fair for us to ask what qualifications and opportunities this distinguished writer had to speak authoritatively on this question. As the editors state, it was in the summer of 1905 that Mr. Kennan was in Korea. To the present writer's personal knowledge Mr. Kennan was not in Korea more than a month. He lodged at a hotel in the foreign quarter quite removed from the ordinary life of the Korean people and as everyone in Korea knows, the rainy season of 1905 was one of the heaviest of the past decade. There was no opportunity to go about among the people and study their condition as could have been done in Spring or Autumn. No time of the year could have been less auspicious for such a work.

The natural result was that he made but little study of the Korean at first hand. This is worth while illustrating, because of the wide circulation given to his statements. A year or more before this he had made a flying trip to Seoul where he had stayed a few days. He wrote a letter at that time which was criticized in this magazine, and numerous blunders were exposed. Among them was his statement that there are no scavenger birds in Seoul. The *KOREA REVIEW* traversed this statement as being quite contrary to fact, for everyone living in this city knows that an enormous num-

ber of hawks hover over the city and swoop down on every morsel of garbage they can find. Now on this second visit Mr. Kennan took the writer to task, saying that his statement was true. He said that he had looked for hawks and had seen none. Now the reader must note that in the midst of the rainy season there is an interval of a few weeks when the hawks are not as commonly seen, though not by any means scarce. On the strength of this Mr. Kennan held to his point against the evidence of a man who has lived in this city for twenty years. This is a significant fact and is thoroughly characteristic of Mr. Kennan's method. His observation covering a few weeks was conclusive of the whole matter and was only less amusing than that of the traveller who upon landing in a certain country saw a yellow dog on the street and wrote back to his friends that all the dogs in that country were yellow.

In the second place Mr. Kennan's observations were almost wholly confined to the capital and one or two ports where the population is not typical of the whole country. In the capital are gathered together the officials and their retinues and there is a large number of men who are either hangers on of these officials or are waiting a chance to get office. We do not defend these men from the charge of laziness, though they are not as a rule degenerates. But they are by no means typical of the country at large.

Then again in the hot summer months it is customary for all the working classes to take a long noon rest, a *siesta*, and it is plain that Mr. Kennan's observations were made largely between ten and two. It is evident that he did not get up at daylight and go to the market places and watch the people, alert, wide-awake and virile. The Korean gets to work in the morning at least two hours

before the workman of America. He makes it up by resting at noon, thereby calling down upon himself the objections of such superficial observers as Mr. Kennan.

But there is a still more important deduction to be drawn from the introductory note of the Editors of the *Outlook*. Five specific phases of Korean life are mentioned as being dealt with by Mr. Kennan (1) the personality of the Emperor, (2) the venality of the officials, (3) the degradation of the people, (4) Japanese administration, (5) Korea's future. Only the first three have to do with the Korean people distinctively. We would ask the candid reader whether this program is a fair one to the Korean people. Nothing can prove more conclusively than this table of contents that Mr. Kennan was a special pleader. He came to Korea to prove that the Koreans were all that is bad and he made no attempt whatever to balance the account by saying anything about their good qualities. He leaves the inference that there are no good qualities to describe. We do not believe that Mr. Kennan was qualified either by the length of his stay, the keenness of his observation or the fairness of his mind to give other than a prejudiced and distorted view of the situation.

If this is not evident from what we have already said, the following facts are available for the purpose. When Mr. Kennan took up his quarters in Seoul and was unable on account of the rainy season to do any considerable first hand work on the subject he called in certain residents of Seoul who knew something of the facts. Among these was the present writer who, supposing that the distinguished traveller desired to make a fair showing of the case, spent many hours with him answering a long list of questions about the state of affairs. We related to him our own observations of

the nature of Japanese rule in Korea but besides this gave him a careful statement of the results of our study of the Korean character and temperament, a study which extended over two decades and which was as careful and accurate as an intimate acquaintance with various classes of Korean society could make it. Now out of all this matter which the traveller borrowed what did he use? Nothing but the account of Japanese atrocities in the peninsula. He used that freely, giving it almost in the words of the writer, but he omitted every statement we made as to the redeeming features of Korean civilization and in place of them gathered together all the irresponsible gossip of the streets and the statements of those who make a business of caricaturing the Koreans, added this to his own inadequate observation and out of it all made a generalization as to the Korean people which for gross prejudice and for culpable inaccuracy can scarcely be matched in literature. This we propose to show. He used us and accepted our statements implicitly and almost verbatim along one line, thereby acknowledging their accuracy and our desire for a truthful presentation of the subject, but along all other lines he ignored our statements; and not only so but he nowhere states that our attitude which he so freely indorsed along certain important lines was diametrically opposite to his statements along other lines. This is a species of trenchery whereby he practically makes us indorse his hideous caricature of the Korean Emperor and people. We naturally object. And we feel a personal responsibility in repudiating his implications and showing wherein lies their damaging falsity. Whether we can eliminate the element of personal prejudice from the indictment can be judged only from the words of the indictment itself.

Mr. Kennan starts out by affirming

that Japan "is making a serious and determined effort to transform and civilize" Korea—that she is making "a conscious and intelligent attempt to regenerate" Korea. This was said concerning the few months immediately preceding the writing of the article, or roughly speaking the last half of 1904 and the first half of 1905.

If the reader will turn to the third article of Mr. Kennan's series he will be able to judge from that writer's own statements whether the words above quoted are at all applicable. The contents of that third article of Mr. Kennan's can be found almost entire in the pages of the KOREA REVIEW. It states our point of view with great exactitude and there is no important point there laid down, and hardly an illustration, that we have not publicly given in the REVIEW. We must therefore inquire to what degree if any these different articles hang together.

In the first article we read that Japan is making a "serious," "determined," "conscious" and "intelligent" attempt to regenerate Korea. In the third we find a very different state of things. Judging from these adjectives one would expect to hear that a really intelligent and statesmanlike policy had been inaugurated by the Japanese in Korea, but listen to Mr. Kennan's words in his third article, not that he knew personally anything about the matter but in this one phase of the subject he drew from the observation of those who had made a careful study of it.

In the first place he tells us that the Japanese in Korea are "disappointing," both as to their "methods and achievements," that "they have not displayed in that field anything like the intelligent prevision, the conspicuous ability and the remarkable capacity for pre-arrangement that they have shown in the arena of war."

The first mistake of Japan's, that he sees is the idea that they could handle the situation without forming a protectorate in the first instance. Well, this is part of the truth. They failed to handle Korea well without such a hold and, according to Mr. Kennan's showing it can be done well only by a constant show of force even as Russia today holds Poland or the Caucasus. But the fact of the case is Japan did guarantee the independence of Korea and Mr. Kennan has yet to show that if Japanese methods had been of an enlightened character she could not have held the position secure and accomplished a greater triumph in the peninsula than she did in Manchuria. But that "if" is a very big one. It was not in the power of the Japanese to exercise the requisite amount of self-control and the breaking of her treaty of 1904 was the only chance of carrying out her policy in Korea. Mr. Kennan talks about obstruction on the part of Korean officials. They would have been fools and cowards if they had not opposed the Nagamori scheme and the financial policy of Mr. Negata, and many another purely selfish plot against Korean wealth and resources. We take exception to the morals of Mr. Kennan's argument. He says that in taking over the postal department Japan virtually broke down Korean sovereignty and for this reason they might as well go the whole length of destroying it entirely. But it was wholly voluntary on Japan's part when she guaranteed Korea's independence in 1904. Does Mr. Kennan mean to tell us that having guaranteed Korea's independence and then finding that she could not exercise the necessary self-control to guide the Korean ship of state properly, Japan had a right to abrogate her treaty and do as she pleased? We had thought this was a distinctively Russian method of handling treaties. Mr. Kennan's whole argument is vicious and its logical conclusion is

that treaties are of value only so long as they are convenient.

The second mistake, according to Mr. Kennan, was "bad judgment as to the necessary reforms and measures that were most urgently needed." He treats the Nagamori scheme to contempt which was its due. He shows how this scheme alienated the good will of the Korean people from Japan and he adds significantly, "Having the people on their side they might have done almost anything with the bureaucracy." How does this coincide with his previous statement that nothing could be done without seizing the entire power of the country?

The fact seems to be that there was not much hope of reform from Japan in any case, for they had not the breadth of mind and the sympathy and self-control necessary for the gaining of the confidence of the people, and the seizure of the country only aggravated ten fold the hatred that already existed.

The third mistake according to Mr. Kennan was to allow Japanese to swarm into Korea before preparations had been made for their proper jurisdiction. He then cites numerous cases of revolting oppression and brutality. How does all this look alongside those four adjectives—"serious," "determined," "conscious" and "intelligent"?

As for the matter of organizing an honest and efficient ministry in Seoul Mr. Kennan scores the Japanese policy as "irresolute and weak." He cites the case of Yi Yong-ik who went away to Japan for his country's good and then came riding back into the Ministry of War. We know something about how that was accomplished but as we were told in confidence we must pass it by. Mr. Kennan was right however in denouncing it. When he did so, where had he left the first paragraph of his first article, in which he said Japan was trying to "transform," "civilize," "up-

lift" and "regenerate" Korea? Yi Yong-ik was so corrupt that the Korean people would have torn him limb from limb if they have put their hands on him, but Japan put him again in power.

Having cited numerous cases in which the Japanese treated Koreans no better than a highwayman treats a traveller Mr. Kennan calls them cases of "conflicting rights or interests." They were not conflicting rights, for the right was all on the side of the Korean in most cases and it takes two rights to make a conflict. Things should be called by their right names.

But he goes on to say that even in view of all these outrages "the Japanese did not even strengthen the clerical force of its Korean consulates with a view to meeting" the increasing need. He even cites Formosa which should have been an object lesson to Japan and the failures of which should not have been repeated in Korea. Without distinctly saying so Mr. Kennan clearly implies that Japan neither remedied the evils mentioned nor cared to do so. Where he finds in all this an "intelligent effort" to regenerate Korea, we fail to see.

But leaving aside the acts of Japanese private citizens Mr. Kennan also arraigns officials and says some true and pertinent things about them. The matter of seizing land for railroads when the Korean government could not find the money to pay for it, and the seizure of land outside the South Gate of Seoul for military barracks, these are things that show an entire lack of that equity and judgment which should be the first aim of a power placed as Japan is vis-a-vis Korea.

We must point to another curious comparison. In one place Mr. Kennan argues that the only thing was to seize the country and declare a protectorate, and in another place he says that it is not necessary to form a protectorate

"but if the Japanese would give the Korean people justice, protect their rights and thus win their confidence" they could soon reform the government and render Russian intrigue innocuous. Either or neither of these things may be true but they cannot both be true.

In his fourth article Mr. Kennan discusses what Japan has done in Korea. He begins with the complaint that the Korean officials would not listen to the advice of the Japanese but put obstacles of all kinds in the way and thwarted every attempt to better conditions in the peninsula. Mr. Kennan could have found an answer to all this in his own words if he had turned to the right page, for while these advisers were advising, the people of Korea were being robbed and maltreated and browbeaten on every side and this naturally had a reflex influence on the officials. They argued, whether rightly or wrongly, that men who would permit such things to be done by their own nationals were unfit to try to "regenerate" Korea. It was a case of wanting to pick a mote out of Korea's eye when there was a beam in Japan's eye. Why should the Japanese try to stop Korean oppression and "squeezing" when the Koreans were suffering more from Japanese abuse than from the native article? Why preach about bribery when Korean magistrates were complaining that they had to pay two prices for their offices, one to Koreans and the other to Japanese? Why listen to talk of sanitation when the Japanese police advisers made Koreans cover their ditches with rough sticks and dirt which would only give darkness to breed more disease and which the first heavy rain would wash away? Why talk about monetary reform when the Japanese adviser by his wildest financiering was driving Korean merchants to the wall and then preventing the Emperor from helping them by forbidding

him to draw his own private money from the bank for the purpose? Why try to reform education when after promising the teachers a certain raise of wages throughout the service certain grades were arbitrarily lowered again? Why talk about improvement of means of communication when every mile of railroad meant that a score of Korean farmers would have their lands wrenched from them at less than half their worth and when enforced work on the line at one third of a day's wage was making certain towns pay thousands of dollars blackmail to the Japanese? If Mr. Kennan had seriously asked himself these questions he would perhaps have arrived at the answer to his.

Another cause of obstruction might have been found in the fact that so many of the proposed reforms were almost solely favorable to the Japanese. For example, the monetary system, while bad for all, was especially bad for the Japanese merchants who did most of the retailing of imported goods. Every Korean knew that the agitation for monetary reform was almost solely in the interests of the Japanese.

Surprising as some of Mr. Kennan's statements are regarding the political situation it is in his assumption of knowledge of the underlying character of the Korean that he proves most conclusively his prejudiced point of view. After three or four weeks of observation which was further restricted by climatic conditions he treads with perfect confidence where those who have studied the question for years hardly dare to make generalizations. Not only has he gotten the facts wrong in numberless instances but he couches his crude ideas in such dogmatic form that he furnishes an *a priori* argument against their accuracy.

"In moral and intellectual characteristics the Koreans and Japanese are as far apart as the Venezuelans and the

Dutch." Here is one of his extreme assertions which will not stand the test of analysis. If he speaks here of morality in its narrow sense of sexual relations, I affirm with out fear of serious contradiction that Koreans are as moral as the Japanese. The Japanese word *geisha* and the Korean word *gyang* are identical in derivation, in meaning and in moral quality, and Mr. Kennan might have found out without difficulty that the Japanese *geisha* are more in evidence in Japan than the *gyang* are in Korea. Even as I write these words the Japanese papers arrive telling how agents of disorderly houses are buying young girls from their parents by hundreds in the famine districts of northern Japan. Such a thing would be impossible in Korea. For a parent to treat a child in this way would bring down upon him instant condemnation from the public and severe punishment from the authorities. There is no question that the morals of Korea are of a low order but they are not one whit lower than in Japan. The trouble is that Mr. Kennan did not know what he was talking about. He gave here no particulars whatever, quoted no authorities but made this sweeping statement out of the storehouse of a vivid imagination and to all appearances with the set purpose of making out the Koreans to be all that is bad without a single redeeming feature.

The same may be said of the intellectual characteristics of the Korean people. It has been my vocation for many years to teach mathematics to Koreans, and my somewhat wide experience of Korean boys and their mental capacity has led me to the definite conclusion that they are naturally as bright as Japanese or American boys of the same age. They grasp the problems of arithmetic, algebra and geometry with a readiness and quickness of comprehension that would surprise Mr. Kennan or anyone

else who has seen them simply on the street. What does Mr. Kennan know of the intellectual capacity of the Korean, or what does anyone know who does not get close enough to them to gain their confidence and enter into their mental processes? Official corruption has nothing to do with intellectual caliber except that in Korea as in every country it takes a very sharp man to become a great rascal. Take the case of the man Yi Yong-ik whom Mr. Kennan rightly holds up to public scorn. Would Mr. Kennan deny to that man intellectual ability of a high order? I would not, especially since I am aware that he once outwitted and befooled one of the most distinguished statesmen of the Far East. Even Dr. Gale as quoted by Mr. Kennan says "It is a wonder why so many bright minds are content with so low a civilization." If they are bright minds would hardly appear that they are as far apart from the Japanese as the Venetians are from the Dutch.

We are told that the civilization of Korea "has not become stagnant, it has rotted." It would appear from this that it is dead, but we are told in the next sentence but one that it can be restored only by a long course of remedial treatment. These two statements do not show that carefulness of adjustment which we should have expected from the pen of so distinguished a writer. What Mr. Millard in his remarkably accurate and convincing book *The New Far East*, says about China is true of Korea. Speaking of national decadence he says that the best test of virility is durability. This is almost axiomatic in its simplicity and lucidity. If Korea has been rotten for centuries how does it happen that the people are physically virile, mentally bright and keenly awake to the insults that have been heaped upon them?

If Mr. Kennan would like to hear a

valid and almost self-evident reason for the present lack of that untiring thrift which characterizes the Chinese he will have it in a nutshell in the following statement. *The relation of population to the area of cultivable land.* The amount of good farm land per capita of the population is enormously greater in Korea than in Japan or in China. Until Korea was opened up to foreign intercourse the average of comfort in Korea was vastly in advance of either of her neighbors. The average Korean dressed more comfortably and ate better food than did the Japanese or Chinese. Time and again the rice crop was so abundant that travellers were not asked to pay for the rice they ate. The country produced more than it could consume. Now it is quite plain that under these conditions the almost frantic struggle in which the average Chinese was engaged in order to keep body and soul together was not necessary in Korea. The common people of Korea could easily produce all that was necessary to maintain a high degree of comfort, and mendicancy was almost unknown. Not until after I had been in Korea five or six years did I ever see an adult beggar. The competition consequent upon the opening of the country soon began to affect the people. The export of cereals and the speedy appreciation in cost of almost all commodities resulted in a lowering of the average degree of comfort in Korea, and the Korean has been suffering ever since from the fact that hard necessity had not taught him the thrift that was now to be the price of comfort. I would submit that here is a natural explanation of the phenomenon of Korean unthrift, which even Mr. Kennan must acknowledge. It is not that Korea is dead and rotten but because her former hermit life prevented the operation of the law of supply and demand as between herself and her two neighbors. The barrier

being broken down, natural law tended to make an equilibrium. Since Korea had enjoyed a greater degree of individual comfort than her neighbors, the opening of the country to foreign intercourse and competition was an economic benefit to China and Japan but an injury to Korea herself. There can be no doubt at all that from the purely economic standpoint Korea would be vastly better off today if the policy of the late Regent had prevailed and she had remained a hermit kingdom.

Mr. Kennan divides his caricature of the Korean people into three parts: (a) the Emperor, (b) the Government, (c) the People. He begins his description of the Emperor by a long quotation from "An American gentleman of impartiality, etc., etc." If by American he means a citizen of the United States we must demur. That description was not written by a citizen of the United States but of Great Britain. His whole picture of the Emperor is epitomized in one sentence "He is as unconscious as a child, as stubborn as a Boer, as ignorant as a Chinaman and as vain as a Hottentot." I say this sentence epitomizes the whole thing, because three out of the four assertions that he here makes prove the very opposite of what he intended. It is somewhat difficult to gauge the meaning of "unconscious as a child." We had never supposed that childhood was a synonym of unconsciousness. On the contrary a child is most intensely conscious and observant. We are willing to grant that the Emperor of Korea is as unconscious as a child. As for the allegation that the Emperor is as stubborn as a Boer we see no reason why he should consider it other than a compliment. We grant that the stubbornness of the Boer is a very well proven fact but remember that that stubbornness was exhibited in the fiercest fight that man ever put up for what he deemed his

native land. That the Emperor is as ignorant as a Chinaman need cause him little alarm in these days when the whole world is beginning to realize that the Chinese are among the shrewdest and most level headed people to be found anywhere. Certainly if the writer of that travesty had wished to make a synonym of ignorance he might have chosen a better subject than the astute Chinese. We are told that the Emperor is as vain as a Hottentot. Much better have stuck to the proverbial peacock, for since the writer of that sentence never saw a Hottentot and knows nothing about them except by hearsay there is some doubt lest his knowledge of the Emperor be of the same nature and that he may be libelling the Emperor, the Hottentot, or both.

"The atmosphere that surrounds him is one of dense ignorance and consequently he is as timid as a fallow deer." Here is another unfortunate simile. Nature has given the fallow deer two means of self defense; keen senses and keenness of foot. To say that the ignorance of the Emperor includes a lack of perception as to what is going on about him is to my personal knowledge far from true. As a rule the Kings of Korea have been secluded and have been deprived of information except such as the immediate courtiers have been willing to divulge, but to say that the present Emperor is timid because of ignorance is the very opposite of the truth. It is, my gentle caricaturist, because he *knows too much*. For the past twenty-five years he has had the Chinese, the Russians and the Japanese on his track and has had no means but cunning with which to throw them off the scent. I venture to say that while there are doubtless individuals who know more about Chinese trickery, Russian trickery or Japanese trickery than the Emperor of Korea there is no other man in the world who

knows as much of *all three* as he does.

It is an undoubted truth that the Emperor is timid. It is not a natural trait with him, not inherited; for his father was one of the most recklessly brave men that the Orient has produced during the past century. It is an acquired trait or rather attitude of mind which has been induced by his environment. The very same may be said of the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan of Turkey, and probably to the same degree. The present Emperor's youth was spent amidst the horrors of a sanguinary Roman Catholic persecution and the alarms of threatened invasion by France and the United States. As soon as this was over there began the blood feud between his father and his wife which opened with the destruction of the father, the mother and the brother of the Queen by an infernal machine. It continued in 1882 in the chasing from the palace of the Queen and the murder and mutilation of some of the highest officials before the King's very eyes. In 1884 six of his most trusted ministers and his faithful body servant were hacked to pieces in his presence while on his knees he begged the butchers to forego the knife. In 1895 a band of cut throats invaded his palace, murdered and cremated the Queen and threatened him with death. One faithful official mortally wounded dragged himself into the royal presence and was there despatched. For months after this the King was kept a virtual prisoner beneath the hands of men in league with the murderers of the Queen. He was forced to see the name of his dead consort dragged to the mud and dishonored before the nation. All these things he suffered and a hundred lesser ones without being able to summon other help than that which his own ingenuity could devise. And yet they sneer at him because he is timid. It

was his misfortune, not his fault. The only man who has a moral right to draw a word-picture of a fellow being is he who can, in imagination, put himself in that fellow-being's place and see things from his stand point. Could any exaggeration be more brutal than this— "He regards . . . all his people as flocks and herds, intended for his slaughter?" How does this tally with a previous statement that "He is kindly disposed and only the other day sent a special gift to help a poor old coolie whose trouble down hat and poverty he had happened to see when he was on his way from his burned Chongdong palace?" Mark that this was not during some gala day procession but when he was making his way from the scene of a terrible conflagration which had laid in ashes the only palace in which he considered himself physically safe. With what nimbleness of wit the caricaturist leaps from one point to the other, seemingly oblivious of the fact that the specific instance of self-forgetful love which he cites refutes whole pages of damning innuendo.

Korean and Ainu.

The question asked recently in Seoul by a correspondent of the *Osaka Mainichi*, "Are not the Koreans a good deal like the Ainu?" is an illuminating commentary upon the attitude of a certain large and influential class of Japanese. It has become increasingly evident, in spite of the protests of a certain few of the better element in Japan, that the above question receives an affirmative answer from the great mass of the Japanese who think about the matter at all. The Ainu once inhabited the greater part of Japan, and were a semi-savage race little if any superior to the Esquimaux. Their social and political system were of the crudest description

These people were gradually driven north by successive waves of immigration from the south. The races which displaced the Ainsu were little if any superior in culture but were fighters by nature and training and the result was never in the balance. The relative civilization of the Korean and Japanese today is much the same as that which existed between the Ainsu and Japanese at the time the Ainsu was being driven north. That is, the general grade of civilization of the masses of Korea and Japan is very much the same. The main difference is that one is warlike and the other is not.

The evident implication of the comparison was that as the Japanese were justified in driving back the Ainsu and appropriating their territory, so the Japanese are justified in driving back the Korean and taking the soil for their own uses. Some people would say that such an argument is absurd on the face of it; but there are others, and not a few, who hold that Korea has not developed the resources of the peninsula in a way that gives her the moral right to continue to hold it. This is an arraignment not of the Korean government but of the nation itself. They think that the Japanese have the right to seize the territory and dispossess the Koreans because by so doing the resources of the country will be properly developed.

There are two points that require special attention. The first is the truth or falsity of the statement that Koreans are not utilizing the resources of the country. The second is the question of the degree of moral right which one country possesses to seize territory of another on the ground that the resources are not being developed. Is Korea making a rational use of her resources? If one travels in the interior of Korea he will find a large proportion of arable land under cultivation, and a

cultivation of no mean order. A highly intelligent and observant American gentleman who has recently been traveling extensively in northern Korea states that the country is highly cultivated, that neither Japanese nor anyone else could make any marked improvement upon it. This agrees with our own observation and that of every foreigner we have questioned. It cannot truthfully be claimed that the Koreans are withholding from the world's consumption any considerable fraction of her possible food production. It must be borne in mind that production follows demand and Korea has not been long enough opened to the world to feel the full force of the world's demand for food materials. Enormous quantities have been exported but the market has not demanded the exquisite care which the Chinese, for instance, lavish upon their fields. And yet Korea cannot be charged with having withheld her produce or with having refused to do her part toward feeding the world. Now no one knows this better than the Japanese themselves. They have travelled exhaustively throughout Korea and they know beyond peradventure that the excuse of Korean unwillingness to get the most possible out of the soil is untenable.

But Korea has other assets besides her agricultural capacity. The country is rich in minerals which ought to be exploited. But this much must be granted that food products differ widely from mineral products in their immediate importance. If a man has a field and persistently and obstinately refuses to cultivate it, thereby inflicting suffering upon those who are willing to buy from him and who need the produce, there would be an excuse for compelling him to utilize the field or else lose it; but in the case of minerals it is somewhat different. Agricultural wealth is perennial and practi-

cally inexhaustible. Land is not injured by wise agriculture. The products of land are largely a gift of nature, and refusal to cultivate is to deny to the world a gift of nature; but mineral wealth is intrinsically different in that, while it is a gift of nature, it is not perennial but strictly limited in amount, and once exhausted is gone for all time. It can be used but once and reason urges that the nation possessing such a resource has far greater moral right to postpone its exploitation than that of arable land. But even so we find in Korea no desire to act the dog in the manger and obstinately prevent the exploitation of this wealth. She demands that it shall be exploited for the benefit of its owners. No reasonable man would deny this. Has the Korean government stood in the way of an equitable arrangement for the development of its mineral wealth? We say no, and the facts are with us. Many opportunities have been given to foreign syndicates to engage in mining here. We venture to say that Korea has been generous to a marked degree in granting such concessions. The charge that the Korean government is opposed to such development is glaringly untrue; but what is the Japanese attitude toward mining here? Without the capital to engage in the work in a way that would get the most out of the ore they attempt to block at every point the granting of concessions to those who could and would do so. The present contest over the concession granted to the Manchu Syndicate is a striking instance of the obstructive policy of Japan. This syndicate offers, we understand, to turn over to the Koreans forty per cent of the net profits of its work. When we remember the difficulties to be met in a country so remote from mining supplies and the lack of railway facilities in most parts of the country, who can deny that the Korean government is being gener-

ously treated in being given forty per cent of the profit? But what are the Japanese giving the Korean government for the mines that they are working in a desultory way all over the peninsula, in many places without the shadow of a right? We venture to say that the Korean government is getting nothing from them that will begin to compare with the forty per cent guaranteed by the Manchu Syndicate. The cry is raised by the Japanese that the Korean government must be protected from the rapacity of foreign investors and adventurers. History never showed a more ludicrous situation than this. While the Japanese are crowding the Koreans at every point, seizing their fisheries, their salt works, their land, they raise the cry that the Koreans must be protected from syndicates that propose to enter into definite and open agreements which have undergone the close scrutiny of both governments and which are entirely above-board and of confessedly mutual advantage. We are reluctantly compelled to believe that it is not Korea that is acting as an obstructionist but that it is Japan. If it were not for her, a dozen foreign syndicates would be, within a year, developing the mineral wealth of Korea on scientific principles and with adequate capital. This would be of advantage to the whole world, Japan included. The marvelous advance of electrical engineering demands increased production of copper. Well, there are magnificent copper mines in Korea blocked today by the obstructive tactics of the Japanese. They have not the capital to develop them and they will allow no one else to do it.

But to return to the Ainu proposition; we must ask in what way the Ainus were dispossessed of their land. Covering most of the country as the North American Indians did America they saw waves of immigration rolling in from the

South. These new comers established themselves gradually and their superior physical power and warlike characteristics won for them a commanding position. Then receiving, perhaps from Korea, incentives toward a higher civilization they gradually forged ahead of the aboriginal peoples and attained to a measure to the same right to the soil of Japan that the European gained in America. The Aino had to go. How different is all this from the present situation! Here we have two nations side by side, each of them having developed a highly articulated form of civilization with written records running back over a thousand years. Two peoples almost equal in mental capacity but widely differentiated in some important respects. On the one side the close contact with China has bred conservatism and has made political life more or less corrupt as it is in China itself. On the other hand we find a new and advanced national spirit which while still far from the goal of western enlightenment is making strenuous efforts to put off at least the habiliments of the past. It has resulted in a striking economic and industrial transformation. The results are laudable though not miraculous. But on what basis of comparison can Japan assume the right to do to the Korean what she did to the Aino? The parallelism breaks down at every point. But, you say, what evidence have you that this desire to make the Korean a second Aino really exists? The reply to this wholly pertinent question lies in the facts that lie right about us and will be abundantly apparent to anyone who will take pains to inquire. The Japanese government is permitting and tacitly encouraging Japanese settlers to come to Korea by the tens of thousands. For these Japanese to acquire land and live promiscuously in the interior is wholly illegal. It is an act of usurpation which

is wholly indefensible by the recognized laws of nations. Before long these illegal residents will aggregate such a large number that even should Japan withdraw from Korea they could arm themselves and terrorize the whole country, impose their will upon the people and sway the destiny of the nation. We say distinctly and with all the force at our command that this monstrous usurpation means the gradual obliteration of the Korean people. The highest Japanese officials may protest that this is not true, that it is far from their intentions, but so long as they allow the Japanese to swarm into the country as they are doing now, so long will it be impossible to believe their protestations, for actions speak louder than words.

Editorial Comment.

Unfortunately the impression is prevalent among a certain class, that the attitude of the *Review* is one of hostility toward the Japanese. This we distinctly disavow. We are here to state both and every side of the case to the public, and those phases of Japanese work in the peninsula which are deserving of praise have not been and will not be overlooked. That we have always spoken plainly and without equivocation can be distasteful only to those who do not care to have the plain facts known by the general public. There can be no doubt that Japan has before her a great destiny. In spite of all drawbacks, the energy and spirit of the Japanese will push them on to great achievements, nor would any man of sense wish to see them checked in their progress toward any legitimate goal. We are willing to see them compete with any other nation and if they can perform a service to any nation or any cause superior in quality to that which is already being done we are willing to see them successful in that com-

petition. It is the logical working of the law of the survival of the fittest. But the large question comes up for answer, What rights of other peoples are the Japanese bound to respect? Should they be called upon to put goods upon the market under their own brands and not attempt to deceive prospective purchasers by imitating brands that have already established reputations in the Far East? Should they be called upon to play the game according to the rules of the game or may they make rules for themselves?

We have long held the opinion that though deservedly successful in the late war, due to objective as well as subjective causes, Japan would find it far more difficult to handle the Korean people than to win battles in the field. The reason for this lies at the basis of the Japanese character. They have more dash than patience, more impulsive force in entering upon a policy than ability to look at things from the standpoint of the other side. They are essentially military in their methods and this means that they succeed better in handling things with the mailed hand than on the basis of an ordinary administrative policy. This can be plainly seen in the events of the past ten months. In glancing over the progress which has been made toward any rational goal in Korea the most sanguine adherent of Japan's cause must confess to disappointment. Without making any serious attempt to manage affairs here on a basis of friendship but after exasperating the people by numberless forms of petty or grave aggressions Japan confessed her inability to handle the country under such conditions and forced upon Korea a so-called protectorate which to this day exists *de facto* though wholly fictitious *de jure*. During all these months what has been done along the whole fring-line of administrative reform? The basis of any settled

government is common justice. We hardly think anyone will contradict the statement that nothing has been done along this line. A good deal has been said about it but what has been done? Today there lies in the outhouses of the supreme court a man who came up to Seoul a year ago asking for a fair trial of his grievance against a notorious plunderer of the poor. He not only did not get justice but he has been slowly starving to death for the past seven months in the court prison where he was thrown by the connivance of the man who had stolen all his property. He is there now, and other Koreans who came to help him are compelled to hide by day and go along side streets only lest they too be seized and imprisoned. Do the Japanese know this? And if not why do they not know and remedy it? A few weeks ago a Korean who had mortgaged a salt field to a Japanese in Fusan for three years was seized by the Japanese and starved for six days till he consented to write a statement that if the money he owed was not paid in a week the field would be forfeited. He could not pay and so a salt field worth ¥10,000 was seized by the Japanese for ¥3,000. Do the Japanese know this? And if they know do they care? There is no such thing as justice today for the ordinary Korean. Now and then we find an exception which is refreshing but as a rule there is no justice. Even since our return Koreans by the scores have appealed to us to save their houses and fields from spoliation. Several women came in only yesterday saying that they had been ordered out of their houses along the road between Seoul and Han Kang and were to receive but ¥10 per *han* for them, when any fairly well informed person knows that they can do next to nothing with such a sum in securing a new home. Probably the gravest charge that can be laid against

the Japanese is this total lack of any definite and tangible results along the line of common justice.

In the field of finance where the results would accrue to the benefit of the Japanese as well as the Koreans we find, even according to the confession of the Japanese papers and the most loyal supporters of the Residency, a complete and disastrous failure. Business was almost at a standstill all last winter and it is only just beginning to pick up again. A loan of ¥10,000,000 has been made to Korea by Japan and a large fraction of it is to be used it seems in supplying Chemulpo with water works. How this can be called a legitimate government expenditure and why the town of Chemulpo should not finance its own water works are questions that those who forced this loan upon Korea will find it hard to answer. There was, apparently, no need of a loan.

Education is one of the themes which have called forth the most eloquent eulogiums of the Japanese, but what has been done in Korea? We can truthfully say, practically nothing. The gentleman who was adviser to the Educational Department has left Korea in disgrace and doubtless in disgust. He advocated the plan of forcing all the common schools in Korea to use Japanese text books. If anything more ludicrously absurd than this can be found in the annals of education we have failed to see it.

In the province of which Taiku is the capital the Korean governor and prefects were allowed to come down upon the people in the good old way for a school tax. Those who know, say that not a tenth part of the enormous sum squeezed from the people will be used for any legitimate purpose. The people were on the verge of revolt and laid the blame upon the Japanese, where it belongs, since they alone could have prevented it.

We have searched the papers in vain

for any indication that the Japanese have accomplished anything along the lines so plainly laid down by Marquis Ito when he first took the matter in hand. We do not at all doubt his good intentions but he had still the lesson to learn that a helpful and conciliatory policy can be carried out only at the hands of those who are helpfully inclined, and unless Marquis Ito could command the services of such, even he was and is doomed to failure. There is no public sentiment in Japan demanding insistently that the Koreans be treated as fellow beings. The general sentiment seems to be rather that of the correspondent of the *Osaka Mainichi* who asked a prominent foreign resident of Seoul if he did not think the Koreans were a good deal like the Ainus. His idea evidently was that the Koreans should be driven back as the North American Indian has been.

The Japanese authorities seem to be unaware of the most potent fact that the civilization of the Japanese has not gone deep enough to keep many of them from reverting to a condition of medieval semicivilization when relieved of the close police surveillance under which they live in Japan.

We have been told that the Japanese are missionaries to Korea because they were sent here to do something. In this case we shall have to inscribe the names of Cortez, Pizarro, Atilla, and Genghis Khan upon the roll of missionaries. They too were sent to do something. We see no evidences as yet of any set purpose on the part of Japan to gain other than selfish advantages in this peninsula. There may be other purposes but they have borne little fruit. Meanwhile Japanese subjects pour in to the country by the thousands and go wherever they wish without passport entirely contrary to their treaty rights. They settle where they wish, buy property or take it, and set up in business with as complete free-

dom as in their own country; all the while considering themselves entirely free from control by Korean magistrates and officials and at the same time too far from their constable centers to be held in check by the Japanese constabulary. There are certain limits within which even a protectorate can move, and if the overwhelming of the Korean people by a tide of Japanese immigration keeps on, the Powers that are still in treaty relations with Korea must and will grow restive.

It is very unfortunate that no one can criticize the actions of Japan in Korea without being charged with being in the employ of Russia. That temper of mind which considers everyone an enemy who is not a blind adherent and an enthusiastic advocate does not speak well for the broad mindedness of the Japanese. We think no reasonable person who has read the pages of this REVIEW will ever charge us with working in the interests of Russia. We would be as sorry to see Russia usurp the power in Korea as we are to see the present state of affairs. We advocate the cause of the Korean people and their continued existence as a nation. In so far as Japan and Korea can be mutually helpful we advocate the temporary predominance of Japanese power in the peninsula; but the things which we specifically object to are the exploitation of Korea for the Japanese, the prevention of the introduction of foreign capital, the swarming of Japanese in the interior without proper control, the rapid alienation of the soil and the continued propagation of the idea that the so-called treaty of last November is a legal and defensible document. We believe that Marquis Ito means well by Korea but that he has been and will be unable to hold in check the selfish ambitions of his own nationals.

We believe that the only way to exer-

cise a deterrent influence is by giving the facts to the public. And in this connection we must inform our readers that since writing the paragraph on education, which has already gone to press, we are informed that the Japanese authorities deny that Mr. Sidehara proposed to have all the common schools use Japanese text books. The reason for his retirement is said to be that the Residency considered the educational problem such a large and important one that it was necessary to have at its head a man of wider experience than Mr. Sidehara. Now, we have looked into the matter carefully and find that Mr. Sidehara did advise that all the students of the Normal school be taught in Japanese and that in the schools which they should be put in charge of Japanese text books should be used. One of the students objected strenuously and said this was a Korean school and not a Japanese school. The plan was to print a large number of Japanese text books for use throughout the school system. After his resignation Mr. Sidehara himself told his Korean friends that he believed this was the cause of his removal. Whether so or not, this proved that the proposition was made and urged upon the educational authorities.

We would be scrupulously careful to note every sign of improvement. We are not able as yet to determine whether the so called "Agricultural and Industrial Bank" may be called a forward movement or not. It is a Korean affair started under the auspices of the Finance Department and its purpose is to loan money to Koreans for the purpose of occupying new agricultural land and improving old land through increased irrigating facilities. This is its ostensible purpose and undoubtedly a laudable one but up to the present time it has merely done the work of a superior kind of loan company, taking deeds of land and houses as security and lending money

thereon for any purpose the borrower may desire.

It is significant that the Il Chin-hoi people were the most active in the matter and they are said to have gotten control of considerable land in the interior which they wish to exploit in this manner. Unfortunately the Il Chin-hoi have not been credited with a great deal of productive labor and for this and other reasons we have to suspend judgment as to the genuineness of this movement. We wish success to every effort which will be of benefit to the people.

The latest movement on the part of the Japanese in separating from the Emperor all the people in whom he has confidence and holding him in practical confinement forms a situation that seems to us to be impossible of permanence. And furthermore it is a matter of such delicacy that we fear even the astuteness of the Japanese will hardly be able to extract any considerable benefit from it. It makes us think of the man who has a bull by the horns and neither dares to keep hold or to let go. The promises of the Japanese to look after the personal welfare of the Imperial family makes it difficult to follow a drastic course and deal with the Emperor as they would apparently desire, but at the same time the perfectly intelligible wish of the Emperor to have some say in the management of his own affairs drives the Japanese to the very crude device of segregating him from all his friends and turning his palace into a jail. This seems to us to be a wholly oriental method of handling the situation. It is proverbially difficult to mix oil and water, and the claim of the Japanese that the treaty of last November was acceptable to the Emperor does not show any logical connection with the charge that the Emperor is fomenting trouble in the interior and trying to interest foreign powers in his

predicament. If the former is true the latter is inconceivable. If the latter is true then the acquiescence of last November was, to use the most euphemistic term, perfunctory.

The Korean Mining Laws.

Comment in the far eastern papers upon the new Korean mining laws has been various. Some find in them nothing to complain about; others consider that they are drawn up not to facilitate the development of Korean resources but to put a stop to all attempts on the part of Western capital to obtain a foothold in the peninsula.

The examination of the text of such a law is like examining a bicycle tire. It may look well on the outside but a very small leak makes it worthless. The tire can be tested in either of two ways; first by putting it to actual use and secondly by putting it in water, in which case any leak will reveal itself. So this law can be tested either by actual use or by subjecting it to very close scrutiny. Until the former method can be tried we reserve the right to try the latter and in doing so we would like to assume an entirely unblamed attitude and treat the question purely on its merits. Whether we do so remains with the reader to determine.

Article I defines the term mining, properly so far as we can see.

Article II states that minerals not extracted, mineral refuse and slag shall be the property of the state. In the highest forms of mining large values are often hidden in these secondary products and whether this law would work a hardship for the expert miner or not would depend very largely upon circumstances. However, this may be passed by as not subject to any considerable criticism. It would necessitate the careful stipulation on the part of the concessionaire of

what products and by-products he proposed to utilize.

Article III states that permission to mine must be obtained from the Minister of Agriculture Commerce and Industry and application must be accompanied by a plan of the intended claim. Proof must also be given of the existence of the minerals to be mined.

In other words foreign capital must send and discover points where valuable minerals may be found and proceed with work until it has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Department that the value is there. This on the mere chance that the application for license will be successful. If the prospective investor could be sure of establishing a claim in the end, this might do, but we shall have to proceed further before discovering what that probability amounts to.

Articles IV, V and VI deal with boundaries and sizes of claims, prohibited areas, etc., and are entirely proper.

Article VII. The Minister of Agriculture etc., shall have the power to refuse permission for mining in case he considers such a step to be necessary in the public interest *or for any other reasons* (italics ours). Here we begin to get at the meat of the matter. The Minister in his own person and without advice from any party can arbitrarily refuse permission to anyone. The reason may be adequate or not. He is not obliged to state his reason but simply to claim there is reason for refusal. There is no possible appeal from this arbitrary refusal and the power vested in the Minister is that of a dictator in mining matters. This again means that the Japanese reserve the right to hold off foreign investment in a perfectly arbitrary manner, for the Agricultural Department like all the rest is dominated by them. This clause alone would be enough to discourage foreign investment. But the

next clause is still more conclusive.

Article VIII. If there is more than one applicant, permission shall be given according to priority of date. As regards applications made on the same date, permission shall be given to the applicant whom the Minister may consider most worthy. In other words, if a foreign syndicate sends prospectors into Korea and locates valuable minerals, makes a plan of the claim and applies for permission on Monday morning, the Japanese with these plans in hand can make out another application for the same claim on Monday afternoon and then leave it to the Minister to decide who is most worthy! It looks as if the Japanese would like to get their prospecting done for nothing. There is no such thing as simultaneous applications, and the clause about "same date" is a perfectly transparent trick to leave a whole day or at least several hours in which to nullify any application that does not suit the dictator. We see no attempt at fairness in this clause. No foreign capitalist, knowing Japanese methods, would for one instant think of spending money to locate minerals in the peninsula, when such a clause is in operation.

There is little use in giving the other articles in detail—enough has been given to show that the whole instrument is intended to block the efforts of foreign capitalists to obtain a foothold in Korean mining operations. But we will mention some other disabilities under which mining interests will labor. Every amalgamation, division or other modification of a mining claim is subject to the consent of the virtual dictator. No right can be sold, assigned or even mortgaged without his consent. He has power to arbitrarily suspend all mining operations when "public interest" requires. But there is no attempt to define what public interest means or how the Minister would interpret the term. It is wholly indefinite

and leaves openings for all sorts of arbitrary manipulation.

Having then given the Minister of Agriculture etc arbitrary and dictatorial power over all mining industries, what checks are put upon abuse of this power? The twenty-first clause makes the curious assertion that the government shall not be responsible for any damage arising from any measure taken by the Minister! Is not this Minister an agent of the government? Why then should the government disavow any responsibility for his acts?

Article XXVII states that as these laws may affect foreigners no such measure shall be decided upon or executed without the previous consent of the Resident General. Now what have we here? The literal meaning is that the fact that foreigners may be interested in mines makes it necessary that every measure taken in connection with mining must gain the consent of the Resident General but the evident meaning is that every measure which effects the introduction of foreign industry shall be subject to the consent of the Resident General. There can be no question that this means a veto power. If the Minister should by any means consent to grant a concession to foreigners the Resident may veto it. Otherwise why should foreigners be singled out for such special attention?

We would also like to ask on what basis Japanese are not included in the list of foreigners. How long is it since Japanese became natives of Korea?

It cannot be long before the various treaty powers come to realize that Japan is rapidly barring out Western capital from the Far East. If these mining laws do not plainly indicate it we should be pleased to hear the argument on the other side and give it publicity.

Opium in Korea.

It has been some years now since the Chinese began to introduce the habit of

opium smoking into northern Korea. The use of this drug is a capital crime according to the laws of the land, but as the Korean government could not well prevent the Chinese from indulging in it the natural result followed and Koreans began smoking. The habit has become something of a fixture in the north but if it were not for the help of outsiders we believe the Koreans would find it difficult to get the drug in sufficient quantities to do much damage.

The Japanese government has long realized the serious danger to society which indulgence in this habit brings and the use of opium for mere pleasure is strictly interdicted in Japan itself. The habit of smoking opium is too costly and requires too much leisure for very many Koreans to be able to indulge, but this difficulty is being rapidly overcome by the free introduction of morphine into Pyeng-yang and the adjoining territory by the Japanese. This may be called one of the forms of service that the Japanese are rendering Korea. There is one Japanese drug store in Pyeng-yang that sells thirty yen worth of morphine every day of the year to Koreans to be injected by use of a Hypodermic syringe. This is done in open day without the least attempt at concealment and, indeed, without any need for concealment. The Japanese authorities cannot but be aware of the facts and yet they allow the cursed stuff to be peddled out to Koreans in this wholesale fashion. One hospital in the north had thirty five cases within a period of one month who had become slaves to this habit and were breaking down. How many more were there who were killing themselves without its coming to the notice of any but their immediate families? There must be thousands.

Now we say directly and unequivocally and without fear of contradiction that for the Japanese government to allow its subjects to come here and retail mor-

phine and hypodermic syringes to Koreans is a monstrous outrage. What is the use of talking about developing the resources of Korea when with both hands they are destroying the best resources of Korea—her men? If the sale of the drug were unrestricted in Japan it might be argued that the Japanese did not know any better, but their scrupulous care to keep Japan clean of the curse leaves them without excuse here. Does it not go far to prove that the Japanese government, whatever a few of the best Japanese may say or think, is entirely careless of the real interests of the Korean people as individuals. They talk big to the world about helping Korea but when it comes right down to the hard and stubborn fact their whole attitude and practice is epitomized in the profit which this Japanese druggist is reaping from the Koreans in Pycog-yang. The same sort of thing was seen a few weeks ago in one of the northern cities. The Japanese soldiers, about whose courtesy and consideration so much has been said, came to the houses of the servants of Americans, turned out the owners and occupied the houses themselves. When the local Japanese resident was notified of the fact by the foreigner he smiled and assured the visitor that as the Emperor of Korea had promised to give the Japanese military anything they needed or desired, no wrong was being done in appropriating the houses. Bear in mind that this was no irresponsible underling, but the highest representative of Japan in the north.

And yet the Japanese resent the evident change that is coming over the sentiment of decent people in America and England. Is it to be supposed that the world is to remain ignorant of what is going on or is it that the Japanese imagine the valor they showed in war will be sufficient to blind the eyes of the west to these revolting inhumanities? We would

not be hypercritical but we do ask that the large and generous statements made by leading Japanese statesmen, and which are supposed to underlie the policy of Japan in Korea, should bear some proportionate and corresponding fruit in actual practice here. We see little of it as yet. An incident occurred a short time ago in Fusan which is pregnant with meaning. A Japanese teacher who had been teaching a Korean school there for many years, had for his next door neighbor a Korean gentleman who is connected with one of the American residents of that port. The Korean's house was behind and above that of the Japanese. One day without warning stones began flying up from below and falling on the Korean's roof and in his yard. This was kept up at intervals for several days. The Korean hardly dared stand in his own yard without cover. He thought the Japanese was trying to persecute him into selling the place at a low figure, but the Korean held his place. Finding that the stones had no effect the Japanese came up one day and entered the yard without warning or invitation. He approached the house, broke the window, entered the room, smashed the hanging lamp, and began destroying everything he could lay his hands on. The Korean concluded that the man was insane and with the help of one or two others he seized and tied the Japanese to a chair until the authorities could be summoned. The police were called but before they arrived the Japanese was freed. The police saw the wreck which had been made of the place but when they found that the Japanese had been forcibly restrained they exclaimed, "What, shall a Japanese subject be tied by a savage of Korea?" and turned and marched back to their places leaving the culprit still on the premises. Repeated application elicited no response from the Japanese authorities. It makes no difference how outrageous may be the

conduct of a Japanese his body is sacred from the touch of a Korean.

But we have gotten some distance away from our main topic—opium. As there seems to be no one else to do it we take upon ourselves the duty of demanding in the name of common decency and humanity that Japan make stringent laws against the sale of morphine to the Koreans and that she seek to it that the law is enforced. We have the best of reasons for believing that this disgraceful state will be fully exposed in the leading papers of England and America and we warn the Japanese that there is nothing that will hasten the turning of public sentiment in the west against Japan like a failure on her part to bring the nefarious business to a full and sudden stop.

In line with what we have said Dr. Wells of Pyeng-yang has the following remarks to make. "The opium fiends, or morphine users, who began by smoking opium, are a most abject lot and usually from the homes of the well-to-do. They use the hypodermic syringe and inject morphine daily. I took on one case and instituted an original treatment in which adrenaline was the main medicine used and the habit cut off at once. This was so successful that it created something of a *furor* among the morphine users, so that in April I had some thirty applications for treatment. They were so numerous that I sent some of them to a hospital conducted by one of my former students and he, with the same remedies I used, is having good success."

To The Editor KOREA REVIEW.

DEAR SIR:—

About the 19th of July the Japanese authorities restaked a railway terminus in Wonsan large enough for a terminal in the city of London. On large planed wooden slabs the size of a Korean monu-

ment they have written these characters 軍用鐵道用地 which, interpreted freely, mean "Military Railway Grant."

Is this a substitute for the useful term adopted for appropriating ground during the late war? I refer to the oft used "Military necessity."

The second time this season the Tokuwan magistrate has been made to order the people to cut and cure hay for the Japanese garrison horses. Farming and other occupations are abandoned while this is done gratis for the Japanese government. Can you tell me whether the people in Japan are forced to provide provender for the military horses gratis? Perhaps you would also say if there is any authority in even the invalid, forced treaty of last November to warrant such action. The magistrate referred to has a good name among the people. He is said not to "squeeze" the people.

AN ENQUIRER.

Wonsan, July 24, 1906.

We more than suspect that there is at least a dash of irony in these questions. They answer themselves. In England if people believe they are wrongly taxed for sectarian schools they sit back and refuse to pay. Some of them get into trouble but it opens the eyes of the authorities to the evil. If these Koreans would simply refuse to be made serfs to the Japanese there might be a little trouble but the Japanese would soon discover that they were going too far. We know of no way to bring these outrages clearly before the public unless the Koreans resent them in a determined manner. It is the old story of the squeezing official over again. If he does not know where to stop and cannot gauge the degree of the people's patience he oversteps the dead line and gets run out. The Japanese seem to think that the patience of the Korean people is without limit, but the time must come when

serious trouble will result. A prominent American Army officer told us that the Korean people will not obtain any considerable sympathy from the West until they show a determination to help themselves. It may be smooth sailing for the Japanese now but let them become involved in war in the future and the outrages they have committed here will bear legitimate fruit, for the people taking advantage of the opportunity will gladly rise up and hound them out of the country as they did in the days of Hideyoshi. But Japan had, and still has, it in her power to adopt other tactics than those of Hideyoshi and treat the Koreans as fellow-beings. It looks much as if she were now killing the goose that lays the golden egg.

The Korean Emigrant Protection Law.

There is something pathetic in the way Japan is providing "protection" for Koreans where no protection is required. No one has heard that Koreans have suffered because they went abroad to work. They make very satisfactory workmen and in Hawaii are considered by many to be much superior to Japanese. No one would deny that the government should exercise a certain oversight over emigration but these laws seem to be simply putting obstacles in the way of emigration rather than helping the Korean to gain an honest livelihood in the labor market abroad. The Korean has as much right to go abroad and work as has the Japanese but these laws practically prohibit this. It may be that free emigration would result in individual cases of hardship but why not begin at points where the Korean really needs protection? To hold a man down by the throat while you rifle his pockets and at the same time give him a dose of quinine for fear he will catch cold dur-

ing the process would be a curious case of mixed motive. Let the Japanese stop seizing Koreans' houses and lands at a quarter of their market value; let them stop drugging the Koreans with morphine; let them stop stealing every stick of timber that floats down the Yalu without having its owner's name clearly marked on it; let them stop beating political suspects in order to elicit information; let them stop pretending that a promise to give all facilities for military operations in 1904 covers the seizure of all sorts of property for railroads and other schemes in time of peace; let them stop forcing Koreans to act as hewers of wood and drawers of water without pay; let them give the Korean a little chance at justice and fair dealing and then it will be time enough to talk about "protecting" the Korean against the wiles of the foreign labor market.

The Korean says "A pin prick calls for immediate attention while worms may eat out the heart unnoticed." It seems to us that there is some such disproportion manifest in Japan's anxiety about the welfare of the Korean people. We are prepared to give chapter and verse for every one of the forms of oppression mentioned above. We have been taken to task for saying that the Japanese torture Koreans. Well, we would hardly have claimed this if we had not had data at hand to prove it. About June 20th a cunuch named Kim Kyu-sun was seized and taken to the Police headquarters. He was taken in hand by a Japanese policeman and a Japanese police captain who beat him and kicked him brutally in the course of his examination. He was brought out each day for about a week and beaten by the Japanese in their attempts to get information out of him in connection, we believe, with the uprising in the south. This man had not been condemned and

his treatment was nothing less than savagery.

As for the emigration laws one is almost forced to believe that successful Korean competition with Japanese labor in Hawaii has much to do with these stringent regulations. We do not affirm this but the fact of such competition combined with the further fact that all so called reforms in Korea, so far, have looked to the sole benefit of the Japanese themselves make it look very much as if more than mere protection of the Korean were involved.

Export Duties.

The decision of the ruling power in Korea to revise the customs regulations by dropping all export duty on rice is the latest reform effected in the Peninsula, and as such should be recorded. It is proper to enquire what the cause of this move may be and whom it will benefit.

The export trade of Korea is almost entirely in the hands of the Japanese. The Koreans have so small a share in it as to be practically a negligible quantity. In the second place there is never any difficulty in disposing of all the surplus rice even when the export duty is in force. So this scheme could not have been pushed in the interests of the Korean people except on the theory that the Korean producer will receive an advanced price for his grain because of the removal of the export duty. No one who knows anything about the methods in vogue in Korea will imagine that any Korean will reap this advantage. The government loses this amount of revenue and has to make up some where else. The brunt of it must fall upon the farmer. For every dollar that the government received from the export duty it must charge the farmer two dollars, for in the the customs there is practically no

"leakage" in transit while to collect the same amount from the farmer a wide margin must be left for "collecting." This seems to us too plain a fact to need further elucidation. But even so the Korean farmer will receive no part of the increment of value resulting from the removal of export duty. He knows nothing about the rice market in Japan nor what is a fair price for his goods. In the summer time the agent of the Japanese exporter goes into the country and buys the standing crop at the minimum price, a price still further diminished from the fact that the money is paid in advance. But does the purchaser share with the Korean the danger of a failure of the crop? Not at all. He takes the deed of the rice field as security for his money and if the crop fails or does not come up to the estimate he seizes the land and the Korean loses everything. How the Korean can be so foolish as to run this terrible risk it is hard to explain except on the general principle that the Korean thinks he has gained something by having a few dollars in hand a few months before he has to give an equivalent. Of course this is all suicidal—for the Korean. The Japanese have a model farm in Chungcheong province. It lies on both sides of one of the main native thoroughfares *but they do not allow a single Korean to travel this road where it passes through the farm.* Even an American gentleman, a few months ago, thought it better to make a wide detour with his Korean attendant rather than run the risk of being assaulted. Well, we would suggest that the Japanese authorities open up this public road again and instead of making model farms for Koreans who know as much about farming as the Japanese themselves, start a campaign of education among Korean farmers to teach them the foolishness of mortgaging their crops and running the risk of losing

everything. Can the gentle reader imagine the Japanese authorities offering the Korean farmer such helpful advice as this against the selfish interests of the sharks who infest the interior intent upon reaping enormous profits with no risk to themselves?

No, there is one and only one explanation for this removal of export duty. It will benefit the Japanese exporter who will put this money in his own pocket instead of paying it over to the Korean government. If the government for this together with other reasons, finds itself unable to make ends meet, it can borrow from Japan at six or seven per cent., receiving about 50% of the face value of the loan!

The Chief Commissioner of customs readily consented to the proposition to do away with the export duty. We wonder what J. McLeavy Brown would have said if he had been approached in regard to such a scheme. It is not hard to guess. He struggled with might and main to keep the country out of debt, and succeeded. Some day, if there is any such thing as justice, the Koreans will erect a monument to that man and as they look upon it they will wonder how they ever could have been so foolish as to hamper him in his work.

The Pyong-yang Land Case.

The people of Pyong-yang who have been treated so unjustly by the Japanese seem determined to leave no stone unturned in their attempt to secure justice or at least some mitigation of their unfortunate condition.

For the third time now they have sent representatives to Seoul to lay their grievances before the authorities. These men are here now and the following are some of the papers which they present in vindication of their cause. They first quote the agreement between Gan. Ha-

egawa and the Korean Home Minister Yi Chi-yong on July 25, 1905 in which the Japanese promised to give back the land, used for military purposes, as soon as it was no longer needed, but Korea was made to guarantee that in case the land is given back she will not only give back the ¥200,000 paid by Japan but also reimburse her for the cost of all buildings or other expenditures on the land. If any property has to be bought from foreigners the Korean Government must cover the total expense.

On October 18, 1905, another agreement of a similar nature was obtained from Korea. More land was needed for military occupation and Japan turned over to the Korean Government 359,000 yen, but with the stipulation that when the Japanese no longer needed the land and should turn it over again to the Korean Government the latter must pay back all the 359,000 yen together with all the cost of buildings, carts and other expenditures by the Japanese.

These petitioners allege that in July, 1905, Japan staked out land at Yong-san, Pyong-yang and Wiju, and announced that this would be needed, and added that it must be given by August 5th or it would be taken any way. (1) Land, according to survey at Yong-san, Pyong-yang and Wiju to be turned over to Japan. (2) ¥200,000 to be given by Japan not as price of land but cost of removal. (3) If there is any difficulty about carrying this through, Korea to assume the responsibility.

Such was the basis upon which Japan proceeded in settling soldiers in Korea.

PETITION OF THE PEOPLE OF PYONG-YANG TO THE HOME DEPARTMENT

April 1906.

"The People of South Pyongan Province, City of Pyong-yang, residents of the *Wang* (outside of wall) represented by three gentlemen, Yang Sŏn-jo, Whang

Sök-whan and Whang Seung-yön, hereby respectfully petition:—

"When, in October 1905, the Japanese Military authorities demanded the property in the vicinity of Pyeng yang we sent a Committee to Seoul to ask whether this was a wanton seizure of our property or whether our government was back of it all. We were informed by the Home Minister that the Japanese needed the land temporarily, that the Japanese would pay the cost of removal and of the growing crops, that when the war was over and Japan and Russia made peace the land would be given back; that we need have no fear at all. The Korean people generally said that Japan would not lie about such a thing as this and would keep her promises. So we acquiesced in the arrangement as a dire necessity. In this forced removal, this tearing up of homes, this displacement and disorganization of the industries and the means of livelihood of thousands of people there was extreme suffering. The pittance given each house owner as cost of removal was practically nothing as compared with the sacrifice the people had to make.

"Already in 1904, 234,000 *hube* (936,000 sq. yards) of land had been requisitioned for a railway station. One hundred and eight houses were torn down and removed at a terrible cost of hardship and suffering. But in February 1905 the railway demanded 580,000 *hube* (2,320,000 sq. yards) more of land and 200 more houses were razed, among them many of those that had already been removed once. The suffering at this time was greater even than before. Land was so scarce that there was only an average of 1,400 *hube* (5,000 sq. yards) to support six or seven people. [This is less than two thirds of an acre]. Thus suddenly to deprive the people of a large tract of farm land could not but inflict enormous suffering.

"It was in October 1905 that Japanese soldiers began coming back from the north. They borrowed or took Korean houses on every side. Forced their way into Korean houses and seized all unoccupied space crowded the occupants of the houses into the smallest possible space and appropriated the major part of the house. They said they would go in April. For this occupancy the Koreans were paid nothing. In this instance also the Koreans put faith in the promises of the Japanese. Believing that these promises would be kept and that their lands and houses would be given back in the Spring the people made all preparation for putting in their seeds. They prepared their implements and bought seed to sow. But when Spring came not only did the Japanese not get out of the houses which they had forced the Koreans to share with them but they actually drove out the owners and stole the houses. There were eighteen houses where the owners were driven out by their 'guests,' and in scores of other cases the owners were threatened with seizure of their houses if they objected to the continued imposition. Not only were the fields not given back, but more soldiers came and seized more land for training grounds, etc., and the people who had waited patiently to be able to plant their fields were in despair. But there was no redress except through the authorities at Seoul. So the appeal was made last April. On May 6th the Home Minister replied that as the people had been scattered and were suffering it was a very unfortunate state of things and that he would immediately consult with the Japanese and have it remedied. These were good words but the promise either was not carried out or else the Japanese were deaf to our entreaties, for nothing came of it."

On July 19th, 1906, the same three men were sent to Seoul to the Japanese au-

thorities direct. They say that seven or eight thousand people at Pyeng-yang are now suffering intensely because of the exactions of the Japanese. They have heard that all but 60,000 *tsudo* of the land is to be given back to the Koreans and they are rejoiced. They have come with a carefully worked out map of the section of land involved and they are waiting to be of any possible service in getting the land back so these thousands of Koreans may not starve. They appeal to the Resident saying that as he has come to govern and help the Korean people he should be even more solicitous of the interests of the Korean people than of the Japanese themselves, because the difficulties that the Koreans labor under are greater than those of the Japanese. They describe graphically the sufferings of the people at Pyeng-yang and declare that earthquake pestilence or war would be easier to bear, because such things come to an end while the present evils seem to stay. The following list of lands, houses, etc., is appended. We give merely the summary.

Houses requisitioned 1951, of which 390 have been torn down while the remainder still are in the Koreans' hands but forcibly shared by Japanese soldiers.

Lands requisitioned 3,400,380 *tsudo* (73,631,420 sq. yards or over 4½ sq. miles). Of this 1,064,420 *tsudo* has been taken by railway, 209,980 *tsudo* by soldiers, and 866,320 extra for railway. The rest is still in the hands of the people.

This is a description of only one of the three main centers where enormous tracts of land were requisitioned. To attempt to defend the seizure of nearly four square miles of land at one place for a railway station and soldiers quarters is impossible. One eighth of that would have been amply sufficient for both purposes.

Then again, the petitioners again call attention to the fact that the Korean

government guaranteed to pay back all the money given by Japanese for the removal of the Korean houses and also to pay for all buildings, carts, etc., etc., at their full cost. The Japanese government apparently proposes to throw on to the shoulders of Korea a vast array of tumble down barracks, worn out carts, and a thousand and one other *residua* of war at their original cost.

We shall be pleased to see the bill that they put in for these things.

LATER. The representatives went to the Resident General's office to present their petition but after some time of waiting they were told that the Resident could not be seen, that he had nothing to do with the matter, that it must be attended to at the Home Office. The representatives replied that as it was Japanese troops that were causing the suffering they did not see how the Home Office could remedy it nor how the Resident could ignore the matter and claim freedom from responsibility; and they added that if Korean people who had been grievously injured were to be handed back and forth between the Residency and the Home Office whom could the people believe or where were they to look for redress? They were told that the Home Office had charge of the whole matter of attending to the needs of the people and that they must address that office. The representatives of the people then asked whether in case Japanese troops act illegally and injure the people the Japanese authorities were going to pay no attention to it. To this they received the same answer, that they must do everything through the Home Office. The representatives then said "Is it possible that Japan has taken control of everything else in Korea except the welfare of the common people?" The answer to this was that the Japanese Resident could be approached by the common people only through the Home

Office. The representatives replied that this, to use a figure of speech, was as if a Korean should fall into the water and while drowning should call to the only boat in sight, a Japanese boat, and the occupants of the latter should reply that he must call to a Korean boat to help him. The Japanese replied that it made no difference what the representatives said, their case would be attended to only by the Home Office. This closed the conversation and the representatives went to the Home Office again and said that the Home Minister must take the matter up or else the Japanese government would not move in the case. The Minister made voluble promises to represent the case to the Japanese authorities. The petitioners asked to be informed when the Home Office represented the case to the Japanese, for if an answer was not speedily forthcoming they would again appeal to the Resident who could no longer make excuse that the matter had not been taken up by the Home Office.

It is plain that these men are determined to get some sort of an answer from the Japanese about this outrageous treatment of their constituency. We trust they will keep at it until they shame the authorities into taking action or else make them uncover and appear in their true character, and no longer pose as benefactors of the Korean people.

Editorial Comment.

One of our Seoul contemporaries, the *Weekly Press*, has come out with an editorial on "Korea's Friends." We are told that they may be divided into two classes each of which tells the Korean people certain things. One class of friends tells them "that they should accept the order of things which has been introduced as a logical and unavoidable

consequence of the late war and make the most of the situation by a frank and straightforward co-operation with the reformatory efforts of their protectors." The other class of friends tells the Koreans, so it is said, "that in the near future there will appear mighty saviors to liberate them from the yoke of their present masters," and these friends "poison the minds of the Koreans by all sorts of insinuations, arguments, stories and what not."

Now the *KORŬA REVIEW* claims some modest degree of friendship for the Korean people but we refuse to be put in either of these arbitrary classes. We cannot join with the first class because the so-called "reformatory efforts" of the "protectors" are not such that the Koreans can possibly have any sympathy with them. There is no justice for the Korean today. We have always said that if the Japanese would see to it that the people get even-handed justice they would gain the co-operation and friendship of the Koreans. What is the situation today? The Japanese are responsible for the administration of the government in the provinces as much as in Seoul, but we are just now in receipt of a letter from an intelligent and observant correspondent in the south who says: "The Korean prefects continue to fleece the people of thousands, on one pretext or another, and are all as contemptible a set of rascals as one could imagine. Hundreds of instances come under our observation of the collection of illegal sums of money by these fellows. They do not lift a hand to protect the people from any harpy that comes along, Korean or Japanese. So far as I can see it would be a blessing if every Korean official in the country were superseded by someone with a little backbone and a glimmering idea of what government is. I do not envy the Japanese the job they have undertaken, and believe the more

impetuous American would adopt far more drastic measures if he were in the position of the Japanese."

He hits the nail exactly on the head. The American would adopt more drastic measures but they would be along the line of cleaning up a rotten administration and thereby gaining the thanks of the people rather than in using up his energy in making emigration laws and mining regulations. Our correspondent doubts the advisability of our attacking Japan's policy here, but from his own showing the *direction* of Japan's energies in this peninsula is all wrong. This is what we oppose and we reaffirm our position, that until Japan stops playing around the edges of the question and attacks it at the center no Korean can possibly follow the advice of our contemporary's first class of friends. What single reform as yet attempted could the Koreans heartily co-operate in? Let someone answer. Will it be the loan of 10,000,000 yen, part of which is to be used in making waterworks for Chemulpo, a town that is almost wholly Japanese? Will it be the removal of the export duty on rice which will deplete the national treasury for the benefit of Japanese exporters? Will it be the permission to Japanese adventurers to overrun the country by thousands contrary to treaty obligations and to the direct detriment of Korean private interests? Will it be the refusal to allow Koreans to go abroad to earn an honest living in the world's labor markets? Of what consequence is Korean emigration compared with the state of things described by our correspondent in the south? Instead of making periodical raids upon the palace on the chance of spounding up some personal friend of the King why not make a raid or two on the Home Office and make the Minister call a few score of the prefectural governors and prefects to account for their hideous mismanage-

ment of affairs. But you say this takes time. Certainly, but even as we write this news comes that the Home Minister has just appointed a new batch of country officials from among his own relatives and henchmen. Does this indicate that the Japanese are using any precautions to prevent the appointment of inexperienced or venial officials? If there is any office where an adviser is needed and where careful scrutiny of every official act is required it is in the Home Office. What sensible Korean can make friends with such criminal neglect of the first interests of the Korean people?

But we are still further from the second class. We have never attempted to poison the minds of the people by arguments, insinuations, etc., we have never told the people that in the near future a mighty savior would appear to liberate them from their present masters. We tell the Koreans to educate themselves in order to preserve their own language and national identity. We tell them to render themselves fit for responsible positions and shame the Japanese into cleaning out the Augean Stables. We have always held that Korea needs a strong hand upon her for a time but she needs that strong hand on her collar and not in her pocket. That is, for her benefit and not merely for the benefit of her master.

So it appears our esteemed contemporary will have to add one more to his list of Korea's friends, namely those who are determined to hold up to the public gaze the facts in regard to Japanese management of Korea in the hope that in time Japan will get right down to business and carry out some of the grand propositions published from Tokyo and which tend to make the world believe that Japan has some interest in the welfare of the Korean people. It will take a few Morrisons, and McKenzies, and Millards to do this, but it is sure to come provided Japan has in her the

ability to learn how to handle an alien people. There is no use in despairing of this, however dark the prospect is. We confess there are reasonable doubts but while there is life there is hope.

We would call the attention of the readers of this magazine to the fact that the name of Pak Yong who should not have been included in the list of the Emperor's personal friends who were seized and imprisoned by the Japanese. In the last issue of the *Review* his name was given as one of the imprisoned men. We will also say that the matter of the abuse of Koreans, after arrest but before sentence has been passed, has been called in question. In our next issue we shall be prepared to give the specific reasons upon which the charge was based. Meanwhile we will say that the charge of having ill-treated the eunuch at the police headquarters has been denied. Now we received the information in regard to this fact from sources which we believe to be wholly reliable but we shall verify it again and if we are found to be in error we shall say so. We understand very well that in the present temper of the Koreans toward the Japanese they are very likely to make extreme statements, but in this instance our information came from a man who has lived many years in America, who knows the difference between truth and rumor, and whose word we will accept with as complete confidence as that of any foreigner in our acquaintance. However, as we say, the matter will be again inquired into with care. We are the very farthest remove from any desire or necessity to exaggerate any case or instance of Japanese oppression in Korea. The world is beginning to ascertain the facts, as is shown by the statements of the *Times* which warns the Japanese that the treatment of Korea as a conquered people will alienate the sympathy of the west.

We rejoice in every indication which points toward a desire and determination on the part of Japan to do the fair thing by the Korean people. At the present time these indications lie almost solely in the realm of promise rather than actual accomplishment. We believe that the best Japanese, among whom we count the present Resident General, desire to deal fairly by the Korean but we also believe that such powerful pressure is brought to bear upon the present administration by those who are interested in selfish aggrandizement that these good intentions are largely thwarted. We earnestly solicit from any source whatever information which will tend to prove that the Japanese authorities are treating the Koreans as genuine friends. And we furthermore declare that if there is the opinion among those interested in Korea that we purposely pick out available points in Japan's policy here to the exclusion of the good points such opinion is a grave mistake. If some one will test this by sending to us for publication a plea in Japan's favor as touching her management of Korean affairs we shall consider it a great favor. Since the first of June we have talked with many people who are acquainted with the actual state of things in Seoul and in the interior and we have been able to elicit no justification of the main points of Japan's policy in Korea. We do not doubt that there are those who thoroughly sympathize in all Japan has done here, but we see nothing of it in the foreign press of the Far East from the pen of those who are here on the ground. What excuse, for instance, has been made for Japan's failure to exercise strict oversight of the personal qualifications of candidates for prefectural and gubernatorial positions in the interior, and to inflict swift punishment and disgrace for malfeasance in these most important positions? This is but

one case. We have cited many more in previous pages of this issue. There seems to be no one who can find reasonable excuse for these things. The upholders of Japan's cause seem to be such by virtue of a general policy to uphold Japan in her work of self-development without any desire to go into particulars. Their strongest argument, if argument it may be called, is a complete contempt of the Korean either as to his desire or his ability to do anything toward self-improvement. This seems, in their eyes, to justify Japan in everything she has done here. Japan is strong, virile, aggressive; Korea is weak, ignorant, conservative; therefore the present state of things is justified and any man who raises his voice to protest that even weak, ignorant and conservative people have some inalienable rights, is a fool if not worse!

We make the following definite engagement with the readers of this magazine. Every statement that we hear or see which justifies or attempts to justify any specific act of the Japanese regime in Korea will receive instant attention, and will be published in full in these pages, *even though such statement be anonymous*. This is contrary to journalistic usage but so desirous are we to see both sides fairly represented that we consider such deviation from ordinary custom justified.

The Japanese in the North.

To those who fancy that the criticism of Japanese actions in Korea is only on the part of a few "soreheads" and cranks we commend the following quotation from the annual report of an American missionary in the north who has had under his sole care 11,943 native Christians, forty-five boys' schools and eleven girls' schools; who has during a single year baptized 1,077 Koreans and has had

all the business of the station to attend to besides looking after the native churches in seventy-eight localities. We submit that such a man has had no time to brood over the situation or get morbid about it. He says:—

"The word 'oppression' has been on every Korean tongue many times of late. It would take too long to enumerate all the evils that are carried on under the name of Japanese occupancy, but a few ought to be mentioned. The seizure of Korean property without compensation still goes on unabated. This is particularly true of the railroad which is constantly making changes in its course involving the seizure of a new right of way and the consequent ejection of a new set of Korean proprietors from their houses and lands."

"Another example is the forestry concession, the object of which seems to be the cutting of every stick of standing timber larger than a walking cane and the entire monopoly of all the lumber produced in Korea. Not only the big lumbermen up the Yalu have lost heavily but the small proprietors of wooded grave sites or other pieces of timber land have found themselves unable to protect their property. Many of these have resorted to the expedient of presenting their timber to the Church in order to save it from the Japanese. As eighteen new churches have been built and twenty seven old ones enlarged during the year, the lumber was very acceptable, but its protection has cost very heavily in worry and American bluff."

"Forced labor still continues in many places, but the stand made by the Christians has compelled the Japanese to pay wages in the greater part of the province. In the districts where the Christians are in the majority the laborers organized and refused to work without pay. There were beatings and outrages galore but the Koreans gradually won the day and

now the vanquishers of Russia appear to be vanquished by the infant church of North Pyeng An Do."

All of this goes to show what? That Korea is being exploited for the sole benefit of the Japanese without a thought for the welfare of the Koreans.

When a Russian timber concession on the Yalu called forth such a storm of protest from the Japanese and others as well, who dreamed that before the echoes of war had died away the Japanese would be outdoing the Muscovite in his rapacity and be making the Russian look white by comparison? That the Japanese should go about stealing the lumber from grave sites is enough to make a very phlegmatic man's blood run faster. It is an outrage that no future apologies of Japan can ever make right. It is an exhibition of the actual as contrasted with the advertised character of the Japanese. How sweetly all this chimes in with Baron Kaseko's strong statement to the American people that the Japanese government would not encourage the Japanese to mix with the Koreans much but that they should consider the Koreans a lower race. Meanwhile Koreans are building Christian churches to save their lumber from being stolen by the representatives of this higher race! All we ask is that the world should once fairly get at the facts and then we shall have no fears for the future.

Another thing that this quotation teaches is that if Koreans will refuse to become the serfs of Japan there is a point of compulsion beyond which even the Japanese dare not go. They will stop short of killing off the population of Korea though many a man may be beaten and crippled in the process. We never have advised the Koreans to armed reprisals nor do we do so now, but he can stand and refuse to be bullied into slave labor.

The report from which we quote was not written for the purpose of showing up the Japanese but only to describe the actual conditions under which missionary work is done in the north today. The missionary has no intention to work against the Japanese in any way but he has the fullest right to make known, to the people who stand back of him and his work, the disabilities under which that work lies. We wish that every American citizen in the world might read and digest this report. It is the man on the spot who knows the facts.

Korea's Internal Affairs.

The only criticism made of our charges against Japan for not cleaning up the ordinary internal administration in Korea has been a verbal cue and cites the fact that in the so called treaty of last November Japan engaged not to interfere in that part of the government. Any alleged attempt on the part of Japan to live up to any of her promises to Korea is worthy of serious attention. But here we meet the necessity of defining terms, and definition is one of the most difficult tests in government where all functions of the administration react upon each other as truly as do the members of an organic physical body. What do we mean by internal affairs? Do we mean for one thing the appointment of the personnel of the administration? If so we are quite cognizant of the fact that the Ministers of State, and through them the whole official, hold their places by the sanction and consent of the Japanese. If one of them says or does anything that is at all inimical to the interests of the Japanese he is gotten rid of in a hurry. Does any one suppose that Yi Chi-yong or Yi Kenu-tak or any of their ilk are fattening on Korea and wrangling over the government patronage without the full consent of the Japanese authorities?

Such would be a woful mistake. Here is the crux of the situation. Is Japan responsible for the hideous travesty of government which the common people of Korea are groaning under today? We see no possible answer to this question but an affirmative one. We are driven to the reluctant conclusion that the Japanese foresaw the difficulties in the way of annexing Korea and becoming responsible for everything and therefore took shelter under the promise of non-interference in domestic affairs while intending all the while to have all the strings in their hands and control everything. It was the world-old desire to get the chestnuts without the risk of burning their own fingers. It was the "indirect" method as distinguished from the "direct." Japan controls the finances, the various lines of communications, the police, and yet she is said to leave some freedom in internal affairs. One might as well cut off the liver, the lungs and the brains from connection with the heart and stomach and then tell these two organs to perform their functions as usual. No, the hard fact, the fact from which there is no escape is that Japan has taken too much to avoid responsibility and too little to give herself the chance to carry out her promises to the world that she would see to it that Korea is governed in an enlightened way. The forced compact of last November was worse than a crime, it was a blunder; for it committed Japan to a course of action that was outside the limits of rational possibility. It made her an irresponsible dictator.

From certain points of view we cannot help sympathizing with the military faction among the Japanese. They apparently wanted to jump in with both feet with a frank avowal of their intention to absorb Korea, make no bones of it, leave excuses and promises to the weak; in fine, play the old berserker act and play

it with a strong hand. Now there would have been something honest in this, in spite of its brutality.

A correspondent has just written me as follows. He is a man who has always stood up for the Japanese and who is trying desperately to do so still.

"I am one who thought the Japanese would ultimately make good, and though I am waiting for evidence I am not ready yet to say it is too late. If the Japanese worked or believed in the direct method I would feel that they had been weighed in the balances and found wanting, but they practice the indirect, and some of their shortcomings, or those charged to them, are the fault of the rascals who even yet steal from the Koreans all they can. I refer to native officials. Of course these officials, as you show are [virtually — *Ed. K. R.*] appointed or advised by the Japanese. The only point yet remaining in answer to your strong and unanswerable position is that after all, the time has been short when the task and the material to be worked with, and on, are considered. * * * * My strongest complaint is that the Japanese do not take hold of things firmly enough. For instance the jail here is the same 'black hole' and there has been no correction since the Japanese became paramount. The Magistrate, *Kam-ni* and Governor are the same type as of yore, though it must be said that squeezing is not so prevalent."

This makes interesting reading and it is from the hand of a gentleman that would be glad to find a valid argument for the Japanese. He cuts into the very heart of the matter when he says the Japanese *do not take hold firmly enough*. But, friend, that lack of a firm hold is the very *kernel of their policy*, for it is the only thing that makes it possible for them to turn clean washed hands to the world and affirm that they are not interfering in the domestic affairs of Korea.

You say they use the indirect instead of the direct method, but this weak hand that you complain of is part and parcel of the indirect policy which you say has not been given time enough. Do not complain of it then but give it time. You say the magistrate and Governor are not squeezing quite so much as they used to. Is this unconscious irony? For conscience sake, man, what is there left to squeeze? Look about your own community and mark the wanton disruption of Korean homes, the stakeless thirst of the newspaper, and then tell me whether the Governor would not have to put the sponge under hydraulic pressure to get anything more out of it.

The most crying need of Korea today is fair government in the provinces. No tinkering with finance, or mines, or water-works or emigration will do any material good so long as the country is governed by the class of men now in office. There is no one acquainted with Korean life who is not aware that brigandage is the gauge which measures the quality of provincial government. It is only when such a gang as the present prefects is let loose upon the people that robbers swarm, and today the native press is crammed to its margins with reports of robber hands. Not one in ten of these men is a professional criminal. They are driven to it by the rapacity of the officials. The other day forty-seven of them were executed in Tai-ku—FORTY-SEVEN—and today the Residency General suggests that small enlightened countries have abolished capital punishment Korea should do so. Do not the shambles of Tai-ku cry aloud for the abolishment of some other things first? If Japan had adopted some other than the indirect method these forty-seven men need not have been killed. But as it is there will be killing and more killing as fast as the people are driven to brigandage.

Editorial Comment.

THE TORTURE OF KOREANS.

Our promise of last month to publish any thing that might be sent us in defense of the Japanese régime has borne fruit in an interesting correspondence with the office of the Resident General in regard to the torture of Koreans by the Japanese.

A few days before the publication of the July issue of this magazine we received a courteous request from the Residency for particulars and names in connection with the charges we had made. We offered to do what we could, since the attitude of the Residency was apparently that of a desire to right a wrong if wrong had been done. We began looking into the case again but were unable to put our hand upon certain special men whom we had seen before and whose deposition it was very desirable to obtain for the Residency.

At last as a sort of report of progress we wrote the Residency saying that as yet we were not ready to report on the specific case mentioned in our columns but would meanwhile report on another case that had come under our notice. It was the case of the eunuch Kim Kyn-ann who, as we believed, had been taken first to the gendarmes' office and from there transferred to the police office. We stated, as appeared in the July issue of this magazine, that this man had been beaten and otherwise misshandled by a Japanese police sergeant and a Japanese policeman in an attempt to secure testimony.

In reply to this note we received an answer from the Residency, from which we quote the significant paragraphs.

"From your note of the 6th inst. I gather that you have not been able to procure any evidence that may be publicly produced concerning the alleged abuse by the gendarmes by way of

explanation you say that "Koreans are afraid to come out publicly with charges of this kind for fear something worse would befall them." This is somewhat at variance with the spirit of the paragraph in which the charge was originally printed, wherein it is stated that "eye-witnesses of this torture have been seen by the editor of this magazine and it is not to be expected that victims of torture will keep still about it." This is, however, by the way. It is at any rate satisfactory to learn that the alleged witnesses have, upon inquiry, displayed themselves in their true character. It is also satisfactory to note that you have discovered upon examination that no responsibility whatever attaches to the gendarmes either for the inhuman acts originally charged or for the only case concerning which you are under the impression that you have obtained precise information, that of the eunuch said to have been ill-treated at the police office. With regard to this case, which really embodies a charge entirely different from that first made, I have made inquiries at the Police Adviser's office and am in a position to assure you that the charge has no foundation at all. You say that the eunuch was arrested and taken to the gendarmes' headquarters about the middle of June and from there removed to the police office where he was daily flogged for about a week. The fact is no eunuch nor any other Korean has ever been handed over by the gendarmes to the police office.

"Under these circumstances I feel sure that you will kindly withdraw the charges in question. In any case I beg you to extend me the usual journalistic courtesy of printing this letter in the next number of your esteemed magazine."

This was dated the thirteenth of August and we replied that as the note implied that we had acknowledged that we had discovered upon examination that no re-

sponsibility, &c., &c. it would be impossible to print the note without printing with it ours of a few days before, that the July issue had gone to press and the matter would have to wait until the next issue before being taken up. To this we received a note the important paragraphs of which are as follows:

"Considering the appearance of confidence with which the charge was originally made, considering the length of time you have had at your disposal for subsequent inquiries and considering the fact that you have more than one eye-witness to rely upon, it is strange, to put it as mildly as possible, that you should still want time for investigation. You seem to attach importance to the alleged fear of the Koreans to come out publicly with charges of this kind lest something worse befall them. Allow me however to point out that they have not been asked to 'come out publicly.' When Marquis Ito asked you to assist him in finding out the truth about the matter His Excellency never dreamed of treating the information you might be able to submit to him as anything but confidential, and Korean informants are not to suffer in any way for telling the truth."

The rest of the note is unessential dealing only with our refusal to print the former note in that issue, a thing that was physically impossible at that late hour. In the concluding paragraph the Resident General suggests that investigation be continued and that Koreans need have no fear as to the consequences of stating the facts as they have seen them. To this note we replied as follows:

"You say that all things considered, it is strange, to put it as mildly as possible, that we should want more time for investigation. Your implication here that we are acting in bad faith is hardly in keeping with the courtesy which has marked your previous communications.

but we waive that and will say that the reason why we were unable to carry out our investigations more rapidly was because the man upon whom we principally depended in this work was taken ill and had to get out of Seoul for some time. (He is a man well known to most foreigners in Seoul and one in whom full confidence can be placed). We wish you had stated at first that Marquis Ito would treat the matter as confidential and not allow his informants' names to get before the public. We were not at all afraid that Marquis Ito would himself cause them trouble but we were not so sure of others, supposing that revelations were made that were not pleasant for the Japanese. Now we should like to say this much about the publication of your note. It would have been unfair to us to have printed your note without printing the others which went before. Ours to you contained no acknowledgment that we had made full inquiries and found that the charges were untrue. Such was very far from the fact. Being as yet unable to secure further evidence as to the acts of the gendarmes we sent you another instance which had come under our notice and which, though as you said a different case entirely, was of identically the same nature. This case we have been able to ask about more definitely and have elicited the following facts. The eunuch who was beaten at the police office has been seen by a man in whom we have full confidence and who was sent for the express purpose. He questioned the eunuch and not content with that he examined the man's back and found conclusive evidence of the beatings. Your disclaimer does not carry great weight in the face of this definite and specific evidence. If you desire we will give you the name of every man connected with this investigation. You may examine the eunuch, our informant

and the man whom we sent to look into the matter; but we have your word for it that none of these men shall suffer for telling what they know.

"You seem to imply that we were trying to slave off the main question by citing another and entirely different case, but we assure you that it makes no difference to the public whether it was at the police office or the gendarmes' headquarters that Koreans are beaten. It is the fact of abuse before a fair trial has been held, it is the attempt to get information out of Koreans by physical pressure that we object to.

"We have said in the issue of the REVIEW about to appear that a question has arisen as to the torture of Koreans by the gendarmes and that we shall give the matter further and careful investigation and that if the charges made cannot be substantiated we shall say so. We have therefore given the matter a tentative character which will enable the public to reserve their judgment of the case until further information is forthcoming."

We received immediately a request for the name of our informant in regard to the case of the eunuch and we complied by doing so. The name and address were given in full. To this we received a reply thanking us for the information but saying that they had inquired "in the responsible quarters" but that no eunuch who had been arrested by gendarmes had ever been turned over to the police. The note ends by saying that "according to existing law the officials are expressly permitted to employ a certain measure of physical pressure to obtain information out of suspects and criminals."

In the first place let us clear up the matter about the eunuch. We obtained the most conclusive proof of the fact of his beating and he affirms it was done by a Japanese police sergeant and a Japanese policeman. We are ready to admit

that the man was not first taken to the gendarmes' place, and we are ready to hear any criticism which this slight inaccuracy warrants. As we did not charge the gendarmes with having hurt him we presume the error is not unpardonable.

Now what happened after the Residency received from us the name and the address of the man through whom we obtained the information? Did the Japanese authorities summon this man and question him about the occurrence? He is a Korean and could not have refused. It was by his full consent that his name was reported. They never went near him, never summoned him, never wrote him a note for information. In other words the witness for the prosecution was not put on the stand. But we receive a note stating that the Residency has once more made inquiries "in the responsible quarters" but that no enbuch, or for that matter no Korean of any kind, "who was arrested by the gendarmen," has ever been handed over to the Korean police. Does this satisfy the desire of the public for information as to the torture of the Korean? That matter is *entirely waived*. We are willing to grant the soft impeachment as to the method of his arrest, but what has the Residency to say about his torture? Silence on this crucial point must be taken for consent. They did torture the enbuch then, as he alleges.

So far so good; now as to the more important matter of the gendarmes. We crave the indulgence of the public while we relate a little story which has been enacted in Seoul during the past few months, more or less. The exact time is unimportant.

A country gentleman whose name we have been given desired to obtain official position. He wanted a good one, none of your thousand dollar jobs but something really good. For this purpose he placed seven thousand yen in the hands

of one of his dear friends who promised to use it for the purchase of the desired bauble. The Dear Friend disappeared over the horizon in the direction of Seoul, and that was the last of him and of the money—for a time. At last the ambitious gentleman began to wonder at the seeming dullness of the official market and followed his Dear Friend to Seoul. In order to get his money back he appealed to the courts and there he met a Korean judge who had enjoyed a good legal training abroad. Let us call him the Lawyer. This bulwark of the law soon had the Dear Friend behind the bars and it began to look as if the Ambitious Gentleman would win out. But as fate would have it he fell in with a lot of young fellows in Seoul who also aspired to be his dear friends and they persuaded him that if he wished to get his money back he must get the Japanese Gendarmes to handle the case. According to them the *modus operandi* would be to make a nice little feast at a tea-house and invite them and some influential gendarmes; and during these festivities the matter could be arranged. To this brilliant advice he listened, and he spent fifty yen on the entertainment. It worked like a charm and a few days later the Dear Friend had changed his lodging place and was housed in the gendarmes' quarters.

The lawyer was not well pleased that the prisoner had been taken out of his jurisdiction and so he summoned the Ambitious Gentleman and asked him about it. The latter replied that "every body" told him it would be better to have the gendarmes tend to the matter. The Lawyer said "I don't know anyone by the name of Everybody. Just give me the ordinary name, Kim, Cho, Pak, or what not. The Ambitious Man demurred but was at last induced to give the names of the new dear friends.

A few days later he came into the

Lawyer's office much dejected. "Well, how about the gendarmes?" "Alas! they got the whole seven thousand out of the Dear Friend but instead of handing it directly to me they gave it to my new dear friends to transmit to me and I got just one hundred and fifty yen out of it!" The Lawyer smiled at him passively a moment, then turned and opened a drawer and drew out a wad of bills that made the Ambitious Gentleman gasp.

"There" said the Lawyer "are six thousand eight hundred and fifty yen. You had to give me the names of your new Dear Friends and I have interviewed them with this result."

The dazed Ambitious Gentleman touched the wad reverently as if it were a thing of beauty and a joy for ever and he hardly heard the Lawyer telling him that the next time he wanted justice he would perhaps know where to look for it.

Here the story ends. But does it? Not by a great deal. A gentleman who is intimately known to the editor of this magazine told us in express and unequivocal terms that he sat in the office of that Lawyer a short time after the events above narrated and heard with his own ears from the mouth of the Dear Friend a detailed description of how the gendarmes got the seven thousand out of him. He said they had a sort of halter that went over the head and under the chin and that by a simple twist they could draw it to a terrible tension. It was by the use of this, he said, that he was persuaded to give back the seven thousand. We can produce the name of the Lawyer, of the Ambitious Gentleman, of the Dear Friend and of the other dear friends. Except for these names the public now knows as much about the incident as we do. But it should be noted that no Korean would invent *that kind of* machine. Nor having lost the money would he

confess that only torture got it out of him. As for the eyewitness who sat in our office he has disappeared. We have not been able to put hand on him, though we have not by any means given up the expectation of doing so before long.

But let us turn to another case. It is well known that the Japanese are eagerly searching for Kang Suk-ho, who has been so long the confidential servant of His Majesty. They have not found him and now he is beyond their reach but they seized a friend of his who lived in his gate quarters and took him to the gendarmes' headquarters. Kang's adopted son, Yi Kil-long, says that the gendarmes beat him most brutally in the attempt to learn where Kang has bestowed himself. The man did not know, and could not tell, but this did not mitigate the pain or the disgrace of the torture. There is where the moral quality of torture shows up. You never can tell whether the man knows what you want to get out of him.

Take another case. A man by the name of Son was seized on the street not long after the little seizure at the palace last November and was taken to the gendarmes' headquarters. He was thrown into a cold room where he was left to freeze. On the twenty-seventh of January he was put out with both feet frozen. He was taken by people with whom we are intimately acquainted and carried to a well-known physician who was obliged to perform severe operations on both feet. It was three months before the man could walk. This was not exactly torture in the ordinary acceptance of that term but who would not rather accept a beating or a moderate head-pinching than to be maimed for life with frozen feet.

The special fact about all this, that the public should note with care, is that after expressing a deep desire to hear

evidence in regard to such irregularities, the Residency General ignored the very witness for whom they had asked and depended entirely upon "authoritative sources."

In conclusion we have to express our surprise that the Residency should quote the Korean law which gives Korean officials the right to torture uncondemned men to secure information. Did we not see in the papers a few days ago that the Residency had suggested to the Korean Government that as most enlightened countries had abolished capital punishment Korea should do so as well? What! execute a man for murder, rape or treason? Out upon such a relic of barbarism!—but "it may also be mentioned that, under the law in force, Korean law officers are expressly permitted to employ a certain measure of physical pressure to obtain information out of suspects and criminals!"

It has been called to our attention that the *Japan Mail* of August 29 made some statements about this magazine. The readers of the *Mail* are told that the editor of the *KOREA REVIEW* went to America to propagate the "false statement" that Japan obtained the treaty of last "October" by force. Now it is curious that the *Mail* should be ignorant of the fact that the treaty was made in November and not in October and it is still more singular that it should suppose a person would go to America for the purpose of propagating an assertion about something that did not occur till a month after he left Korea. But letting all that go, we say now that if every assertion made by this magazine is as true as the one that the treaty of last November was obtained by force the public need have no anxiety about the trustworthiness of the information given in these pages. The *Mail* says we display prejudice, but for the editor of that paper

to hang to that long-exposed fiction about the mutually satisfactory nature of the bogus treaty after even the Japanese themselves have blantly acknowledged that there was a little bit—yes, just a little bit, of opposition, will have to be described by a shorter but no less pungent word than prejudice.

The editor of the *Mail* finds fault with our criticism of Japan's utter neglect of the best interests of Korea in the matter of the appointment of officials. Here is the point that brings the whole matter of Japan's treatment of Korea to a focus. Having seized upon almost everything in the peninsula that spells money, torn from thousands of Koreans their means of livelihood, let loose upon the people a horde of irresponsible and heartless adventurers, Japan attempts to preserve the name of leaving something to Korea by leaving the one thing that needs to be taken in hand and remedied. The editor of the *Mail* need have no fear that we would find in the usurpation of this function of the Korean government an argument to show that the treaty has been broken. It has been broken at so many points that it would be waste of space to add this. He sounds a plaintive note in his statement that the *KOREA REVIEW* is anti-Japanese from cover to cover, but we would remind him that this means anti-oppression and anti-usurpation from cover to cover. We wish the Japanese well in all legitimate lines of national development, but we do not like to see her set a blot upon her escutcheon by playing the part of a despot in Korea.

The *Mail* says that "this may do some good, however, for its complaints must embody grains of truth, we presume." We advise the *Mail* to look up these grains of truth and study them, if that paper wants to be a true friend of Japan rather than a mere flatterer.

Korean Finances.

We have received from Mr. Megata a printed report named "State of Progress of the Reorganization of Finances of Korea." This was published in July 1906. This paper contains eleven specific articles (1) Progress of the Note Associations, (2) Establishment of Warehouse Department, (3) Establishment of Seoul Public Warehouse Company, (4) Establishment of Agricultural and Industrial Banks, (5) Despatch of members of staff of Industrial Bank of Japan to Seoul, (6) Opening of Bonded Market, (7) Supervision of Local Revenue, (8) New Government Enterprises, (9) Disposal of old nickel coins, (10) Extension of work of Customs, (11) Building of Lighthouses.

In our eagerness to find something which Japan has done to help the Korean people and offset in part the bitter oppression which is going along in other lines we have hit upon this report as being the most likely place to find it. We believe that we have succeeded in finding some tangible evidence here of a certain amount of solicitude for the welfare of the Korean people. It will be in place for us to examine with some care the nature of the help extended and the source from which it springs, together with its relations to other forms of Japanese activity in this country.

In the first place, in spite of some damaging mistakes at first we are inclined to believe that Mr. Megata has some adequate appreciation of what the Korean people need and that he honestly wishes to do something for the benefit to the Korean people. We do not believe he is in sympathy with the atrocities that are being perpetrated in the interior or the spoliation of the Korean people. We shall show from the contents of this report that he has learned from his initial mistakes that sudden changes

work more harm than good and that much careful consideration must be given to every financial move. The Koreans can stand fluctuations in governmental policies but when the legal tender of the people is disturbed it touches them to the quick.

If one will examine closely the above eleven headings he will see that in only one of them is the general scheme of government finance touched upon. In only the one topic of Supervision of Local Revenue is the vital subject of national finance broached. All the rest deals with private undertakings. For instance the Note Associations, Warehouse Companies, Bonded Markets, etc., bear solely upon private enterprise.

Let us first examine the seventh article of this report and see what it contains. It states that a plan has been made whereby financial agents in the provinces are to make inquiries of the people as to whether the taxes have been paid or not and to see to the remittance of the taxes. An arrangement has been made with the local Japanese post offices to oversee the remittance of the government revenues. This new system is to be inaugurated in the near future. Moreover by increased strictness in the appointment and dismissal of local officials the reduction of the expense of transport by horse-back will be earnestly aimed at. "But as sudden reforms are apt to involve unavoidable mischief the supervision of the local administration will be gradually made stricter in proportion to the adaptability of the new system of supervision." The statement that sudden reforms involve unavoidable mischief is evidence that the framer of this report has learned much by experience in the field of Korean Finance. It must be noted that all this is as yet merely in the promissory state. Such and such things are to be done. This is good so far as it goes but while we recognize the helpfulness of the sug-

gestion it will be necessary to wait and see how the plan works before we can accept it as a report of progress in finance. There is no doubt that the system of collecting taxes needs immediate attention. Progress has been made in the laying of plans but not in the actual carrying out of the reforms proposed. We learn from those who are best in touch with affairs in the interior that there never was a time when greater indirection prevailed. One governor allowed the prefects and their underlings to carry out a list of *seventeen illegal forms of taxation* at one time. Now nothing is said of this in the report before us. The vital point is that the people should have before them a printed list of all legal taxes and that they should be protected from any farther imposts. Such a move would immediately result in an enormous lightening of the heavy load they now bear. We fear much that the people will care but little for reforms in the manner of remitting the taxes to Seoul so long as the prefects and their *ajins* are allowed to come down upon them at will for heavy illegal taxes. In the report before us this matter of taxation is as yet mere plan and promise. Nothing has as yet been definitely accomplished nor has the promise of greater care in the appointment of prefects been as yet fulfilled. Moreover this vital matter occupies less than half a column out of a total of twenty-two columns in the report. It is apparent that as yet but secondary importance is placed upon it. One should not forget that the important matter of appointment of prefects is not within the province of the Finance Department and no promise given by the Finance Department outside its own proper field can have more than conjectural weight.

But now as to the private enterprises outlined in the report. First comes the Note Association.

For centuries the Korean merchants

have recognized and used that important business asset called credit. Korean firms of good standing throughout the country have been accustomed to give their notes payable at a specified time, and these have been considered almost as good as legal tender. These notes are always transferable and negotiable. Whoever holds the note can present it at maturity with full expectation of its being paid or of some satisfactory arrangement being arrived at. The uniformity with which these notes are met at maturity has astonished those who have looked into the matter and we have reason to believe that Mr. Megata himself gives Korean merchants credit for a high degree of commercial morality. It is seldom indeed that a regular business firm attempts to repudiate its notes. The question has been raised therefore why a note association is necessary. Its avowed object is to restore the credit of bills, fix their forms and regulate their circulation. This much can be said that the member of such an association has this added incentive to straight dealing that if he fails in his financial duty he will be doubly disgraced and he will be publicly ostracized from the company of honest tradesmen. However safe the notes of these men may have been before this, membership and the guarantee of payment which accompanies it make the transaction additionally safe. This is specially true because the affairs and business standing of each member of the association are carefully examined into by agents of the association and this further guarantees the member and makes his standing beyond reasonable question.

But the limits of this association are evident, for only the larger and more wealthy merchants are considered eligible. The ordinary retail shop keeper with a stock of two or three hundred yen would not be allowed to join. His financial ability would be considered below

the mark. His membership would jeopardize the interests of the wealthier members, for the failure of a single man to meet his notes would reflect upon the credit of the entire body. The government has given a certain amount as a fund from which any such dishonored notes of members will be paid. Without pretending to any special knowledge of finance we cannot help questioning the wisdom of this. Unless the government engages to supplement this fund from time to time the public must consider that the fund is exhaustible, and the question arises by what means it can be maintained. If the merchants forming the association should guarantee to meet such losses by assessment on the membership there would be a permanent guarantee, but a mere gift from the government to start things off is more likely to call attention to the unwillingness of the membership to cover losses than to inspire confidence in the undertaking. However we do not expect the public to raise this objection and on the whole the project must be approved as a step in the right direction. We do not think the credit of the merchants has ever been so low as to warrant the expression of a conviction that "an epoch making start in the circulation of bills will take place in the near future." It will do more or less good but will cause no revolution in trade conditions.

Second, comes the warehouse business. This is no more a new departure from recognized custom than is the circulation of notes of hand, but it has been systematized and rendered more accessible to the farmers than heretofore. During the first two months of the current year such warehouses were established in seven places in Korea and money to the amount of over 700,000 yen was loaned on security of the grain warehoused. In Seoul there is a special arrangement and here the amount of yen 276,000 has been

loaned on go-down receipts. There can be no question that this is a good move and is calculated to benefit the people. It is a larger application of a principle as old as the dynasty.

Next come the industrial and agricultural banks. These are established for the purpose of providing capital for furthering the interests mentioned in the title. Money loaned for this purpose shall be used only for specific purposes, namely cultivation, drainage, irrigation, roads, forestry, seeds, manure, implements, livestock, buildings, and other improvements of a direct character.

We see no difficulty here. Such a plan is calculated to be of benefit to the people provided they are in a position to take advantage of it. The difficulty lies in another direction. Neither this nor any other improvement will be of any use so long as the people are not secure in the possession of their land. Right at this moment we are in receipt of information of the most scandalous thefts of land from Koreans by the Japanese. We would suggest that every Korean owning land hasten to mortgage it in one of these institutions for a small sum, not because they need the money but because the transaction will help to protect them from Japanese who are wresting the land from people without payment. In this way some immediate good would come from the founding of these banks. No Japanese would dare steal land that had been mortgaged to one of these institutions. In this way Mr. Megata might do more good than he ever anticipated, and the Korean owner could well afford to pay the low rate of interest for the small sum borrowed. We take it that the rate of interest will be low. It is a disappointment not to see the rate mentioned in the report but we imagine that not more than a possible 10% per annum would be charged. This would be low for Korea, but being well secured

would be ample. We seriously suggest that all foreigners in Korea advise their Korean friends to immediately mortgage their land to these banks at the lowest possible figure and call the annual interest simply a tax for protection against unscrupulous land-grabbers. We think it would be an excellent way to save their property from illegal seizure. It would give the banks a legal hold upon the property which would insure their intervention in case anyone else tried to play any tricks upon it. We cannot believe that these banks would deliberately cheat the people, and such being the case a mortgage would be the very best of safeguards. We do not think the Koreans need money for improving the land. Take the question of manure, where would they purchase it? Every ounce of fertilizer is already utilized and there is none to buy unless it is imported. The same is true of cattle. As for agricultural implements, the Koreans cannot afford to import them, and we doubt whether imported tools would be any better adapted to Korean needs than the native tools are. The traveller through Japan sees the farmer using identically the same implements that he did twenty years ago.

The fifth section dealing with the sending of members of the staff of the Industrial Bank of Japan has no special significance. They are simply to investigate conditions.

The sixth section dealing with the Bonded Market has nothing at all to do with the Koreans but is simply for the Japanese, enabling them to import various food stuffs and pay the duty after they have sold the goods. This may or may not be good finance for Korea whatever it may be for the Japanese merchants. We have never heard of such a plan being tried elsewhere. Of course the pressure will always be in the direction of lengthening the list of things

that can be imported thus. Two things should be watched (1) whether this rule is made to apply to goods imported from Japan or to imports from any country and (2) whether the tendency will be to extend the law to textile fabrics and other things imported from Japan. But as this does not closely affect the people it may be passed by with only a mention.

Of the supervision of the local revenue we have already spoken. It is hardly more than hinted at in the report and further details must be forthcoming before anything definite can be said.

The eighth heading is New Government Enterprises. This has to do with the expenditure of the ten million yen that Japan pushed upon this country as a loan at six per cent, price of issue 90. Korea ought to have gotten this loan at a price of one hundred cents on the dollar, instead of ninety. Korea was not treated fairly in this. The Customs are good security for such a sum as this. But let that pass. The first use to be made of the money is to provide water works for Chemulpo. This has been commented on before. Unless the Korean government is to do this on the distinct understanding that it is to be a paying affair it is a great imposition. No one supposes that the Koreans on the outlying hills will benefit from this water supply. It is almost solely for the Japanese residents of that town. We see no reason why the Korean government should obligate itself in this way. The municipality of Chemulpo ought to undertake it themselves. Nothing is said of what the government will get back for doing this favor to Chemulpo, and if Chemulpo why not any or all the other open ports in Korea? We see no justice in it from whatever point it is viewed. The second object is the building of some 325 miles of roads through the country. Now what roads are contemplated? First a road from Gensan to Chinnampo through

Pyong-yung and second between Taiku and Yang-il Bay, third a road out of Kun-san to Chon-gye and fourth out of Mokpo to Kang-gyu. We are unable at present to say whether the Koreans are in special need of road repairs in these particular places more than elsewhere. The question of good roads is an urgent one and if the whole 10,000,000 were to be honestly expended upon that one object we should be able to find little fault with the project. On the theory that a little is better than nothing we cannot but commend the project. But as yet it is all in a promissory stage and no actual progress can be said to have been made.

The ninth section deals with the disposal of the old nickel coins. There are ten sections giving in minute detail the way the old coins are to be defaced, cut up, analyzed, ticketed, labelled, stored and accounted for. That has nothing to do with progress in monetary reform. Why are we not told what portion of the old nickel coins have been called in and how many have been whistled for but won't come? Foreigners in Seoul see a hundred of the old coins to one of the new. The electric railway has not been able to change to the new coinage much as they would doubtless like to do so. Korea is cursed with a motley combination of coinages and we see no way out of the difficulty. There is no progress apparent in the direction of cleaning up this business and giving Korea a good monetary system. We very much doubt whether the framers of these plans have any better notion of what it is all coming to than the public do. Everything seems to be drifting. So far as this ninth section is concerned it has no bearing on the real vital question of a legal tender for Korea.

The tenth and eleventh sections deal with the extension of customs grounds

and with light houses. These are laudable undertakings mostly in the theoretical stage as yet but likely to become tangible facts in the near future.

We search this paper in vain for any evidence of the definite accomplishment of anything for the betterment of the condition of the Korean people. There are plans, proposals, promises, some of which are good and reflect credit upon the head that planned and the good will that promised them. But now the important question comes up as to the difficulties to be met with in carrying out these plans. Take for instance the agricultural and industrial banks. Some, probably much, of the ten millions go to finance these banks. Will this money which the Korean government has borrowed at a high rate of interest be loaned to its own people or to Japanese mostly? Here we see grave possibilities of wrong. We know that thousands of Japanese are swarming into this country seeking land, and with land they must have cattle, implements, houses, seed, etc., etc. Are we uncharitable therefore in fearing that the Korean government has been pushed to borrow money with which to set up Japanese immigrants in agricultural and industrial business in Korea? We do not say that Mr. Megata has this in mind. On the contrary we believe he has a certain degree of sympathy for the Korean people, but judging from the way Japan is encouraging the immigration of her citizens into Korea and the extremes to which her officials go in protecting their people even from the consequences of indirection and even crime we are forced to the conviction that in spite of any good intentions on the part of a few of the more intelligent and sympathetic Japanese, if there is any money to be borrowed cheaply for agricultural or industrial work the Japanese will get the lion's share of it. In this prospectus, for that

is what the report amounts to, we see no definite guarantee that the interests of the Korean people will be upheld, that they will be protected in the possession of their property, that taxation shall be made fair and equable, that money borrowed by Korea shall be used solely in the interests of Korea and the Korean people.

Prince Eui-wha.

AN APPEAL.

There are probably a good number of our readers who would like to know something more about the personality of this young prince whose name is so often before the public. His title has lately been changed to Euichin but people have known him so long by the other name that we retain it in the title of this brief review of his life.

Prince Eui-wha is the son of the Emperor of Korea by a palace woman or *sahe* named Chang. He was born in 1877. When the Queen learned of it she was violently disturbed and sent for the woman and questioned her. The latter did not attempt to conceal the facts and from that hour she was a doomed woman. It is more than probable that the King would have liked to protect her but the family of the Queen was so powerful at the time that this was very difficult. She died of poison and the little child was left in the care of her brother who lived not far from the palace.

He was married in 1893 in his seventeenth year to a member of the Kim family. At that time his royal blood was more fully recognized and he was given a separate palace to live in. It was situated in Sa-dong not far from the Tal-won-kun's former residence.

It was in 1895, some months before the assassination of the Queen by the Japanese, that the young man was sent abroad to study. He went first to Japan but

before long he passed over to the United States, where he seems to have enjoyed himself to the full, picking up the language with fair facility though he did not settle down to serious work in any one institution for any considerable length of time. This of course was unfortunate but at the same time he naturally picked up a large amount of information and came in touch with the life of the West.

Prince Eui-wha returned as far as Japan in 1904 and stayed two years, during which time he was continually with the Japanese and doubtless added much to his previous knowledge of the language. He has recently returned to Korea. The fears that have been expressed by the people that his coming covered some ulterior design on the part of the Japanese is probably without foundation for however much the Japanese may humiliate His Majesty he has their definite promise that the safety of the reigning house shall be preserved.

This young Prince, now thirty years old and possessed of a wealth of experience and observation enjoyed by few in his station, is in a position to do much for the Korean people. If he should become thoroughly aware of the condition of the Koreans and the treatment they are receiving at the hands of the Japanese and should turn his attention to the important work of bettering their condition he might easily make representations to the Japanese in high authority which would receive attention. What Korea needs today is an advocate from among her own people—a man deeply sensible of the needs of the nation and intimate enough with the Japanese to be able to approach them as no outsider could do. Those of us who are pounding away at the bolted doors of American and European sympathy are called conspirators, intriguers, charlatans, obstructionists, and many people doubtless believe these words describe us, but with him it

is different. He is in close touch with the Japanese, is presumably more or less in their confidence and has opportunities which no other man has to make the needed appeal to the better, the higher feelings of those Japanese who hold Korea in the hollow of their hand. We appeal to him in the name of patriotism, of honor, of common humanity to espouse the cause of his country, of his nation whose life is threatened, to throw himself body and soul into the noble task of preserving the identity of Korea as a nation; not by separating himself from his Japanese patrons and taking an antagonistic attitude, but by a serious and earnest presentation of the facts as they really exist and an appeal to the honor of the Japanese nation, an honor which is engaged by the most solemn promises to the preservation of the welfare of this people. What can he hope to win by sitting silently by and letting his own people become aliens in their own land? If they go down, he goes down with them. If their name is lost, his is lost. The title of a prince borrows its meaning from the felicity of the people who confer it. It is a reflected glory and can survive the nation's death only by recording on the page of history a ringing protest against the setting of the sun which gave it birth. Why is it that as moss creeps up the monument which marks the grave of Poland it dare not cover and obliterate the name of Kosciuszko? Why is it that as Nemesis plucks at the names of Rome's later nobility she dare not touch one letter of the word Rienzi? It is in either case because the passion of his love for his native land saw, over and beyond its weaknesses and faults, the glorious future of which its better qualities gave promise, and even life itself was too small an offering to lay upon the altar.

Prince Rui-who is not asked to take the sword like Kosciuszko or mount the

rostrum like Rienzi, but the united voice of his people, the better instincts of his nature, the peril which overshadows his native land, all cry out to him to make use of the opportunity which providence has put in his hands of appealing to the masters of Korea.

Japan in Northeast Korea.

It is our duty to call the attention of the public to a serious case of interference with the rights of foreigners in the town of Ham-heung in northeast Korea. We had heard something about the case by ordinary rumor but have now been able to verify the information from original sources. Rev. D. M. McRae is a missionary connected with the Canadian Presbyterian Mission. He has lived in that section for many years and has had a successful career as a missionary. He is well known to the whole foreign population of Korea and bears an unblemished reputation for probity. Now here are the facts in brief. Mr. McRae purchased land in Ham-heung for a mission station. The transaction was entirely legal the deeds were authentic and the property was indubitably his, or the Mission's. The Japanese military people in that town seem to have looked with envious eyes upon this property for some time. It was evident that they hated the presence of a foreigner there. Once in conversation with the Japanese he said that he had a legal right to reside in Ham-heung but they demurred and took the ground that he had no such right. One day he discovered that part of the mission property had been enclosed by stakes driven by the Japanese military authorities. Without attempting to remove them himself he represented the case to the authorities on at least two occasions and asked that the stakes be removed. Nothing was done about it and after a while he removed them him-

self. This aroused the intense anger of the Japanese military people and it was not long before this took definite form. So long as there were two foreigners on the compound the Japanese made no trouble but one day one of the British citizens had to leave the city for a few days and on the very next day six Japanese soldiers entered the compound and attacked Mr. McRae. He got his back to a wall and received the whole six. As fast as they threw themselves upon him he threw them off to right and left. What they wanted to do is not clearly apparent for they did not shoot at him or use their bayonets. It seems as if they wanted to give him a good drubbing with their fists. Finding at last that they could not down him their rage was so great that one of them took his gun and reversing it lunged at Mr. McRae with the butt of the weapon, dealing a heavy blow on the thigh. This did not cripple him and he still stood on guard. They finally gave up the struggle and left the place. They seem determined to persecute him until he is driven out of the town. The residence of foreigners anywhere in the interior is very distasteful to the Japanese for they know that the foreigner observes their brutal treatment of the Koreans and is more than likely to report it. The things that have occurred in the northeast are fairly heart-rending. But when it comes to attacking the person of a British or an American citizen on his own property and attempting to beat him for protecting his own land from encroachment it is high time the authorities in England and America became awake to the facts and decide the question whether the flag means anything and whether the proud boast that England or America will protect their citizens in their manifest rights is a living principle or an exploded fallacy.

A short time ago Japanese soldiers

were seen robbing the garden of an American at Pyeng-yang. The Japanese authorities had given notice that if any irregularities occurred the matter should be reported. Two or three Americans followed the Japanese thieves to their quarters and asked the name of the superior officer and the number of the regiment or company. This precipitated such a disturbance that the Americans feared an attack and retired to their homes. That evening, as one of the Americans returned to his home he found a Japanese captain or other officer sitting in the drawingroom in an easy chair with his feet in another chair smoking a cigarette. He declined to move but began talking violently in Japanese and demanding, as was learned afterward, why the Americans had made inquiries at his headquarters. Two other American gentlemen came in and the Japanese was told that this was not the time or place to discuss anything and he was asked to remove. This he refused to do and went on bawling out his complaints. The Americans simply refused to listen or have anything do with him. The gentleman who owned the house removed to another American's residence with his wife and spent the night, leaving the Japanese officer in sole control. He stayed until one o'clock in the morning and then was seen to leave, but before he had gone more than a few rods from the house he was joined by a number of Japanese soldiers who had hidden in the vicinity. It was perfectly plain that if the Americans had attempted to put the Japanese out by force there would have been a fatal affray. Apparently this was just what the officer wanted but he was frustrated by the unwillingness of the Americans to assert their rights.

The whole matter was reported to the army headquarters the next day and the authorities expressed regret at the occurrence and said that the officer would be

subjected to nine days imprisonment. He was not compelled to go and apologize to the people he had grossly insulted and whose house he had illegally seized. Nor does any one know whether the punishment was really inflicted. In any civilized country such an offence would inevitably result in degradation to the ranks. This sort of thing is just what was sure to come and the ball is now open. What American or British citizen will be the next to suffer attack? What these foreign residents of Korea want to know is to what extent their rights are to be respected by the Japanese and to what degree they can depend upon the protection of their respective flags. The situation is a delicate one and a new one. Action on the part of Great Britain in defending a citizen from outrageous treatment can only have the effect of bringing the facts before the public, and once these facts are known the reputation of Japan will suffer a severe blow. The result of such action will be of international significance but we believe the time will come and shortly too, when those who stand back of the British and Americans in the interior of Korea will be compelled to force the matter on the attention of the world and investigation will be in order. Nothing can now help the Korean people short of such investigation. The sooner it comes the better.

Japanese Immigration.

The question of Japanese immigration into Korea is manifestly of the very first importance to this people. This is why it has been receiving such attention in the press of late. It is not a simple problem of addition, for many factors come in which demand attention; some of them being rather unique. We would like to discuss the problem from an entirely dispassionate standpoint, recog-

nizing the difficulties under which Japan labors as well as the dangers which threaten the Korean people. Let us first look at it from the standpoint of the Japanese government.

The Japanese people have just come out of a desperate struggle with Russia. We say desperate because though the victory seems to have been a foregone conclusion it terminated at a point where each contestant was almost at the last gasp, Japan financially and Russia because of internal disaffection. Japan came out of the struggle with colors flying, with enormous prestige but with a debt which, considering the size of the nation and the resources of the country, is probably unprecedented. She came out of the struggle with the military and naval elements fiercely resentful of the terms of peace and the people wounded in their vanity and siding with the fighting element in their unreasonable denunciation of the diplomatic solution of the war, a solution made imperative by the utter lack of means to prolong the struggle.

It has been intimated (and it comes from Japanese sources) that at the time of the signing of the treaty at Portsmouth President Roosevelt promised that if the treaty were signed the United States would put no obstacles in the way of Japanese ambition in Korea. This may not have been the wording of the promise but such seems to have been its general tenor. We have no need to comment here upon the moral quality of this act at a time when Korea and America were in full treaty relations with each other. The fact remains and it is this fact which explains the immediate removal of the American Legation from Seoul as soon as the usurpation of last November had been consummated. This seizure of Korea was practically one of the spoils of war and while it was not effected soon enough to unseater the

anger of the Japanese people it was an asset with which the Japanese government was prepared to console them gradually.

That government was confronted with the necessity of pacifying the people and at the same time of inducing them to pay out an enormous sum of money to meet the payments of interest on the war debt. Here Korea lay, possessed of large wealth in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mines. Some of these resources were already highly developed and some were hardly developed at all. For every dollar's worth of these assets that Japan could put into the hands of Japanese the Japanese government stood to receive in the long run. If Japanese, leaving comparatively restricted sources of wealth in Japan, could come into Korea and get into their own hands the wealth producing resources of the peninsula there would be an inevitable expansion of the field from which Japan could look for revenue to meet her enormous load of debt.

But this was a field from which the harvest could not be immediately reaped. It must be sown before it could be harvested. Japanese must come into Korea and seize all points of vantage commercially and industrially and prepare the way for their own future taxation. Railroads must be built, harbors must be improved, and many other things must be done to open the way to the heart of Korea's wealth.

But there is one important step that still remains to be taken. These Japanese cannot be taxed for Japan's benefit until Korea becomes a province of Japan or in other words until another definite promise of Japan has been broken. In the capacity of a mere protector Japan cannot hope to see the Japanese in Korea paying taxes to the Japanese exchequer. It has been all outlay so far. The seed has been sown. The time will come soon

when the harvest will begin. At present the Korean government claims all taxes paid by Japanese whether in the indirect form of customs duties or in the direct form of land tax.

As soon as victory began to perch on Japan's banners the Japanese people began swarming into Korea until today there are a little less than 100,000 of them here. Many if not most of these people were small shop keepers in Japan and at any rate each one of them paid taxes in some form to the Japanese government. By coming to Korea they accomplished two things. They escaped taxation and they found a large field of activity. On what possible theory would the Japanese government allow such an enormous exodus of taxable citizens if there was to be no eventual return? The advance in industrial enterprise ought easily to absorb all unemployed labor in Japan. An industrial country cannot afford to lose its laborers in this way unless there is something better coming. The plaint of the Japanese authorities, therefore, that they could not prevent the flood of immigration into Korea seems to be a mere ruse to cover the fact that such immigration was just what was desired in order to accomplish a definite result in the future; for no one for a moment believes that Japan could not have curtailed the immigration with ease if it had been so disposed.

But let us look at the matter from a different standpoint. No one now denies that Korea is heavily populated. Even the *Yokodan* a Japanese paper concedes this. There are certain parts of Japan that are almost as thinly populated as the most mountainous and inaccessible parts of Korea. People cannot live where there is nothing to live on. Population will always mass itself near the sources of supply. No argument is needed to prove that the most productive portions of Korea today support the

densest population. If we look at the established facts concerning what we may call agricultural immigration in other countries we see that the immigrants take up soil that is for the most part as yet lying fallow. This is true in America, Canada and Argentina and it constitutes a definite advance in the development of industry; but is this natural law being carried out in Korea? The facts do not indicate so. The Japanese are demanding and are getting the very best land here and their methods are such that no unprejudiced mind can condone them. The same is true of the forests, of the fisheries, of the salt works. The methods by which the natives of Quelpart have been deprived of one of their main sources of livelihood are enough to make just men blush for the people who adopt them. Where are the people of Quelpart to go to obtain the means of sustenance? Who has compensated them or proposes to compensate them for the seizure of their seaweed business? It has been made a monopoly of the Japanese and henceforth though some Koreans may be used as common laborers the profits of the business will go into Japanese pockets. We have elsewhere shown from eyewitnesses that the Japanese are clearing the north of timber in the Yalu region, even private grave sites being plundered of trees to feed the insatiable rapacity of the Japanese. We have been lately importuned for help by Koreans whose broad rice lands have been seized by Japanese. These Koreans hold the deeds to the property. The prefect of the district, the governor of the province and the Home Department in Seoul have all recognized officially the legal ownership and yet the owner cannot secure possession. The charge is a multiple one.

(1) The Japanese take spurious, forged deeds of land and seize it, leaving the Korean to litigate for his rights. The

Japanese does not prove his claim and have the occupant dispossessed by process of law but he seizes the land by force and throws the burden of proof on the Korean owner.

(2) The Korean is not given the proper facilities for making good his claim and getting back his property. The Japanese local authorities are almost inaccessible to the Korean plaintiff. The Korean officials know they hold their positions by the favor of the Japanese and they are therefore slow to help the Korean plaintiff bring to the notice of Japanese authorities facts that must be distasteful.

(3) No adequate measures have been taken to control the Japanese resident in the interior. The Koreans are still being browbeaten and treated in the most contemptuous manner by Japanese without hope of redress.

(4) The appropriation of land for "imperial pastures" has never been explained. Rich farm land twenty miles long by ten wide are being taken from the people to make pastures or to cover some scheme whereby the value of the land can be diverted from the actual owners into the pockets of others.

We think every one of these charges can be proved beyond reasonable doubt and we submit that this form of immigration is not such as the civilized world recognizes as legal.

A perusal of some of the arguments advanced by Japanese periodicals in favor of Japanese immigration is likely to open the eyes of the reader. One paper says that seven million Japanese could be easily accommodated in Korea without displacing the Koreans, and it demands that the Korean peninsula, smaller than the state of Kansas but with a population of at least 10,000,000, should receive annually nearly half as many immigrants as pour into the United States.

Another paper says that in the 20,000,-

ooo Korean population there is not an aggregate of 500,000 able-bodied workmen. It estimates four Koreans to be equivalent to one Japanese workman. There is nothing to say to this except that it is ridiculously false. Those who know the Korean farmer and how he works would not for a moment endorse this estimate. The Korean farmer is as hard working a man as the Japanese farmer, and those who know will say that with all his better protection against fleecing officials the Japanese could not get a tithe more out of a piece of land than the Korean can.

The plea for heavy Japanese immigration carries with it the demand for the annexation of Korea to Japan. No one supposes that two or three million Japanese in Korea would live under a Korean administration or pay taxes to the Korean government. Such immigration presupposes the entire seizure of Korea by Japan, the end of the dynasty, the breaking of all pledges which Japan has given. Is the civilized world prepared for such an ending to the drama? Will China look upon it as a recommendation of Japan in the work of opening the Middle Kingdom or will it bring the conviction which is now *de embryo* that Japan aims at the seizure of the Dragon Throne as well?

Editorial Comment.

The *Japan Mail*, utterly unable to meet our statement of fact and equally unable to understand how a man can have honest convictions and stand up for them even against his own personal interests, lets itself go in a tirade of abuse which ends with the courteous suggestion that the editor of the REVIEW has hung himself with his own halter. We enjoy such exhibitions of wit. Their sparkle and effervescence fill the empty void

where argument is lacking. The question remains whether our main proposition was true or not. This the *Mail* nor any one else has been able to gain say. The facts that one witness or set of witnesses saw one kind of torture and another set saw another kind would hardly seem to the legal mind a proper proof that neither existed. But so it seems to the *Mail*. What astonishes us most of all is the unwillingness of certain people to know the truth about the situation. A short time ago we met a person living in the East and in course of conversation we had occasion to criticize the official acts of a certain eminent man in America. Our only criticism was an implied one for we gave only a straightforward narrative of events; but that person raised hands of horror and said they would hear nothing against the official; even if it was true they would not hear it. That individual had idealized the official in his mind—had formed a sort of idol of him and facts could have nothing to do with the matter. If the image had feet of clay, that individual did not want to know it.

Ignorance, honest ignorance is a thing to be pitied and, so far as possible, remedied, but wilful ignorance, the kind that hates to be enlightened is to be condemned. There are no people in the world who enjoy being fooled less than the Englishman or American. He hates it so desperately that it sometimes takes a long time to make him see that he has been used as a cat's-paw. He fights against such a revelation, for his self-esteem and his self-respect both suffer if he has to acknowledge his blunder. And yet beneath it all there is an abiding love of the truth. The Anglo-Saxon finds himself sooner or later; and when the fact begins to dawn upon him that he has been hoodwinked, that things are not as they have been represented, that the goods are not up to sample, his in-

dignation is in direct ratio to his former stubborn adherence to the fallacy.

It is this faith in the ultimate fair-mindedness of the Anglo-Saxon that makes us smile at the rancorous attacks of men who have no desire to learn the facts but whose position can be maintained only by keeping the bandage on their own eyes and on the eyes of the world.

We do not want the public to accept these statements of fact on our own authority; we want them to come and see for themselves. We rejoice at the sight of every foreign traveller who comes to Korea. The chances are ninety-nine to one that he is an honest man and that for him facts are facts irrespective of theories and preconceptions. During the last four months we have seen something less than a score of foreign travellers in Korea and what they have seen and heard and learned here has impressed them mightily. Does the editor of the *Japan Mail* want foreigners to come here and examine critically the brand of protection which Japan is giving Korea or does the Japanese administration want it? We trow not. Every foreigner in the interior of Korea is a thorn in Japan's side today. No one knows it better than these foreigners themselves. They have had ocular and physical demonstration of the fact. Time was when any foreign gentleman could travel in an open chair alone from one end of Korea to the other without fear of insult. Is it true today? Ask foreign ladies who have travelled here, even with escort, and see what they say. The man who would allow his wife or sister to travel twenty miles from Seoul in any direction without escort ought to be ostracized from decent society. The railway trains must be excepted from this, as they are public conveyances and are under strict surveillance.

We repeat that our one and sole desire for the Korean people today is that the

world might know all the facts of the case. On that platform we will stand to the end. If any one challenges our statement of the facts we only answer "Come and see for yourself." Dr. Howard Agnew Johnston, an American of national reputation, has just been in Korea. Ask him what he found. Bishop Candler has been here. He is an observant man, but is not at all interested in politics. Ask him what he saw, from the merely humanitarian standpoint.

The *Japan Herald* strikes the proper note when it says "Evidently these long established rights of the Koreans cannot be put aside as easily as in the case of a savage race." But this is precisely the attitude of the Japanese people in Korea. In spite of rights that are centuries old Koreans are being treated precisely as the Ainu or Formosans would be treated if they were here.

The *Times* of London says Korea must not be treated as conquered territory. The intelligent press of the world agrees in this but when facts are presented to show that this is precisely the condition of things in Korea today the people who present those facts and who earnestly ask that they be verified and corroborated by those who shall come here and investigate are called rascals and conspirators. The *Times* warns Japan that the treatment of Korea as conquered territory will alienate the good will of the world but at the same time depends for its information about the peninsula upon its Peking and its Tokyo correspondents, one of whom has never been in Korea and knows nothing about conditions here except by hearsay. In a recent letter to the *Times* the Tokyo correspondent says that the "Il-chin society takes liberal progress for its motto." He says there was no coercion practiced in the signature of the so-called treaty of last November. He says the Emperor of Korea was an assenting

party. None of these statements will bear scrutiny and yet one of the leading journals of the world prints them as solemn fact.

The wilful blindness of this correspondent is nowhere better shown than in his calling us "western theorists," for we suppose we have the honor of being included in what he calls "a small body of occidentals—especially American citizens—who preach to Korea the creed of national independence." We would refer him to our columns to see whether we have theorized or whether we have brought together such an array of facts that he cannot meet them but can only hide behind a barricade of vituperation. As for preaching independence, our columns show that we have always held that Korea should have a strong hand upon her for a time. We believed for a long time that that hand should be Japan's but we have been compelled reluctantly to change our mind. In this we are in the same boat with almost every American citizen in Korea as well as with many British citizens. We fully believe that the most promising days that modern Korea has seen were in 1897 when Sir J. McLeavy Brown was in partial control of the finances of the country. She will never see the same hopeful conditions under Japanese rule.

There are some fine qualities in the Japanese. They have a restless energy, a scorn of obstacles, a boldness of initiative which all must admire, and none more than ourselves. That Japanese merchants are establishing themselves in European Russia at this moment is well nigh astounding. Their abounding faith in their own capacity for achievement and their contempt of traditional limitations are simply superb. That their methods favor of Machiavelli and Tallyrand is no impeachment of their sagacity whatever it may argue as to their morality. That as a nation they are al-

most wholly lacking in sympathy and in a just appreciation of the rights and interests of other people only brings out in sharper relief the brilliancy of their acquisitive faculty. They are a people that have acquired the implements of modern civilization without being hampered with any of those altruistic notions that the public conscience so often interposes between the Anglo-Saxon and a ruthless pursuit of selfish gain.

Perhaps there is no better illustration of the saying that history repeats itself than the striking similarity between Japan's present actions and the spirit which dominated France just one hundred years ago when she was under the spell of the first Napoleon. He did great things for education, for law, for civic efficiency—things which by themselves were calculated to seat him in the hall of fame beside Lycurgus, Justinian and Alfred the Great but his vaulting ambition so far overleaped the bounds of his legitimate sphere that he became a universal menace and it took the combined power of three kingdoms to re-establish the equilibrium of Europe. In some such way Japan has shown herself capable of great things in the path of self-improvement, has made herself something of an object lesson to all Asiatic peoples; but there are distinct signs today that she has also imbibed rather too freely of the Napoleonic nectar and we doubt not that if she goes on unchecked she will some day meet her Wellington and her Waterloo.

A recent visit to the city of Pyongyang has resulted in a number of curious discoveries in regard to the situation in the north. The first is the dual government of the Japanese. There is a local Japanese Resident in that city but when cases of injustice and oppression on the part of the Japanese military people are brought to his attention he disclaims any power to interfere. He has nothing

to do with the military and the two arms of the Japanese occupancy work not only independently of each other but in many instances at cross purposes.

There is one fact so abhorrent to the mind, so damaging to the good name of Japan that it is with great reluctance that we mention it, and yet it is so fully proved both by foreign and native witnesses that it is beyond dispute. In a certain town in Korea the military quartered soldiers in some Korean houses and in others Japanese prostitutes. In a number of instances Korean Christians were compelled to give up part of their houses to these prostitutes who carried on their nefarious business on the premises. We made careful inquiries about this unspeakable outrage on decency and the fact was verified in the most positive manner. Every Christian man whose house was thus invaded was told by the church authorities that if he could not get rid of the horror he must leave his home, desert it and seek a lodging somewhere else. It was impossible that a Christian family should continue to live in such surroundings. We would like to ask what the civilized world would say if it were fully aware of this proven fact. What would the churches of America and England say? What, indeed, would anyone say, whether he be a churchman or not?

It gives us no pleasure to place before the public eye such a revolting picture. It is a grim necessity, a duty which if unperformed would make us accessory to the crime. The only way to stop such practices is to let the light of general knowledge in upon them, place them before the world and ask it to pass judgment upon a civilization which leaves it possible for men in authority to perpetrate such an outrage as this. All through the north both on the east side and on the west these abandoned women are debauching the Korean youth. They sell

themselves at a price within the reach even of the poor and create a condition of society unknown in all the history of the land. Korea is low enough, God knows, but this sort of thing oversteps all former bounds and leaves the observer simply stupefied. We hardly think we will here be charged, as we sometimes have been, with a shallow sentimentalism. Put yourself in the place of the Korean who sees his house turned into a brothel and imagine how you would feel. We would like to see how the *Japan Mail* or any other supporter of the Japanese policy in Korea would comment on this condition of things. They doubtless will maintain discreet silence as they did about the opium atrocities which we opened up in a recent number. Since then we have learned that one Japanese vendor of morphine was caught in the act of selling to a Korean; the local authorities were notified but instead of treating the culprit as he would be treated in Japan they inflicted no punishment whatever, on the ground that the man "promises not to do it again."

We lay these facts before the public in the full belief that thinking men, far sighted men, will be roused to the significance of passing events which from their very proximity fail to engage the attention, as more remote occurrences do.

Missionaries in Korea.

The idea of steering clear of politics in the restricted sense of that term is a laudable one and the missionaries are undoubtedly right in their main attitude. They are here to teach Christianity and only that. But what will Christianity teach? Here as elsewhere it will teach morality, cleanness, honesty, patriotism. It will make a man discontented with bad moral surroundings as well as bad sanitary surroundings and he can no

more refrain from trying to correct the evils that surround him than he can stop breathing. The early Church took the same attitude about politics that this resolution implies, but the growing force of Christianity finally, and without bloodshed, revolutionized society and put a Christian Emperor on the throne of Rome. Was this politics? Not exactly. It was something larger than politics and included it.

To say that the evangelization of Korea, which is going on today with startling rapidity, has no political significance would be to belie history. And right here we touch the whole question of missions in China, Japan, India, Persia, Siam and everywhere else. Politics, at the bottom, is made up of moral forces and Christianity is nothing if it be not a moral force. In order to keep missions from affecting politics you must drive every missionary and every Bible and tract and suggestion of Christianity out of the country. If you don't want the bread to rise you must not let any yeast get into it. This whole effort to prevent Christian missionaries from having political significance while still allowing them to teach Christianity is as futile and illogical as it would be for any missionary to claim the ability to keep himself and his work out of politics. You can keep the Church and the State separate but you cannot keep morality and cleanliness and honesty and justice and patriotism and the other qualities which are heightened, if not actually caused by Christianity—you cannot keep these things and the State separate. No government was ever more despotic than that of the Caesars and yet even there it was proved that the State is the aggregate of individual wills, and the despotism of that line went down before the silent progress of Christianity as surely as the revolving year turns winter to summer.

If it were a question merely of missionaries keeping out of law cases into which Korean Christians may be drawn it would be easy of solution but the matter is far more complicated than this. Questions of morals come in and the missionary has to give his advice. Imagine for instance that Korean Christians are ordered by the Japanese to work on the railway on Sunday and the missionary is asked for his opinion. He can give but one answer, and that is to refuse at all hazards. No missionary would dare to withhold his advice and he dare advise nothing less than this, but here he becomes mixed up in "politics" by advising resistance, though passive resistance only, to Japanese authority. In some cases the missionary is in duty bound to interfere, even when his advice is not sought; as in the cases cited in our last issue, where Japanese public women were quartered upon Christian homes in the interior.

But there is another aspect of the question. What is that missionary to do when his own personal rights or the rights of his employers are threatened? Suppose a Japanese comes and drives stakes around a part of the missionary's property, what is he to do about it? Why, just what has been done in half a score of cases already, take it to his Consul for adjustment. It always gets adjusted in the long run, for the Japanese authorities know that the missionary will claim no more than his legal rights and to refuse to rectify the matter would make a public scandal. The missionary gets his rights because he has behind him a government that has to be reckoned with. But the Korean who has no one to back him has his land or his house taken away from him without any hope of redress or indemnity. If he be a Christian he comes to the missionary for advice. The missionary says it is a matter he cannot have anything to do with

personally and the Korean goes sorrowfully away wondering who is to help him. If the missionary were to use his influence to the full and get the Korean out of trouble there would be ten thousand others flocking to the church for the purpose of securing such aid. This is why the missionary has to keep his hands off such cases. Scores of Koreans have appealed to us to help them secure justice and in every case where help has been attempted we have made it perfectly clear that we would as willingly help a heathen Korean as a Christian one in this matter of getting justice. To make a distinction would be to do a great injustice and injury to the Christian church.

In closing we would like to say that it must not be inferred that the Christian people of Korea are not in full sympathy with the main object of this magazine for we know to a certainty that such is not the case. We have received too many words and letters of encouragement and good cheer to be at all in doubt on that point.

Tax Collection in Korea.

The new Japanese regime proposes to effect a radical change in the method of collecting taxes throughout the country. There can be no manner of doubt that a change of some kind is greatly needed. In this paper we propose to give the subject as thorough and critical a review as we can, dealing with it from various points of view and attempting to give our readers a comprehensive survey of the whole subject. It cannot be done in a few paragraphs and we crave the patience of the reader if he finds that it is long. We consider this matter one of great importance both for the Korean people and as illustrating what Japan is doing and is capable of doing in this peninsula. What we say may be susceptible of unfavorable criticism and we shall welcome

any such criticism and give it space in these pages. We wish to illustrate every phase of this and every other question in regard to this unfortunate people.

At the outset we waive, for the purposes of discussion, the fact that the presence of Japan in Korea today is internationally illegal, that she has no more moral right here in her present capacity than Germany would have in Denmark or than the United States would have in Canada. We waive also the fact that according to the so-called agreement of last November the Japanese have no right to assume control of all internal matters in Korea. Whether such assumption is a good thing in certain ways or not, it is illegal and a distinct usurpation. We waive these facts for the moment and for the sake of the argument acknowledge the absolute *de facto* control of every function of the Korean government by Japan. For the time being, at least, Japan can work her will in Korea. Such being the case, the point under discussion is whether the present work of tax reform is calculated to work out the best results for Korea. To discuss it intelligently we must first go back and inquire what the method has been heretofore and then compare it with the proposed method.

From the most ancient times the collection of taxes has been in the hands of local prefects who have always carried out the work through the agency of a special class of men called *ajuns*. As there are approximately 80,000 square miles in the Empire and about three hundred and fifty prefectures it follows that each prefect covers an average area of 228 square miles, and as the population may be roughly estimated at 22,000,000, each prefect has under his care an average of a little less than 35,000 people. This population has always been very largely agricultural, and as the land tax has always provided nine-tenths of the

revenue of the country it will be seen that the great bulk of the work of running the government has devolved upon the prefects and that from the practical point of view they and the *ajuns* have done more to keep things going than all other officials combined.

The *ajuns* are different from all other Korean officials in that they are an hereditary class and have the most substantial local standing throughout the prefectures. The prefects are birds of passage but the *ajuns* are permanent. They are the esquires, so to speak; not exactly country gentlemen but generally solid men of affairs, intimately acquainted with the people and all their circumstances. They are the best read and the most intelligent and widely informed men in the country. It is to them that the people instinctively look for help and for suggestion. In some instances they are horribly corrupt and fleece the people to the limit of endurance but this is the exception rather than the rule. There is no doubt that in every prefecture in the land the people have had to pay much more than the nominally legal rate of taxation but the reason is that neither the prefects nor the *ajuns* have ever received from the government a living wage. Today the *ajuns* receive four yen a month, on which pittance they are supposed to support their families. This is less than half what it is possible for them to live on. It is the same thing with the prefects, they have always been underpaid. This is true also in China, and must be taken into account when we begin to find fault with the so-called squeezing of the people. But these *ajuns* live right among the people and cannot get away, and if they go too far in indirection they know that the people have that last court of appeal, mob law, and many an *ajun* has been made to feel the heavy hand of popular condemnation.

There is an average of at least ten *ajuns* in each district, or something over 3,500 in the whole country. Say what we may, these men have more local influence in every line than do any other class of people. It may not be an ideal state of things but such is the fact. It is necessary to impress this important point, because it will help to show the nature and extent of the change which the Japanese have so lightly inaugurated.

It is now settled that thirty-six newly appointed tax collectors are to be given the complete management of the business of collecting and transmitting the taxes of the country. Under them there are 142 assistants or clerks or deputies who will assist in the work. From the statistics of area and population which we have already given it is susceptible of mathematical proof that each of these thirty-six collectors will have under him an average of about 300,000 people scattered over an area of about 2,000 square miles. Each collector will have under him four deputies or clerks. The overwhelming difficulties under which such a system will work may be easily summarized.

(1) The land tax produces almost the whole revenue of the country. This money comes from the sale of the annual crop which is harvested largely in the autumn by the people who, as a rule, make a bare subsistence and who by necessity have become past masters of the art of concealing everything that might tempt the cupidity of those who are stronger than themselves. The result is that it has always been found necessary to collect the tax immediately after harvest. If there is delay the difficulty of collection will be enormously increased. At this time all the 3,600 *ajuns* of the country are kept as busy as bees seeing that the money is forthcoming, watching the people as a cat watches a mouse to see that the people do not

evade the law. Of course the prefects could seize the land of any person who refused to pay but if this is done to any great extent trouble is likely to brew. The money must be collected at a time when the people have no excuse for not paying. This necessity is the reason why the number of tax collectors in each district is proportionately large. Each prefecture is divided into a large number of districts and the collection of the taxes in each district is in charge of an under official called a *sa-ryung*. Each district is again subdivided into villages or neighborhoods each in charge of a *so-in*. These last are the ones that come most closely in contact with the people. They hand over the tax money to the *sa-ryung* who pass it on to the *ajuns* and they in turn account to the prefect. This minute detail seems cumbersome to us but there can be no doubt that under the circumstances a small number would find it impossible to collect the revenue. From this it seems quite evident that these new tax collectors will have to depend entirely upon the old machinery. Thirty-six Collectors with 142 deputies can do nothing more than have general supervision of the work and this supervision will be just as much more indefinite and subject to error than the old system as the new collectors are less in number than the old time prefects. The question now arises whether the new regime will not be compelled to rely upon the present *ajuns*, *sa-ryung* and *so-in* just as the prefects have relied upon them in the past. There can be but one answer and that answer is Yes. The reason for this lies at the very root of the Korean social system. To collect taxes in Korea it is necessary for the immediate collectors to know the people intimately, to understand their individual circumstances and be able to detect any attempt to over-reach the government. At the same time he must be able to see when,

because of unforeseen circumstances or accidents, particular individuals are really unable to pay promptly and to extend a certain degree of leniency as to the time of payment. If the work is done by those who do not know the people intimately some hard and fast rule will be necessary. Any degree of discrimination between individual cases would at once throw the whole machinery into confusion and great hardship and injustice would inevitably result.

Taking it as settled, then, that in the end the new collectors will have to depend upon the same instruments as of old, the important question arises whether either the people or the government will be benefited by the change. The answer to this lies in a brief consideration of the need of any change. Where does the trouble lie that the Japanese administration should suggest a change? We reply that the only difficulty about the taxes in the country is that the people have never been told definitely by the central government exactly what they must pay each year. It is understood in a general way that the legal tax is so many dollars a *hyul* but no guarantee has ever been given the people that much more than this will not be exacted in the form of special imposts. In some cases these special taxes have been ordered from Seoul but more often they emanate from the cupidity of the prefects and the *ajuns*. But these are the very men upon whom the new collectors will have to depend. The *ajuns* have never been able to live on their salaries and the same practices as of old will have to be resorted to in order to make ends meet. It is certain that in connection with the new regime the government will have to give the people a carefully prepared schedule of taxation and rigidly adhere to it if the desire of the Japanese is that the people may benefit by the change. But if such a

schedule were made out and the people everywhere were clearly told that any attempt on the part of any official to collect more would be the signal for his immediate dismissal and punishment there would be no need of a new regime. The salaries of the prefects and *ajuns* could be raised to a point where cupidity would have no valid excuse for extortion and then the people could be assured that there would be no intermediate and vexatious imposts. But we have been told by some who are personally intimate with conditions in the country that even then the *ajuns* would oppress the people and the latter would not dare to report them to the higher authorities. This may be so but what is there about the new plan to prevent the very same thing? Any means for that end would apply equally well to the old system. It is said the prefects are corrupt and are only intent upon feathering their own nests. But what guarantee is there that the new men will not do the same, and if not why could not the same kind of men be appointed as prefects? And here we come to the second consideration.

(2) What is the quality of the men that have been appointed to these thirty-six collectorships? One would think, from the importance of their work that great care would be exercised in their selection. That only those would be chosen who have had large experience in prefectural work and who know the ropes. We have made a careful examination of the list of appointees and we find that out of thirty-six men there are seven and possibly eight who are reasonably efficient. There are about the same number more who are doubtful, as they have never shown what they can do, and the remainder, more than half of the whole, are men who could scarcely hope to hold down a prefectural job to say nothing of exercising control of the collection of taxes in ten prefectures. Many

of them are young fellows from twenty-five to thirty years old with no experience whatever and who can be easily manipulated by their underlings in whatever position they are put. It would be silly to hope for any good results from such material. The probability is that they will not be able to do the work nearly as well as the prefects have done it heretofore.

(3) Another consideration that must weigh heavily in the balance is this; if the new men could depend upon the hearty and loyal co-operation of the prefects and *ajuns* in the various districts, even such men could perhaps do something effective but what is the truth of the case? Every prefect and every *ajun* will be from the first bitterly opposed to the new tax collectors. In some places the *ajuns* have already declared that they will do the new deputies physical injury if they come in contact with them. No reasonable man can suppose that the collectors will get anything but obstruction and hatred from the officials who are being superseded in this work. The *ajuns* will not put at the service of the new commission any more of their intimate knowledge of local conditions than they are absolutely compelled to do. They have it in their power to put so many insuperable obstructions in the way that the new collectors will be glad to throw up the job, and we doubt very much whether this will not be the upshot of the matter. People who have been superseded are never eager to help those who have taken their places, and this is the way the prefects look at the matter, and the *ajuns* take their cue from the prefects.

(4) It is worth while asking what the cost of this new system will be. These collectors, carrying a heavy weight of responsibility, will naturally receive high salaries. If they do not get this legitimately they will get it some other way.

They are not going to do high work for low pay. The same is true of the deputies. The whole commission will be an added expenditure, for the fact that these men relieve the prefects of the major part of their work will not make it possible to lower the salaries of the prefects. What benefit is the government to receive from this added expenditure? From the considerations already mentioned we believe there will be little if any. If it is urged that checks can be put upon indirection we reply that the very same checks might as easily be put on the old method. In this new scheme the checks will simply have to be put upon a larger number of individuals. It is already said that, beginning with next February, the taxes are to be collected in the new currency. Just what this means we do not know. If it means that in place of one old nickel one new one will be demanded it follows that the tax will be doubled. If it means that the people are to pay the same value but in the new coinage nothing more absurd could be proposed for the new coins are not found to any extent in the interior and the people might as well be asked to pay in English sovereigns or Indian rupees.

Now these are the main reasons why we think a mistake has been made. It may be that the Japanese financial authorities mean to do the right thing, but, as in the Nagamori scheme and others, we do not think they have examined into the conditions sufficiently or have rightly gauged the difficulties to be met. They have underrated the conservative tendency of the people, the opposition of the men who are to be superseded, the difficulties of the work generally. If it be said that this criticism is merely destructive, it will be easy to show the way in which the collection of taxes could be made efficient and proper by the Japanese without going to all

this trouble and without having the whole country about their ears. All that would be needed is to give the people a printed list of every tax that they will be called on to pay and make it a criminal offense for anyone to exact a single cash more. Make the issuance of special lists by governors or prefects a felony and pass a law that any man who is made to pay a cent more than his legal tax shall collect double the amount from the man who has taken the money. Even then there will be indirection but if courts of law are to be established any man who cares to stand up against being defrauded can bring the offender to justice. We have inquired carefully from foreigners living in the interior and who almost daily come in contact with Koreans who have been compelled to pay outrageous special taxes and it is their opinion that such a measure as we have here outlined would do away with nine tenths of the trouble.

But one other thing is needed. The prefects and other officers should be paid a living wage or else the squeezing system will remain as it has always been, the only way to keep from starvation on the part of the *ajuns, se-ryung* and other petty officials in the country. It would not be difficult to estimate what that living wage must be. Even with the new system this would be equally necessary, in order to prevent over-taxation.

If we look at the matter in a more general way we shall see that before the best results can be obtained the oriental idea that public office is the only road to wealth must be done away and in its place must come the more rational western idea that public service is desirable only for one of two reasons; first the desire to serve the state and make an honorable name or secondly to obtain a position which will bring a good living wage and will be permanent so long as the work is well done. We do not say

that these ideals are always followed in the west but they are recognized as being the usual motives in seeking public service. The contempt with which the public at large looks upon the use of office for illegitimate gain is evidence enough that such use is the exception rather than the rule.

Nothing but education and Christianity combined will ever bring this ideal home to the Korean people or to any people; and the present enthusiasm along both these lines in Korea today form the silver lining to the cloud which envelops her.

Later:—In what we have written above it is intimated that the *ajangs* will doubtless be utilized in the collection of taxes. We based this surmise on the utter impossibility of carrying out the work without them; but later advices indicate that they are not to be used at all. If so we are prepared to predict that the new system will prove an insupportable burden upon the common people. What will happen has already been foreshadowed in the action of the servants of one prefecture. Feeling sure that they were to be ignored by the new commission and that their means of livelihood was to be taken away they determined to do all that was in their power to hinder the operation of the new commission. They therefore destroyed all the records of the taxes and every means of discovering the amounts that different persons are accustomed to paying as taxes. This will throw an enormous burden on the shoulders of the commission, a burden that will crush them to the earth. The men who have been displaced have never been convicted, as a body, of indirection. It is true that many of them have probably oppressed the people, but to condemn them *de facto* and replace them with men who know nothing about the work to be done and who give no better promise of square dealing than they them-

selves, is not calculated to please the country officials or make them ready to aid in the new work.

There is one thing in this connection that should be barred against. As these commissioners go about their work accompanied by Japanese auditors or accountants there will be, as we have pointed out, thousands of cases where land will be seized and sold to pay taxes. Who will there be to buy this land and what will the price be? The Japanese authorities should be on the lookout for a class of men who might take advantage of the Korean farmer and buy up his land for a song under the grim necessity of tax payment. We do not say there will be such a class but we would suggest in the most pointed manner that the government should look to it that there be no sharks swimming about with this intent.

Our pessimism may be unwarranted and if so, if the danger to the safety and welfare of the Koreans which this move threatens, is warded off and comes to naught, no one will rejoice more than we.

The Korean Prefectures.

It will be remembered that some months ago the government doubtless under instruction from the Japanese determined to reconstruct the whole prefectural system and join together several prefectures, thus lowering the total number from about 345 to something like 140. But no sooner was the scheme stated than the unforeseen difficulties in the way began to pile up so high that, like the Nagasaki scheme, it had to be abandoned *in toto*. The benefits to be derived from the change were so problematic and the obstacles were so definite that the matter ended in a fiasco. But the new masters of Korea yearn for changes. Things must be overturned

irrespective of their utility. The Japanese reform plan is largely iconoclastic and unless there is a universal overhauling of institutions they will not be satisfied. So a substitute motion has been put, namely that the prefectures should be so far disintegrated as to allow them to be made more uniform in shape and area. It is proposed to lop off this projection and that corner and add them to contiguous prefectures. It is claimed that it will thus be easier to administer the government of the prefectures. But this is entirely problematic as yet. In one way it may simplify matters but in another and more important way it will complicate them. Thousands of people will be transferred from one jurisdiction to another and the amount of readjustment required in this process is not easily understood by the foreigner be he European or Japanese. Bear in mind that the *ajuns* in the country have everything under their eye, that all sorts of social institutions are familiarly known and critically scrutinized by these social leaders, that such intimate acquaintance is necessary to the successful adjudication of law cases where evidence is generally more a matter of public knowledge than of specific information. Imagine then a section of a prefecture detached from its old connections, taken out of the hands of the men who have managed its affairs and whose fathers and grand-fathers for hundreds of years back have held the same position, and put into the hands of men of a neighboring and, in many cases, rival prefecture. Their new neighbors look upon them as new comers and interlopers and it will take decades for the people thus transferred to gain a position where they will have as much influence in the affairs of the prefecture as they had before. The *ajuns*, unused to the study of new peoples and new conditions, will be unable for a long time to adjust themselves to the new

state of things. There will inevitably be discontent and a considerable degree of suffering before things will get to running smoothly again.

Look how the would-be reformers leap from one extreme to the opposite one. In one breath they want to double or triple the work of the prefect by throwing several districts together and with the next breath they sigh for a change which will relieve the present prefects of part of the burden of administration by equalizing the area of the prefectures. Both are wild-cat schemes and have no basis in common sense. Let the prefectures alone and begin the work by improving the quality of the *men* rather than the shape of the prefectures. The troubles of Korea today can be overcome only by a *moral* revolution, not a physical one. You cannot make it easy for a left handed man to use a pair of shears by taking the shears apart and putting them together differently. *You must teach the man to use his right hand.* So in Korea no gerrymandering of the prefectures will be of any use unless the quality of the men be raised to a higher point of efficiency. The Japanese do not seem to realize this, as the recent appointment to tax collectorships show. We urge not the sudden change of methods of administration but a cleaning of the present methods, otherwise we shall see not only the same indirection as heretofore but added to it the confusion incident to sudden and violent attempts at social readjustment.

Swift Retribution.

We are in receipt of certain details connected with one of the worst atrocities ever perpetrated in Korea by a Japanese. It occurred near the town of Mokpo and is thoroughly authenticated. A young Japanese about twenty two years old was determined to secure pos-

session of the house of a Korean in one of the villages near the port. We are not told whether he had secured any lien on the property or had put the owner under any sort of monetary obligation to himself but, be that as it may, he went to the man's house a few days ago and demanded possession of the property without process of law. The owner, a man about fifty years of age, refused to give up the house. The young Japanese thereupon seized the Korean and bound him. He tied a heavy stick across his shoulders and attached a weight to each end of the stick and then hung him to the roof-tree of his own house in a position of the most exquisite torture that was calculated to kill him by inches. This is what happened for after a few hours of intense agony the man expired. This may have frightened the Japanese, for he made off. The disorderly man's son returning home soon after, armed himself with a knife and started in pursuit. He overtook the Japanese at a river side. The Japanese plunged in and swam across. The Korean carrying the knife in his teeth followed without an instant's hesitation. Near the other side of the stream he caught the murderer and bound him. Others of the villagers hurried up and they dragged the Japanese back to the scene of his revolting crime. There they killed him and taking out his heart and liver sacrificed them to the spirit of the murdered Korean.

There are two or three things to note in connection with this crime and the summary punishment. In the first place the murder of a father is in the eyes of the son a crime that demands sure punishment. In Korea the whole social system is built on the reverence of parents by their children and if the son had not sought to avenge the murder as speedily as possible he would have been set down as a greater criminal than the murderer. Whatever the result might

be to himself he was in duty bound both by the tenets of his own religion and by the unwritten law of his social environment to avenge his father's death.

In the second place the murderer was not a Korean. If he had been, the law would have upheld the punishment meted out to him. It would not have been necessary to carry out the execution instantly for the law would have done it in any case, without fail. But with a Japanese the case was different. The Korean knew, as all Koreans know and as has been demonstrated more than once, that to have appealed to the Japanese authorities would not have secured the extreme penalty of the law. The Japanese would have been locked up for a time perhaps and probably deported back to Japan but no one conversant with the history of this present occupation will believe for a moment that strict justice would have been done. Here was a second and a very strong motive.

In the third place it must be noted that the act of vengeance was carried out in a sense deliberately. The criminal was not cut down and killed at the point where he was caught but he was brought back to the spot where he had committed the crime and, in the presence of the object of his crime was given all the hearing that was necessary. He was convicted by the very sight of his victim. Sentence was carried out there and then and all the atonement that could be made, in the Koreans' eyes, was there made by sacrificing his vitals to appease the spirit of the murdered man. There was a certain judicial method in it in spite of its promptness.

Now we are far from saying that this is the civilized way of doing things, but no one will deny that justice was done, albeit the hand was rough; and under the circumstances it was the *only* way in which justice could have been secured.

Another fact lies right on the surface

and cannot be passed without remark. If the Japanese regime were what it ought to be and what its apologists claim it to be this Japanese would never have allowed the underlying savagery of his nature to get the upper hand. The whole story shows he was a coward, and if he had known that Japanese law would grip him and inflict the ultimate penalty he would have thought twice before exhausting his ingenuity in torturing his victim to death. He knew he was safe from capital punishment or from any other serious penalty. Everything he had heard or seen confirmed him in the conviction that he would be screened and gotten off, or if worse came to worst he could only be deported. He never would have committed this crime in Japan against one of his own countrymen. He had been led to think that against a Korean the crime would be condoned or that if he could get among his own countrymen he could hide and defy prosecution. He knew that no Japanese court would take the evidence of a Korean to the extent of pronouncing the sentence of death. Now we do not hesitate to say that the administration is responsible for the condition of things which rendered this crime possible. They cannot hide behind the excuse that so many Japanese came that it was impossible to hold them in check, for the Japanese government could have prevented their coming faster than the legal machinery for their management was introduced. No one now doubts that Japan wanted a large number of her people to come here and still wants them to come, irrespective of her power to hold them in check.

There is still one more deduction to be made. When the Koreans become desperate, as they are fast doing, no fear of punishment will prevent their attempting reprisals. Take that particular village, for instance. They have tasted blood. They have gotten even with one of the

hated race, and we feel sure that Japanese renegades will give it a wide berth for some time to come. If Koreans begin reprisals some of them will be killed, but others will not, and for every one that escapes the consequences there will be a hundred who will want to follow his example. Every Korean who hears of this case before us will applaud it and wish he had been there to help.

In 1592 the Japanese swept through Korea unretarded and unchecked, but the time came when even the weak Koreans turned on them and in the end made them wish they had never come. Have the Japanese estimated what it would mean if the Koreans as a people, as a whole, should turn and hurl themselves at the throats of the people who claim this country as the spoil of war? Let us imagine Japan engaged in a great war at some other point of the compass. Does she suppose the Korean people, armed or unarmed, would let the opportunity pass unimproved? We think not.

Douglas Story on Korea.

Mr. Douglas Story, a special correspondent of the London *Tribune*, takes up in the September 4 issue of that paper the statements of the *Times* correspondent in Tokio relative to the events of one year ago in Seoul. He was in Seoul at the time and was in close touch with the palace officials. No one has questioned his veracity or the unique opportunity he had to study the situation. It was great good luck for Korea to have him here as he was, to give the world an unvarnished and unacquainted tale of what actually occurred. He makes six definite and categorical statements for the truth of which he vouches.

(1) His Majesty the Emperor of Korea did not sign nor agree to the treaty signed by Mr. Hyashi and Pak Che-sun on November 17th 1905.

(2) His Majesty objects to the details of the treaty as published through the tongues of Japan.

(3) His Majesty proclaimed the sovereignty of Korea and denies that he has by any act made that sovereignty over to any foreign power.

(4) Under the terms of the treaty as published by Japan, the only terms referred to concern the management of Korea's external affairs with foreign powers. Japan's assumption of control of Korean internal affairs never was authorized by His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea.

(5) His Majesty never consented to the appointment of a Resident General from Japan nor has he conceived the possibility of the appointment of a Japanese who should exercise imperial powers in Korea.

(6) His Majesty invites the Great Powers to exercise a joint protectorate over Korea for a period not exceeding five years with respect to the control of Korean foreign affairs.

Mr. Story goes on to give details of the method by which he secured authentic documents setting forth these facts, and he declares that certified copies of the same lie at Seoul today. There never was a more straight-forward and unequivocal account. It would stand before any unbiased jury. It is so conclusive as to the main facts of the event described that the only way it can be attacked is by saying that Mr. Story received a forged document with seal of the Emperor fraudulently affixed. But Mr. Story was doubtless aware of the facts through other channels as well. They were well known in Seoul within twenty-four hours. It seems most strange that anyone who knows anything about Eastern court life would suppose that such a thing could be kept secret, and the Editor of the *Japan Mail* by hanging to the exploded theory that the docu-

ment forced on Korea that night is internationally legal is doing it in the face of direct evidence which no intelligent man can deny. But there is other evidence that can be brought to bear to prove the attitude of His Majesty. A few days after the event in question the editor of this magazine, who was in Washington at the time, received a cablegram dictated by His Majesty in which he denounced the document as being null and void because it had been forced upon him by intimidation and under duress. He declared he had never signed it nor given his consent to the signing of it and never would. He instructed the writer to lodge a protest with the Department of State in Washington and take whatever steps were necessary to have the document repudiated by the treaty powers. He further intimated that a joint protectorate would be acceded to if necessary. This cablegram was forwarded immediately after the event in question and before the removal of the American Legation from Seoul. This had nothing whatever to do with the documents put in the hands of Mr. Story and forms independent corroborative testimony if such were needed. We know precisely by what agencies this cablegram was sent and we are as positive that it was authentic as we can be of any event.

Not only so but we have received from men who participated in the events of that night clear and specific accounts of all that occurred. The facts of the case are settled beyond dispute and to attempt to hold the contrary is as senseless as to stick to the theory that the earth is flat and not round. But why does the *Japan Mail* cling so tenaciously to the exploded theory? Evidently because it can see no moral excuse whereby to condone the forcible seizure of Korea contrary to treaty stipulations. In this the *Japan Mail* is more squeamish than the

Japanese themselves for the latter tacitly admit that Korea was obliged to submit.

But there are many who say it is folly to say anything more about the matter. The thing is done and cannot be undone. Therefore the less said about it the better. There are good reasons for continuing the discussion. The world at large is not yet fully aware of the facts. It is the ignorance of the European and American public that angers ill for the future. Someone burns down your house. You make a fun about it. Your neighbor says, "What's the use of talking about it? The thing is done and cannot be undone. The less said the better." You reply that your outcry is for the purpose of warning others to keep watch over their property lest a similar fate should overtake it; and your argument would be unanswerable. The fate of Korea and the means by which it was effected should be held up before the world as a perpetual warning.

But there are other reasons for not dropping the subject. We have no reason to believe the world is coming to an end in the near future and there is probably time for much to happen before that consummation. Things happen so rapidly in the Far East, the kaleidoscope is turning so fast that the keenest sighted cannot tell what combination of circumstances many turn up tomorrow. The nation will not die. It is too numerous, too virile, too homogeneous to be destroyed speedily even under the blows which Japan is dealing. Let the people cling to their language, to their soil and to the best of their traditions and a century hence will see them still as distinct from the people that oppress them as the Shemitic stock is distinct from the Slavic in Russia.

If one wants to know what Japan is doing to Korea he must not stay about Seoul. He will see only a certain side of it there, and the best side. He must

go down into the country where there is no one to note and record what is being done.

A leading article in the December 4th issue of the *Japan Daily Herald* strikes the nail pretty fairly on the head. In it we find a repetition of the reason why Japanese act so differently in Korea and in Japan, namely because passions and appetites which lie dormant, while the Japanese are in their own country under strict police surveillance and under the whip of public scorn, awake to life as soon as the Japanese gets to Korea and he finds himself able to do about as he pleases without fear of consequences. A very pertinent remark is this "If the confidence of the country is to be fully gained it is evident that the rulers must not only show that they are willing to protect the people from injustice, but *they must go out of their way to protect them.*" (Italics ours).

Nothing could be truer than this, but we find that the Japanese are not only not going out of their way to protect Koreans but they are not even attempting to give them common justice. "It must not be merely a case of even justice, but *extreme pains must be taken to make that justice known.*" (Italics ours). Here is the very point. Who ever heard of Koreans being urged to bring complaints against Japanese or any effort being made to teach the Koreans the methods and avenues through which they can get justice? To any fair-minded man living in Korea the very idea is ludicrous. The writer knows of a dozen cases at this present moment where the Korean would gladly, eagerly claim redress but his only recourse is to hunt up a Japanese lawyer, give him a retainer fee and prepare a case for a law court. The Korean knows no more about this than a babe unborn. He is utterly at sea. It may be that a Japanese has seized his land and defies him to touch it. There

is a notorious case of this kind at Chinampo right now in which a whole Korean clan of forty families has been deprived of all their lands by a Japanese who holds a bogus title. The Japanese cuts the harvests off these fields under the protection of an armed Japanese force. One renegade member of the clan "sold" the land to the Japanese and ran away. Now there is one law that the Japanese should lay down with double emphasis and without it every claim to fair treatment will be false. That law should state that no Japanese shall foreclose a mortgage by force but shall do as is done in all civilized countries, and foreclose by process of law. The same should hold true in the matter of purchase. The person in possession should have the privilege of challenging the sale of his property, and making the claimant prove his right. This is not the way things are done in Korea. The day a mortgage falls due the mortgagee is kicked out without a day of grace and without the right to make a forced sale and realize something over and above the mortgage. Only a few weeks ago a shameful attempt was made to force the surrender of ¥60,000 worth of property on a mortgage of ¥13,500. On the final day the mortgagee offered the money due at the office of the mortgage holder but he was "out" and the money could not be paid. When the Korean went the next day to pay, the Japanese declared the property forfeit. The Korean brought pressure to bear and the Japanese authorities made the Japanese take the money but *they allowed him to demand from the Korean ¥1500 because of the day's delay.* The Korean had to pay this extra fifteen hundred yen. Let the *Japan Herald* take that fact and ponder upon it for a while. It is a fair and straightforward periodical and we want to know what it has to say about such a case as this. Justice? That Korean

grinds his teeth every time he hears mention of justice at the hands of the Japanese.

There is one thing that we cannot understand and that is the way the *Japan Herald* harmonizes two of its statements. At the beginning it says that Marquis Ito's assurances as to the state of things in Korea are "satisfactory" and then after specifically implying that it is necessary for Japan to gain the confidence of the Korean people it ends by asserting that "There is no doubt Japan is acting under the best intentions toward Koreans, but the fact seems to remain that having bitterly antagonized the Koreans *she is doing nothing* to regain their confidence." (*Italics ours*). How can the *Herald* say then that Marquis Ito's assurances are satisfactory? His assurances are precisely as satisfactory as the "good intentions" which do not materialize. A certain place is said to be paved with good intentions. Shakespeare never said truer words than these:

"If thou hast a virtue let it come forth of thee."

We want to see this virtue come forth of Japan and not remain in the embryonic state of good intention.

Min Yong-whan.

When it became evident that the Japanese intended to force the matter of a treaty Min Yong-whan used all his influence to oppose it, but, in spite of all, the night of November 17th saw the accomplishment of the nefarious scheme and Korean independence went to the wall. Min Yong-whan was in despair. He memorialized the throne in connection with many others but the Japanese laughed at them. Nothing could be accomplished and Min Yong-whan determined to pour out his life as a lasting protest against the brutal outrage which had been perpetrated against the liber-

ties of his country. He intimated to his fellow officials that he had no further use for life but it was not taken seriously. He went to his home and said good bye to his family and then went to the home of one of his servants and secured a room for the night. He bade the servant leave him and a few moments later the servant heard a peculiar sound coming from the room. He opened the door and found his master with his throat cut vertically and laterally, the jugular vein and the windpipe being severed. It was done with an exceedingly sharp pocket knife. An instant outcry was made and all was confusion. The body was taken in a chair to the home of the dead man. A large number of letters were found which he had written to many of his friends, to the foreign Legations and to the Emperor. They were practically identical in tenor and after giving the reasons why he found it longer impossible to endure life called upon all friends of Korea to unite in efforts to get back the independence which had been lost.

Every rational man must acknowledge that suicide is always a mistake. Min Yong-whan could have done much more good by living than he did by ending his life in the very midst of his career. It is just such men as he that are needed now to publish throughout the world the facts of Japan's lawless actions in Korea. Suicide is always an acknowledgment of failure and it is only under the most exceptional circumstances that it can prove an effectual call to men to exert themselves for any cause. It is one of the fallacies which civilization has not yet eradicated from the Japanese character and which seems to have as firm a hold as ever. It is scarcely to be wondered at then, that Koreans have not shaken themselves loose from the idea that self-destruction is akin to martyrdom.

Min Yong-whan was one of the most

sensitive Koreans we have ever met. There was nothing callous about him. His feelings lay near the surface and had never been blunted either by the excesses into which wealth so often leads nor by the selfishness which is such a marked characteristic of official life the world over. It is not to be wondered at therefore that the unblushing effrontery of the Japanese in putting their grip upon the throat of Korea should so far have unbalanced him that death, even at his own hand, seemed preferable to life. Had he lived he would have had to become an exile from his native land and all that he held dear. Even so he might have done much for Korea. But it is not for us to judge him. One must be put in the same position and subjected to the same mental strain before passing judgment on such a case. A man of much the same type is Han Kyo-sul who was Prime Minister at the time of this national catastrophe and who still survives. The time will come when every such man will be needed in this country. History brings its own penalties as well as its own rewards and for every broken promise which paved the way to the present usurpation of power in this land the Japanese will some day pay with compound interest.

Gambling in Korea.

Be it known that gambling is a criminal offense in Korea and has been such for many centuries. Now and then a raid will be made and two or three people arrested but nothing seems to come of it. I am credibly informed that today many of the ill-paid police can make ends meet only by demanding blackmail from gambling people whom they threaten to arrest unless a substantial "testimonial" is forthcoming. No genuine effort is made to stop the growing evil. Koreans who make their living

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in this way and who are afraid of being caught and handled by the law, rent rooms from Japanese where no Korean police would dare to make a raid even though he knew the law was being broken. One of the commonest sights now is the Japanese with his little shuffle-board where the Korean takes a throw with only one chance in six of winning. Korea itself never evolved any swindle quite so barefaced as this and no really enlightened government would allow its nationals to inflict such an imposition upon the public; but then, we are not talking now of enlightened nations.

An Eminent Opinion.

Bishop Warren A. Candler of the Methodist Episcopal Church (South) in the United States has lately been in Korea attending to his duties as Bishop over this portion of his church. He travelled widely and saw a great deal of the Korean people. He gathered independent opinion of the situation from all sides. He has published in the *Atlanta Journal* a letter with the heading "A Broken-hearted Nation Turning to Christ." The opening paragraph is as follows:

"Have you ever seen a broken hearted nation? If you answer negatively then I am sure you have never seen Korea. . . . I think I have seen, before coming to Korea, a few broken hearted men and women out of whose pitiful lives every ray of hope seemed to have faded; but never before have I seen a whole nation which seemed to be utterly dispirited. The Koreans seem to me to be without earthly hope, at least they seem to be utterly discouraged."

After relating some of the salient points of earlier Korean history he comes down to the present time and says: "The Korean Emperor is now a salaried antiquarian in his palace while Marquis Ito is the real ruler. The Em-

peror is to all intents and purposes a prisoner on his throne. Japan's century-long aspirations are gratified and Korea's last hope of independence has failed."

"The Koreans have gotten what they least desired and their case is made more galling to them by the coming into their country of the worst class of Japanese immigrants. The scalawag always follows a victorious army and Korea is now full of Japanese scalawags. The Korean regards the scalawag as the true representative of the land from which he comes, and considers the situation hopeless."

Of the Korean people he says "I never saw a more gentle or grateful people."

We commend to the public these words of an eminent man who came to Korea utterly unprejudiced either for or against the Japanese or the Koreans. We have not space for his whole article which is largely about the remarkable success of Christian work in Korea in which he cites cases in which the lives of notorious Korean criminals have been completely revolutionized. He has very little to say about the political situation but what little he says is so pregnant with meaning that it sums up the whole matter. He says the country is filled with Japanese of a very questionable character, men who have come here to exploit the weaknesses of the people for their own selfish gain. He says the Korean people are a broken-hearted nation seeing no hope for their political future. And why should they see no hope for the future if all the praises of the Japanese which have been sounded are true, if Marquis Ito is bent upon the elevation of the people and their education, if a helpful policy is being adopted here and the Korean people are being given justice? The trouble is that all these eulogistic phrases are either wholly untrue or are hideous exaggerations. Native industries are being discouraged. Native enter-

prise is being banned. Unless a Korean joins himself to a Japanese and the latter stands to make ten yen where the Korean makes one, the Korean will get no encouragement to enterprise.

A most distressing case came to our notice the other day. Not many miles from Seoul a Japanese company has gone into the grain business. They need transportation so they go into a dozen villages and say to the Koreans "You must furnish pack-horses for us at such and such a price" (being exactly one half the rate which is current in that locality.) Four horses and their groomers are demanded each day from the Koreans in each village. Now in this particular instance there were among the Japanese connected with the company two who were professing Christians. The Koreans, many of whom are Christians, learning of this, went to the Japanese Christians and said "You are Christians and so are we. How is it that we are obliged to give our services to you at half price? This seems to be far from the sort of conduct that should obtain between members of the same faith especially if that faith is Christianity."

The Japanese agreed that it was a hardship but they said that they were only two of the company and they could not stop it, and besides, if they had to pay the full price for transportation the profits would be too small to make the venture a paying one. For these reasons they declined to interfere. We hear someone say "Oh, that is just a canard, the statement of one of those 'friends' of Korea." Well, we answer as we have answered before that if any reader of this magazine will step into the office we will soon put him in the way of learning all about whether it is true or not. If it is not true, why have the people who claim to be suffering the outrage come to Seoul to ask for help to find some means of redress, and if the Japanese claim, that justice is an easy thing for the Korean to get, is true why do these Koreans need foreign help to get the case before the eyes of the authorities? However, come around and be assured that this charge is true, if you dare. If it is not true we will publish a specific apology and retraction. If it is true we will ask you to join with us in a protest to the Japanese authorities against the outrage.

SUMMARY.

The foregoing pages give a glimpse of the actual conditions in Korea. They show with some degree of conclusiveness the following facts.

(1) Japan has effected a forcible protectorate over Korea by which she has broken her own word and involved the United States in an international outrage.

(2) Korea is being exploited solely for the benefit of Japanese capitalists and adventurers.

(3) The Koreans are barred at every point from developing by themselves the resources of the country.

(4) Every effort is being made by Japan to prevent the introduction of Western capital and enterprise into Korea.

(5) The Japanese authorities permit Japanese subjects to carry on forms of business, like the sale of opium and gambling devices, which would never be allowed in Japan.

(6) That ^{admission} no attempt is being made to better the intellectual status of the Koreans by means of education.

(7) That land is being seized all over Korea by Japanese without proper payment.

(8) That Koreans are forced to give their services to Japanese civilians at a mere fraction of the regular wage.

(9) That the Koreans are utterly without means of securing legal redress for wrongs perpetrated upon them.

(10) That fisheries, salt works and other industrial works have been seized and thousands of Koreans driven out of employment.

(11) That the Japanese regime is so corrupt that brigandage is more common than at any time during the past decade.

(12) That Japan has forced Korea to borrow money from her and that this money is used almost solely for the interests of Japanese in Korea.

(13) That Korea swarms with Japanese prostitutes which in some towns have been quartered by the military upon the people; by which means the Korean youth are debauched.

(14) That the Japanese authorities keep putting out specious statements about the success of their administrations but these statements are very far from the facts and are made to cover up a state of things which would make the world cry out against Japan if all were known.

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